January 27, 1983
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
There was a land registration case between Cristina Penullar and Florencio Felix for the declaration of absolute nullity of judicial proceedings in a land registration case. While the case was pending, the land was mortgaged to PNB for a loan by the defendants of the case for declaration of nullity of judicial proceedings.
The CA in that case declared the judicial proceedings void and all Certificates of Title flowing from the proceedings null and void, but at the same time declared the mortgage of PNB valid on the basis of being a mortgagor in good faith.
Penullar claimed that PNB was negligent in allowing the void title to be mortgaged.
RULING:
Whether or not PNB was negligent. - NO.
PNB had a right to rely on the torrens titles presented to it, furthermore, Petitioner Penullar was also found to have been negligent, to wit:
He whose negligence had enabled a third person to cause damages shall, as between two innocent parties, bear the loss – “In the present case, [if herein petitioner] had appealed from the decision in the registration case, no certificate of Title would have been issued just like that in the name of the [petitioner] and no mortgage could have been constituted by them in favor of Bank but as it is, said [petitioner] failed to do that, instead they let the decision in the registration case gain the status of finality; allowed without prior protest, the certificate of title to be issued; did not even as early as possible, annotate an adverse claim on the titles; and they filed this case only several months afterwards, it was their negligence that permitted said adjudicatees in the said registration case to apply for and secure mortgages from the Bank.
Thursday, August 29, 2013
[CASE DIGEST] PENULLAR v. PNB (G.R. No. L-32762)
Sunday, August 25, 2013
How to go to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Central Office in Quezon City, Philippines | Commuting Guide
The CSC is tasked to oversee the workforce in the public sector. Work in the government is funded by taxpayers' money and is vital in achieving cultural, social, political, and economic growth.
The effects of government service permeate across all sectors of society. This is why it is important to set standards and regulations pertaining to the preservation of the dignity and trustworthiness of the civil service.
Located along the stretch of Batasan Road off Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City, the CSC Central Office is located right next to the DSWD Central Office and right across the Batasang Pambansa Complex.
From any point in Metro Manila, the easiest (but not exactly the cheapest) way to go to the CSC Central Office is by booking a Grab ride or hailing a taxi cab.
Alternatively, you can try the following:
Thursday, August 22, 2013
[CASE DIGEST] ARGUELLES v. TIMBANCAYA (G.R. No. L-29052)
July 30, 1976
Ponente: Antonio, J.
FACTS:
Defendant Guillermo Timbancaya appeals directly and on purely questions of law the decision of Palawan CFI. The trial court ruled that the property, subject of plaintiff’s action for reconveyance and by virtue of a compromise agreement and judgment in Special Proceedings No. 211, was owned jointly one-half thereof by Caridad Arguelles and the other half by Guillermo and Alberto Timbancaya.
During the special proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose Arguelles, the court rendered a decision, in conformity with a compromise agreement, adjudicating one half of the land to Arguelles and the other half to the Timbancaya’s. It also ordered both parties to pay for the coconut trees planted in their respective portions of the land, which they relinquish in favor of the other.
Contrary to the agreement and judgment in the special proceedings however, Timbancaya was able to have the original certificate of title cancelled and have a new CT issued in his favor covering the whole land (June 5, 1961), despite Arguelles’ actual open and continuous possession of one half of the property even before the filing of the special proceedings.
Upon knowing the issuance of the TCT, Arguelles filed the instant case for reconveyance (April 30, 1965). Timbancaya, for his part, alleges that Arguelles has no right to the property in question because she is not an heir of the estate of the late Jose Arguelles despite the decision in the special proceedings.
RULING:
Whether or not TCT had already become indefeasible, since almost four years have lapsed before action was filed. - NO.
The rule that a decree of registration once issued becomes final and incontrovertible 1 year after its issuance is not relevant to the case at bar.
Arguelles does not question the validity of the OCT but instead seeks the annulment of the TCT, which was issued to Timbancaya after the judgment by compromise and based on his misrepresentation in the Register of Deeds. Timbancaya had claimed that he and his brother are the exclusive owners of the property as the “only legitimate children and surviving heirs of (their) parents Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes”—a representation contrary to his previous admissions that “they are not the legitimate children of the deceased Spouses Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the sons of Rufina de los Reyes with her first husband, Joaquin Timbancaya.”
In this case, the action to annul the title or action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that “in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.”
This remedy is distinct from that authorized by Section 38, which has for its purpose the reopening of the decree of title, on the ground of fraud, within 1 year from its issuance. Judgment appealed from affirmed.
The rule on the incontrovertible nature of a certificate of title applies when what is involved is the validity of the OCT, not when it concerns that of the TCT.
Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust, should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrong doing.
Friday, August 16, 2013
[FULL CASE] SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS vs. VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO (G.R. No. L- 46364)
April 6, 1990
Ponente: Paras, J.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
Sunday, August 11, 2013
[CASE DIGEST] Dinio v. Laguesma
June 9, 1997 | G.R. No. 108475
Gamaliel Dinion, Ernesto Mangahas, Edgar S. Vinson, and Party for Reform, petitioners
Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, The Committee on Election, Danilo Picadizo, national officers of the PCIBank Employees Union, members of the COMELEC-PCIBEU, respondents
FACTS:
The election of a new set of union officers for the PCIBank Employees Union (PCIBEU) was scheduled after the expiration of the terms of office of the incumbent officers. The election was between Party for Progress and Unity (PPU), with president Nandiego, and Party for Reform (PFR), whose standard bearer was petitioner Dinio.
The PCIBEU board through a Board Resolution, which was not signed by Dinio, formed a Committee on Election (COMELEC).
Two days before the elections, PFR filed with the BLR a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order against the COMELEC, on the grounds that: PCIBEUComelec was not validly constituted; that said committee failed to issue the necessary election guidelines; that official ballots were dispatched to the provincial branches without the knowledge of PFR; and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the elections will be rigged in favor of the other party.
Med-Arbiter granted the TRO.
On appeal, DOLE undersecretary Laguesma declared that the TRO issued by the Med-Arbiter had no force and effect. PFR failed to hurdle the test of “grave or irreparable damage.”
ISSUE:
Whether the TRO issued by the Med-Arbiter was valid – NO.
HELD:
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
The lowdown on law school entrance exams in the Philippines: So you think you have what it takes to become a law student? (part 1 of 4)
While the pursuit of medical studies in the Philippines, on the one hand, normally begins with the NMAT followed by the entrance exam conducted by the university of your choice, the pursuit of law studies, on the other hand, involves the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and the entrance exam conducted by the law school of your choice. Beyond the LSAT, local law schools are free to devise their own formulas to gauge an applicant's mental aptitude and emotional readiness to survive the grueling demands of life as a law student.
Friday, August 2, 2013
[CASE DIGEST] SOTTO v. TEVES (G.R. No. L-38018)
October 31, 1978
Ponente: Guerrero, J.
FACTS:
On June 13, 1967, the herein private respondents filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against petitioner Marcelo Sotto, as administrator of the intestate estate of Filemon Sotto, for the recovery of possession and ownership of the 5 parcels of land described in the complaint, with damages. The complaint was based mainly upon the theory that a trust relation was established and created with respect to the said properties, with Atty. Filemon Sotto as trustee and as cestuis que trust, his mother-in-law, Maria Fadullon Vda. de Rallos; his wife, Carmen Rallos; and his sister-in-law, Concepcion Rallos (predecessor in interest of herein private respondents); and that in gross violation of the trust reposed upon him by Concepcion Rallos and after her death, by her heirs, the said Atty. Filemon Sotto, through sheer manipulation, fraudulent acts and means, non-existent and void decrees, fictitious sales and transfers, succeeded in causing the transfer of the ownership of the properties to the name of his wife Carmen Rallos, and finally to his name alone.
