Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS
Francisco Duque III was appointed by PGMA as Chair of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on January 11, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, PGMA issued EO 864, which designated the CSC Chair as a Member of the Board of Directors/Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home Development Mutual Fund (HMDF) in an ex officio capacity.
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the aforecited agencies.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EO 864
- Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
- Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) expressly states that the Chair of the CSC shall be a member of the Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, such as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar boards as may be created by law.
- Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution mandates, among others, that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, and shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
- PD No. 1 dated September 24, 1972, explicitly empowers the President of the Republic of the Philippines to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the National Government, as a vital and priority measure to effect the desired changes and reforms in the social, economic and political structure of the country.
FUNA'S ARGUMENTS
- EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance of its government functions.
- Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 unduly and unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC.
- The charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF do not mention that the CSC Chair sits as a member of their governing Boards in an ex officio capacity.
- The President may not amend the Congress-enacted charters of the subject agencies by the mere issuance of an executive order.
- EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment.
RULING
Petition partially granted. (a) Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 is constitutional; while (b) EO No. 864 is unconstitutional.
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions? – YES.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions -- the CSC, Comelec, and COA -- as "independent."Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions.
To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit: (a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure; (b) Engaging in the practice of any profession; (c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and (d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or – controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure.
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position, Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. The President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
And finally, Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Whether Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 allows for Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF unconstitutional. – NO
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
A closer look at the powers and functions of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF would show that while these agencies are granted powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, they are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are NOT personnel-related (e.g., imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions for GSIS, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers for PHILHEALTH, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations for HDMF).
These powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chair sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are NOT anymore derived from his position as CSC Chair.
Whether Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is constitutional. – YES.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chair’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chair. The CSC Chair’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
What are the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality of Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF?
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, ifthe office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
The De Facto Officer Doctrine
"In cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office."
In fine, all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.
Whether Funa has locus standi/legal standing to file the instant petition. – YES.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act. But the rule on locus standi is a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly: (a) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (b) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (c) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (d) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
The present petition is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has "far-reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. As such, Funa is allowed to institute the instant petition.
Whether the instant petition is moot and academic. – YES
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value
During the pendency of this petition, Duque’s designation as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and PHIC could have terminated or been rendered invalid by the enactment of RA No. 10149, thus causing this petition and the main issue tendered herein moot and academic.
Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The situation now obtaining definitely falls under the requirements for the review of a moot and academic case. The Court will therefore not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review, the cessation of the controversy notwithstanding.
DOCTRINE
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself.