Ponente: Recto, J.
FACTS:
·
North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) was the owner of
a site in which was located its sugar central, with its factory building and
residence for its employees and laborers, known as the "mill site."
It also owned the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda
"Begoña." Across its properties, NNSC constructed a road connecting
the "mill site" with the provincial highway. Through this road
plaintiff allowed vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each
truck or automobile. Pedestrians were allowed free passage through it.
·
One of the users of said road was Serafin
Hidalgo, the owner of a billiard hall and a tuba saloon located at Hacienda
Sañgay adjacent to NNSC's mill site. Like other people in and about the place,
Hidalgo used to pass through the said road because it was his only means of
access to Hacienda Sañgay. Later on, by NNSC' order, every time that Hidago
passed by driving his automobile with a cargo of tuba, NNSC's gatekeeper would
stop him and prevent him from passing through said road. In such cases, Hidalgo
merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda Sañgay
across the fields of Hacienda "Begoña," which also belonged to NNSC.
·
In October 1933, NNSC filed before the CFI of
Negros Occidental a complaint praying that an injunction be issued, restraining
Serafin Hidalgo from entering or passing through NNSC's properties, specially
through the "mill site." NNSC alleged that Hidalgo caused trouble
among the peaceful people of the place by disturbing public order and molesting
NNSC's employees and their families. The CFI ruled in favor of NNSC and issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting Hidalgo from using said road.
·
After the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, NNSC decided to amend its complaint by dropping its allegations
against Hidalgo. It turned out that NNSC merely fabricated the allegations and
failed to state that the subject road was in fact open for the public to use.
The real damage which NNSC sought to avoid, as it were, did not consist in
Hidalgo's taking tuba with him while traversing the NNSC's property, as there
was no causal relation between the act and any resultant damage, but in the
fact that tuba was disposed of at the Hacienda Sañgay to which NNSC's laborers
had access. As a result, said laborers would ingest tuba, become drunk, and
occasionally fight against one another, to the detriment of the peace in NNSC's
property and the sugar production.
RULING:
Whether
NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from using its road. – NO.
·
NNSC's road is an easement of way voluntarily
constituted in favor of a community. Art. 531 of the old Civil Code read that
"easements may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons
or of a community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong," while
Art. 594 of the old Civil Code provided that, "The owner of an estate may
burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form
as he may consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law or public
order."
·
It is undisputed the road in question was
constructed by NNSC on its own land, and that it connected the central or the
"mill site" with the provincial road. NNSC also made this road
accessible to the general public, regardless of class or group of persons or
entities. Its use has been extended to employees and laborers of NNSC, and so
also to all those who have a mind to pass through it, except that, in cases of
motor vehicles, a passage fee of P0.15, each should be paid.
·
It has also been sufficiently proven in court
that NNSC's road was the only road that can be used by those living in Hacienda
Sañgay because they didn't have access to the provincial road. Therefore, under
Art. 564 of the old Civil Code, there existed a forcible right of way in favor
of the owner and occupants of Hacienda Sañgay. Property becomes clothed with a
public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large.
·
Therefore, as a private property affected with
a public interest, it is unlawful to make arbitrary exceptions with respect to
its use and enjoyment. The circumstance that NNSC is not the holder of a
franchise or certificate of public convenience, or that it is a company devoted
principally to the manufacturer of sugar and not to the business of public
service or that the state has not as yet assumed control or jurisdiction over
the operation of the road in question by NNSC, does not preclude the idea that
the said road is a public utility.
·
All told, Hidalgo cannot be enjoined from
using said road for no valid cause, especially since he complies with the
condition set by NNSC to pay P0.15 as toll every time he uses said road. He
cannot be arbitrarily or whimsically excluded from its use.
Whether
NNSC was in good faith when it filed for an injunction to prevent Hidalgo from
using its road. – NO.