Answering the complaint, petitioner Marcelo Sotto as administrator of the estate of Atty. Filemon Sotto, denied that there was any trust relation between Don Filemon Sotto on one hand and Maria Fadullon Vda. de Rallos, Carmen Rallos and Concepcion Rallos on the other; that granting that such relationship existed between Don Filemon Sotto and Concepcion Rallos, such a relationship could not have endured until the death of Don Filemon Sotto; that the decree of Lot No. 7547 was issued in the name of Carmen Rallos pursuant to an agreement among the heirs of Florentino Rallos that this parcel of land, together with the other parcels of land involved in this case, be adjudicated to Carmen Rallos as her share in the estate of Florentino Rallos, in the same manner that several parcels of land were likewise adjudicated to, and decrees issued in the name of Concepcion Rallos, as her share in the estate of Florentino Rallos; that the partition agreement adjudicating Lots No. 7547 and 1/2 each of Lots Nos. 842, 2179-A and Lots Nos. 123 and 1370 were adjudicated to Carmen Rallos and the other halves of Lot Nos. 842 and 2179 were adjudicated to Maria Fadullon Vda. de Rallos and decrees were accordingly issued later on by the Cadastral Court relative to the said properties of land in pursuance to said partition agreement; that more than 1 year having elapsed from their issuance, the decrees had become indefeasible; that the parcels of land, having been transferred to the purchasers for value and in good faith, the present action for reconveyance will not prosper; that the plaintiffs have no cause of action as the same is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and assuming that there was any trust relation between Atty. Sotto and Concepcion Rallos, the trust was repudiated by Atty. Filemon Sotto a long time ago as shown by the series of transfers of these lots made by him personally. A counterclaim for exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees were also set up.
RTC RULING: The issues having been joined and trial concluded, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered its decision 5 dismissing the complaint, holding that no express trust relation existed between Atty. Filemon Sotto on one hand and Maria Fadullon Vda. de Rallos, Carmen Rallos and Concepcion Rallos on the other with respect to the lots in question; that there was no implied trust subsisting between Atty. Sotto and the said heirs and that there was actual partition between them whereby the 5 lots were given to Carmen Rallos as her share; that Carmen Rallos exercised acts of ownership over the 5 city lots in question to the exclusion of Concepcion Rallos and Maria Fadullon Vda. de Rallos, registering them in her name under the Torrens system; that Concepcion Rallos and her children after her death were thus notified constructively and actually by Carmen Rallos de Sotto's raising the flag of exclusive ownership and repudiation of the trust relation, if there was any, and since then the period of prescription of 10 years for bringing the action tolled against an implied trust. Laches or inaction on the part of Concepcion Rallos and her heirs have thus rendered their demand sale or no longer enforceable.
CA RULING: The heirs of Concepcion Rallos appealed to the Court of Appeals, In the Decision 6 promulgated Nov. 25, 1972, the Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The appellate court agreed with the conclusion of the lower court that no express trust was created between Atty. Filemon Sotto and the heirs of Florentino Rallos by the mere signing of the Mocion in behalf of the heirs of Florentino Rallos.
CA RULING upon the motion for reconsideration was granted:
The above decision of the Appellate Court having been assailed on a Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiffs-appellants, now the herein private respondents, the Court of Appeals, Special Division of Five, reversed the said decision in its Resolution of Sept. 14, 1973. The Court, however, agreed with the ruling of the original decision declaring that the heirs of Florentino Rallos had "by manifesting to the probate court that it was their desire to preserve and maintain the ownership of the inherited properties thereby intended and created by direct and positive acts an express trust among themselves," as it was in conformity with the evidence and the law. 8 The court also noted that "(t)he parties ceased to debate the question as to whether or not an express trust was created by and among the Rallos heirs after our decision was promulgated. They came to agree that such a relationship was indeed created and that it existed. In the present motion for reconsideration, the dispute centers on the issue as to whether the express trust subsisted or it was repudiated. The parties are also in disaccord on the question as to whether Atty. Sotto should be considered a party in the express trust or should be regarded merely as a constructive trustee." 9 The respondent Court of Appeals said that upon the facts and under the law, Atty. Sotto can be regarded as the constructive trustee of his wife and of the widow and descendants of Florentino Rallos; that Atty. Sotto's special relations with the Rallos heirs inhibited him from any act or conduct that could put his interests above or in direct collision with the interests of those who had reposed their trust and confidence in him.
RULING: