August 25, 2010
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS
Armelo J. Lamayo was a machinist at Negros Metal Corp. In 2002, he was called out by William Uy, Sr., company manager, for being at the foundry grinding some tools. As a machinist, Lamayo was not supposed to be working at the foundry. Nonetheless, he said he was there because he was using the bigger grinding machine to finish his work faster.
Subsequently, Lamayo was charged with loitering and incurred a warning. He was suspended twice: the first for three days (for the warning), and the second for 10 days (for failing to sign the memorandum suspending him earlier).
After serving the second suspension, Lamayo reported for work, only to be told that he had been dismissed from the company.
Lamayo later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter. In lieu of a position paper, the company filed a Manifestation contending that the complaint should be dismissed because the LA had no jurisdiction over it since, under their CBA, such matters must first be brought before the company's grievance machinery.
LA RULING: Lamayo was illegally terminated.
NLRC RULING: Set aside the LA's ruling. Remanded the case to the LA for disposition based on the company's grievance procedure.
CA RULING: Reversed NLRC ruling and reinstated LA ruling. Lamayo was illegally terminated.
The company was insisting that contrary to the CA's ruling, Lamayo's complaint should have first been heard at the company's grievance machinery as per the CBA before being filed at the LA. Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Wednesday, May 27, 2020
Monday, May 25, 2020
[GUIDE] Here's a complete guide on how to transfer your RDO in BIR
For administrative feasibility, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) – the principal government agency tasked to assess and collect taxes for the Philippine government – is broken down into several regional district offices or RDOs. An RDO, as its name suggests, is an office of the BIR that caters to tax matters concerning taxpayers within a specific area or region.
Imagine if all taxpayers are required to file their returns and address their other tax concerns to one and only one BIR office – that would be total madness, given the millions of taxpayers and the endless array of tax concerns.
So depending on where you are employed or where you are doing business in, it is important to know under whose RDO jurisdiction you fall under. Note that RDOs are distinguished by numeric codes. For example, the RDO for taxpayers in the northern section of Quezon City is RDO 048. This bit of information will prove helpful should you need to talk to someone from the BIR for any tax concern you may have in the future.
Your RDO must be up to date at all times. This means that your tax identification number or TIN must always be registered with the proper RDO of the place where you are currently employed or doing business in. Otherwise, it is imperative to transfer your TIN to the proper RDO.
Imagine if all taxpayers are required to file their returns and address their other tax concerns to one and only one BIR office – that would be total madness, given the millions of taxpayers and the endless array of tax concerns.
So depending on where you are employed or where you are doing business in, it is important to know under whose RDO jurisdiction you fall under. Note that RDOs are distinguished by numeric codes. For example, the RDO for taxpayers in the northern section of Quezon City is RDO 048. This bit of information will prove helpful should you need to talk to someone from the BIR for any tax concern you may have in the future.
Your RDO must be up to date at all times. This means that your tax identification number or TIN must always be registered with the proper RDO of the place where you are currently employed or doing business in. Otherwise, it is imperative to transfer your TIN to the proper RDO.
Saturday, May 23, 2020
[CASE DIGESTS] HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE v. COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET LUMBER COMPANY, represented by its President TAN ENG LAY (G.R. No. 126881)
October 3, 2000
Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS
Following World War II, brothers Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay pooled their resources together and allegedly entered into a partnership to sell lumber and construction supplies in Baguio City. They named their enterprise "Benguet Lumber" which they jointly managed until Tan Eng Kee's death.
In 1981, Tan Eng Lay and his children caused the conversion of the partnership "Benguet Lumber" into a corporation called "Benguet Lumber Company." The incorporation was purportedly a ruse to deprive Tan Eng Kee and his heirs of their rightful participation in the profits of the business.
After the death of Tan Eng Kee in 1984, his common-law spouse Matilde and their five children Teresita, Nena, Clarita, Carlos, Corazon and Elpidio -- collectively known as the heirs of Tan Eng Kee -- filed an action against Tan Eng Lay for accounting, liquidation and winding up of the alleged partnership.
RTC RULING: Benguet Lumber was a joint venture akin to a particular partnership. As such, Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay were joint adventurers and/or partners in a business venture and/or particular partnership called Benguet Lumber, both of whom should share in the profits and/or losses of the business venture or particular partnership
CA RULING: Reversed RTC and ruled there was no partnership between Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS
Following World War II, brothers Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay pooled their resources together and allegedly entered into a partnership to sell lumber and construction supplies in Baguio City. They named their enterprise "Benguet Lumber" which they jointly managed until Tan Eng Kee's death.
In 1981, Tan Eng Lay and his children caused the conversion of the partnership "Benguet Lumber" into a corporation called "Benguet Lumber Company." The incorporation was purportedly a ruse to deprive Tan Eng Kee and his heirs of their rightful participation in the profits of the business.
