Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. and Chung Gai Ship Management, petitioners
Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr., respondent
Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr., respondent
Ponente: Perez, J.
FACTS:
·
On November 6, 1991, Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr.
was was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. on behalf of its principal
Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the
vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) months. Two days
later, he joined the said vessel.
·
After nearly three (3) months of rendering
service and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s
master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason or
explanation. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to
Stolt-Nielsen Transpo’s office where he was transferred employment with another
vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under the same terms and conditions of
the First Contract.
·
The Second Contract was noted and approved by
the POEA on April 23, 1992. In November of the same year, the POEA certified the Second Employment Contract,
without knowledge that Medequillo was actually not deployed with the vessel MV
"Stolt Pride" despite the commencement of the Second Contract on
April 21, 1992.
·
Medequillo made a follow-up with Stolt-Nielsen
but the same refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract. In December
1994, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other employment
documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in exchange
of his signing a document stating that he could not seek employment from other
agencies.
·
On March 6, 1995, Medequillo filed a complaint
before the Adjudication Office of the POEA against Stolt-Nielsen and Chung Gai
Ship for illegal dismissal under the first contract and for failure to deploy
under the second contract.
·
LA Vicente Layawen held that Medequillo was
constructively dismissed by herein petitioners and ordered the latter to pay
the former $12,537.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. The NLRC affirmed the decision of LA Layawen, but
modified the award to $3,636.00. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. Hence, the
instant petition.
RULING:
Whether or
not Medequillo's non-deployment under the second employment contract
constituted an actionable wrong. – YES.
·
Despite Stolt-Nielsen's contention that under
the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition
for the commencement of the employment, the Court held that even without actual
deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of
Stolt-Nielsen and Chung Gai Ship.
·
Even if by the standard contract, employment
commences only "upon actual departure of the seafarer", this does not
mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment without any
valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of Stolt-Nielsen and Chung Gai
Ship of the alleged poor performance of respondent while on board the first ship
MV "Stolt Aspiration" cannot be sustained to justify the
non-deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.
·
Distinction must be made between the
perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the
employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and
respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms
and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship
would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of
hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of
certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of
action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the
seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable
for damages.
Whether or
not the novation of the first employment contract was valid. – YES.
·
Stolt-Nielsen and Chung Gai Ship contend that
the first employment contract between them and Medequillo is different from and
independent of the second contract subsequently executed upon his repatriation
to Manila. However, the Court held that novation took place in this particular
case. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the
first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by
substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person
in the rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the
concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a
previous valid obligation; (2) there must be an agreement of the parties
concerned to a new contract; (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old
contract; and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract.
·
It should be noted, however, that recovery of
damages under the first contract was already time-barred. The prescriptive
period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may initiate money claims
under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. The start of
the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be reckoned on February
1992, which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his repatriation
to Manila. It was at this point in time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of action
already accrued under the first contract. He had until February 1995 to pursue
a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract. With
the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly
beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was
already time-barred.
·
As such, herein petitioners cannot be held
liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the
breach of the second contract