Monday, March 2, 2020

[CASE DIGEST] MYLENE CARVAJAL v. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK and/or OSCAR Z. RAMIREZ (G.R. No. 186169)


August 1, 2012 

Ponente: Perez, J.

FACTS:

·         Mylene Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon Development Bank (LDB) in October 2003 under a six-month probationary employment contract. At the time, Oscar Ramirez was LDB's President and Chief Executive Officer.

·         In December 2003, LDB sent Carvajal a Memorandum directing her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for "chronic tardiness" on November 3, 5, 6, 14, 18, 20, 21 and 28 2003 or for a total of eight (8) times. She apologized in writing and explained that she was in the process of making adjustments regarding her work and house chores. She was thus reprimanded in writing and reminded of her status as a probationary employee.

·         In January 2004, a second Memorandum was sent to Carvajal directing her to explain why she should not be suspended for "chronic tardiness" on 13 occasions or on December 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, and 23, 2003. In January 2004, Carvajal submitted her written explanation and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions.

·         On January 12, 2004, Carvajal was informed, through a Memorandum, of her suspension for three (3) working days without pay effective January 21, 2004. Finally, in a Memorandum dated January 22, 2004, Carvajal's suspension was lifted but in the same breath, her employment was terminated effective January 23, 2004. This prompted Carvajal to file an action before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against LDB. 

·         LDB explained that Carvajal was dismissed on three grounds: 1) chronic tardiness; 2) unauthorized absence; and 3) failure to perform satisfactorily as a probationary employee. LDB explained that Carvajal was a chronic violator of the bank’s rules and regulations on tardiness and absenteeism. Aside from her numerous tardiness, she was absent without leave for 2 days. She also cleared a check which later turned out to be a bounced check. Finally, Carvajal garnered only a rating of 2.17, with 4 being the highest and 1 the lowest, in her performance evaluation.

·         Labor Arbiter: Ruled that Carvajal was illegally dismissed. The LA held LDB and its CEO, Ramirez, solidarily liable for payment of Carvajal's money claims amounting to  P20,070, representing full backwages of complainant from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the end of her probationary contract of employment with LDB, plus, 10% of the monetary award as attorney’s fee. / The LA also found that Carvajal was dismissed without due process because "she was not afforded the notice in writing informing her of what respondent LDB would like to bring out to her for the latter to answer in writing." The LA also did not consider "unsatisfactory performance" as a valid ground to shorten the six-month contract of Carvajal with the Bank.

·         NLRC: It was Carvajal, not LDB, who appealed the LA's decision before the NLRC. Carvajal claimed that she should be considered a regular employee on account of the fact that LDB did not inform her of the standards she should adhere to in the function of her duties as an employee on probation. Her basis was Book VI, Rule 1, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which states that, "Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee."

·         The NLRC partially affirmed LA's ruling. But it deleted money claims and instead ordered LDB to reinstate Carvajal to her former position, without loss of any seniority  rights and other monetary benefits and to pay her full backwages from the date of her dismissal to the date of her reinstatement, actual or in payroll.

·         CA: Reversed NLRC ruling. CA held that Carvajal was not entitled to backwages because she was rightfully dismissed for failure to meet the employment standards. Hence, the instant petition.

RULING: 

CA ruling affirmed.




Whether Carvajal was informed of her functions and the standards she should adhere to as an employee on probationary status. – YES.

·         At the time of her engagement and as mandated by law, Carvajal was informed in writing of the standards necessary to qualify her as a regular employee. Carvajal knew, at the time of her engagement, that she must comply with the standards set forth by LDB and perform satisfactorily in order to attain regular status. She was apprised of her functions and duties as a trainee-teller. LDB released to Carvajal its evaluation of her performance where she was found wanting. 

·         Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector. As a matter of fact, habitual tardiness is a serious offense that may very well constitute gross or habitual neglect of duty, a just cause to dismiss a regular employee. Assuming that Carvajal was not apprised of the standards concomitant to her job, it is but common sense that she must abide by the work hours imposed by LDB.

·         As stated in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., the rule on reasonable standards made known to the employee prior to engagement should not be used to exculpate a probationary employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense, in regard to which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met.

·         Since LDB did not challenge NLRC's ruling that Carvajal should be reinstated, then she should be entitled to be reinstated as a probationary employee. But the determination of whether she can qualify to become one of LDB’s regular employees is still within the well recognized management’s prerogative..

Whether Carvajal was illegally dismissed. – NO.

·         Carvajal was validly dismissed from probationary employment before the expiration of her 6-month probationary employment contract for her failure to adhere to the reasonable standards prescribed by LDB. 

·         A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281 (now 287) of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an authorized cause and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

·         In the instant case, the primary cause of Carvajal's dismissal from her probationary employment was her "chronic tardiness." At the very start of her employment, she already exhibited poor working habits. Even during her first month on the job, she already incurred eight (8) tardiness. In a Memorandum dated 11 December 2003, she was warned that her tardiness might affect her opportunity to become a permanent or regular employee. And Carvajal did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the cause of her tardiness.

·         LDB also cited other infractions such as unauthorized leaves of absence, mistake in clearing of a check, and underperformance. All of these infractions were not refuted by Carvajal.




Whether LDB failed to observe due process when it ordered the dismissal of Carvajal from the company without notice and hearing. – NO.

·         In Carvajal's letter of appointment, LDB reserved the right to "immediately terminate this contract in the event of a below satisfactory performance, serious disregard of company rules and policies and other reasons critical to its interests."

·         In Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. v. Magtibay, Jr., the Court held that: "Unlike under the first ground for the valid termination of probationary employment which is for just cause, the second ground failure to qualify in accordance with the standards prescribed by employer does not require notice and hearing. Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known to him at the time of his probationary employment. By the very nature of a probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and his performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous scrutiny by his superiors. It is in apprising him of the standards against which his performance shall be continuously assessed where due process regarding the second ground lies, and not in notice and hearing as in the case of the first ground."

·         LDB complied with the basic requirements of due process as defined in PDI v. Magtibay, Jr. Carvajal had more than sufficient knowledge of the standards her job entails. LDB had not been remiss in reminding her, through memoranda, of the standards that should be observed in aspiring for regularization. She was even notified in two (2) memoranda regarding the bank’s displeasure over her chronic tardiness. Every memorandum directed her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action. Each time, she acknowledged her fault and assured the bank that she would, in her daily schedules, make adjustments to make amends. This certainly is compliance with due process.