·
The existence of a right violated is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. The alleged conveyance of tuba
to NNSC's "mill site" or the sale thereof within its property has not
been established by the evidence adduced in this case. Neither is there any
evidence to show that Hidalgo actually created disturbance in NNSC's
properties, including its "mill site." In other words, there has been
a failure on NNSC's part to establish either the existence of a clear and
positive right specially calling for judicial protection through an
extraordinary writ of the kind applied for, or that Hidalgo has committed or
attempts to commit any act which has endanger or tends to endanger the
existence of said right, or has injured or threatens to injure the same.
·
The legal rule is that what the law does not
authorize to be done directly cannot be hone indirectly. If NNSC cannot
judicially enjoin Hidalgo from selling tuba at Hacienda Sañgay, neither can it
obtain said injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to
transport tuba to that place as long as Hidalgo is ready to pay the transit
fees required by NNSC and does not sell the said goods inside the said
property.
·
NNSC's action is frivolous and baseless. In
petitioning the courts for an injunction to avert "friction or
ill-feeling" against Hidalgo, NNSC is in effect attempting to intrust to
the courts a mission at once beyond those conferred upon them by the
Constitution and the laws, and unbecoming of their dignity and decorum.
·
The well-known principle of equity that
"he who comes to equity must come with clean hands" bars the granting
of the remedy applied for by NNSC. To
obtain a preliminary injunction in this case, NNSC alleged under oath in its
original complaint facts which it knew to be false, or, at least, unprobable,
because it did not only eliminate them from the amended complaint which it
filed after the issuance of the preliminary injunction, but it failed to
substantiate them at the trial. From all this, it follows that NNSC, in order
to obtain a preliminary injunction, trifled with the good faith of the lower
court by knowingly making untrue allegations on matters important and essential
to its cause of action. Consequently, it did not come to court with clean
hands.
CONCURRING
AND DISSENTING: J. Laurel
·
No servitude of way under the (old) Civil Code
has been created on the tenement of the NNSC in favor of Hidalgo. No legal
servitude of way exists in the present case. Hidalgo has not shown that his
right of passage across the tenement of NNSC exists by reason of necessity
growing out of the peculiar location of his property. He does not even own the
tenement where he conducts his business.
·
NNSC's construction of a road, performed
wholly upon its own exclusive property, should not be construed to constitute
the creation of a servitude. Servitus in faciendo consistere nequit. "For
a man should not use that which belongs to him as if it were a service only,
but as his own property."
·
The mere opening of the private way in
question to the public did not necessarily clothe it with a public interest
such as to compel the owner thereof to allow everybody to pass thereon. Even on
the hypothesis that such private way is affected with a public interest, still,
it is good law that the owner thereof may make reasonable restrictions and
limitations on the use thereof by the general public.
·
NNSC was denied the right as the owner of the
private way to impose a reasonable limitation upon the use of its
property. Hidalgo in his store sells and
otherwise dispenses tuba which intoxicates the laborers of NNSC, incapacitates
them for work, and breaks their morale. The damage to NNSC is positive and
real. It is not mere "bare possibility." Therefore, NNSC may prohibit
Hidalgo from using its private property. Stated otherwise, the use by Hidalgo
of the private way of NNSC may be conditioned upon his not carrying tuba.
·
Nonetheless, J. Laurel still concurs with the
majority opinion that a writ of injunction should not be issued in favor of
NNSC because: (a) the relief sought for by NNSC is an "accion
negatoria," which has been repealed by the (old) Civil Code; (b) the
granting/denial of an injunction is not subject to appeal except where there is
a clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, which abuse is
absent in this case; (c) the remedy sought here is not against the
transportation of tuba by Hidalgo through the premises of NNSC, but the entire
exclusion therefrom of Hidalgo regardless of whether he carries tuba or not;
and (d) issuing the writ of injunction in favor of NNSC will result in a
discriminatory and unjust condition where Hidalgo shall become the sole person
excluded from the use of the subject road while the general public will still
be able to use it.
DISSENTING:
J. Villareal
·
Writ of injunction should be issued in favor
of NNSC because as the owner of the private road in question, NNSC has a right
to regulate its use by imposing reasonable restrictions and limitations. To
prohibit its use by Hidalgo who has repeatedly disregarded the warning of
NNSC's auditor not to use the road when delivering tuba, thus becoming a
persona non grata, is certainly not unjust.