After the death of Tan Eng Kee in 1984, his common-law spouse Matilde and their five children Teresita, Nena, Clarita, Carlos, Corazon and Elpidio -- collectively known as the heirs of Tan Eng Kee -- filed an action against Tan Eng Lay for accounting, liquidation and winding up of the alleged partnership.
RTC RULING: Benguet Lumber was a joint venture akin to a particular partnership. As such, Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay were joint adventurers and/or partners in a business venture and/or particular partnership called Benguet Lumber, both of whom should share in the profits and/or losses of the business venture or particular partnership
CA RULING: Reversed RTC and ruled there was no partnership between Tan Eng Kee and Tan Eng Lay.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Tuesday, May 19, 2020
[CASE DIGEST] GEORGE I. RIVERA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 115147)
January 4, 1995
Ponente: Vitug, J.
FACTS
George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Sometime in the late 1980s, he dealt with one of LBP's clients, Wynner, regarding the latter's pending loan application with the bank. Rivera promised Jesus Perez, Wynner's marketing manager, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission.
When the loan was approved, Rivera received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds. William Lao, an investor at Wynner, also gave Rivera P20,000.00 pocket money for the latter's trip to the US, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to HK.
On top of these, while still working at LBP, Rivera also served as personal consultant of Lao in various companies where the latter had investments. For his consulting services, Rivera drew and received salaries and allowances amounting to approximately P20,000.00 a month as evidenced by vouchers.
When LBP got wind of Rivera' violations, he was charged with the following: (a)Dishonesty; (b) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; (c) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; (d) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; and (e) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337, resulting in misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.
On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which upheld the guilt of Rivera. But the MSPB noted that since this was the first offense on Garcia's record, the penalty of forced resignation without separation benefits and gratuities should be reduced to one (1) year suspension.
LBP subsequently filed an appeal before the CSC, which held that LBP's original decision (i.e., forced resignation and without separation benefits and gratuities) should be upheld.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Ponente: Vitug, J.
FACTS
George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Sometime in the late 1980s, he dealt with one of LBP's clients, Wynner, regarding the latter's pending loan application with the bank. Rivera promised Jesus Perez, Wynner's marketing manager, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission.
When the loan was approved, Rivera received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds. William Lao, an investor at Wynner, also gave Rivera P20,000.00 pocket money for the latter's trip to the US, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to HK.
On top of these, while still working at LBP, Rivera also served as personal consultant of Lao in various companies where the latter had investments. For his consulting services, Rivera drew and received salaries and allowances amounting to approximately P20,000.00 a month as evidenced by vouchers.
When LBP got wind of Rivera' violations, he was charged with the following: (a)Dishonesty; (b) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; (c) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; (d) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; and (e) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337, resulting in misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.
On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which upheld the guilt of Rivera. But the MSPB noted that since this was the first offense on Garcia's record, the penalty of forced resignation without separation benefits and gratuities should be reduced to one (1) year suspension.
LBP subsequently filed an appeal before the CSC, which held that LBP's original decision (i.e., forced resignation and without separation benefits and gratuities) should be upheld.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Wednesday, May 13, 2020
[CASE DIGEST] PHILEX MINING v. CIR (G.R. No 125704)
FACTS
In 1992, theBIR sent a letter to mining company Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities amounting to P123,821,982.52. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities, stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it had paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P119,977,037.02 plus interest. Therefore, these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.
The BIR dismissed the protest, arguing that since these pending claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty, it follows that no legal compensation can take place.
Ruling on Philex’s appeal, the CTA held that taxes cannot be subject to set-off on compensation since a claim for taxes is not a debt or contract.
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of BIR.
Taxes cannot be subject to legal compensation to be offset against tax refunds for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt: debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.
The SC also emphasized that the argument stating that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner is no longer without any support in statutory law.
In 1992, theBIR sent a letter to mining company Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities amounting to P123,821,982.52. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities, stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it had paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P119,977,037.02 plus interest. Therefore, these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.
The BIR dismissed the protest, arguing that since these pending claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty, it follows that no legal compensation can take place.
Ruling on Philex’s appeal, the CTA held that taxes cannot be subject to set-off on compensation since a claim for taxes is not a debt or contract.
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of BIR.
Taxes cannot be subject to legal compensation to be offset against tax refunds for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt: debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.
The SC also emphasized that the argument stating that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner is no longer without any support in statutory law.
Sunday, May 10, 2020
[CASE DIGEST] ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY v. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC. (G.R. No. 172642)
June 13, 2012
Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc., since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun (senior crewman of the deck department and is responsible for the components of a ship's hull) on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in GCI's vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.
Nelson's employment contract expired on August 13, 2000. He died 25 days later due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia.
At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI's collective bargaining agent. Nelson's widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was declared deadlocked as GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen refused to grant the benefits sought by Merridy Jane.
On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Three days later, Joven Mar, Nelson's brother, received P20k from GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen pursuant to Article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a certification acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability.
Merridy Jane contended that she was entitled to the aggregate sum of US$90k pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the CBA, and that the P20k already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment of the total claim.
GCI, on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter's death. Nelson also had no claims against GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI.
They further alleged that Merridy Jane was not entitled to death benefits because GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen are only liable for such in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract and the cause of his death is not work-related. Nonetheless, they admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 of the CBA.
LABOR ARBITER: Ruled in favor of Merridy Jane by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. It ordered GCI to pay P4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90k less P20k, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the proximate cause of Nelsons death was not work-related.
NLRC: Affirmed the LA's decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latter's ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson's death.
CA: Reversed the NLRC's ruling and referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for the designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator or the constitution of a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the applicable CBA provision.
The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane was a money claim, the same basically involved the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belonged to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc., since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun (senior crewman of the deck department and is responsible for the components of a ship's hull) on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in GCI's vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.
Nelson's employment contract expired on August 13, 2000. He died 25 days later due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia.
At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI's collective bargaining agent. Nelson's widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was declared deadlocked as GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen refused to grant the benefits sought by Merridy Jane.
On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Three days later, Joven Mar, Nelson's brother, received P20k from GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen pursuant to Article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a certification acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability.
Merridy Jane contended that she was entitled to the aggregate sum of US$90k pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the CBA, and that the P20k already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment of the total claim.
GCI, on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter's death. Nelson also had no claims against GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI.
They further alleged that Merridy Jane was not entitled to death benefits because GCI and Aboitiz Jebsen are only liable for such in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract and the cause of his death is not work-related. Nonetheless, they admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 of the CBA.
LABOR ARBITER: Ruled in favor of Merridy Jane by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. It ordered GCI to pay P4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90k less P20k, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the proximate cause of Nelsons death was not work-related.
NLRC: Affirmed the LA's decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latter's ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson's death.
CA: Reversed the NLRC's ruling and referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for the designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator or the constitution of a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the applicable CBA provision.
The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane was a money claim, the same basically involved the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belonged to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Thursday, May 7, 2020
[CASE DIGEST] CIR v. MARUBENI (G.R. No. 137377)
December 18, 2001
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS
The CIR assessed Marubeni, a Japanese corporation engaged in business, for deficiency income, branch profit remittance, contractors and commercial brokers taxes arising from undeclared income from two contracts in the Philippines.
Marubeni filed two petitions before the CTA questioning the said assessment, followed by an application for tax amnesty pursuant to E.O. No. 41.
Subsequently, the coverage of E.O. No. 41 was expanded, prompting Marubeni to file a supplementary tax amnesty return.
The CIR was contending that Marubeni did not properly avail of the tax amnesty because Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 41 provided that "those with income tax cases already filed in Court as of the effectivity hereof" may not avail themselves of the amnesty.
RULING
SC ruled in favor of Marubeni.
With respect to income taxes, Marubeni properly availed of the tax amnesty because the point of reference is the date of effectivity of E.O. No. 41.
The filing of income tax cases in court must have been made before and as of the date of effectivity of E.O. No. 41.
In this case, the 2 CTA cases were filed last September while E.O. 41 took effect in October. However, with respect to contractors tax assessment and estate and donors tax and tax on business, Marubeni cannot avail of the tax amnesty.
E.O. No. 64 has no provision on who cannot avail of the tax amnesty but it provides that provisions of E.O. 41 which are not contradicting are applicable also. A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law.
If granted, the terms of the amnesty, like that of a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. For the right of taxation is inherent in government.
Tuesday, May 5, 2020
HERE'S WHY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD DO AWAY WITH THE TOP 10 BAR PASSERS LIST
It's that time of the year again when the general public is yet again treated to a media frenzy revolving around the release by the Supreme Court of the list of law graduates who passed the most recent Bar Exams.
The Philippines is probably just about the only country on the planet where the results of the Bar Exams are treated very much like a kitschy spectacle. This is sad because in an idea world, the announcement of the results of the Bar Exams should be routine and matter of factly, not raucous and dramatic.
It doesn't help that the Supreme Court of the Philippines has continuously pandered to this fiesta-like tradition. This time of the year for so long, the Supreme Court would set up a platform at its courtyard in Padre Faura, Manila, complete with loud speakers and giant LCD monitors flashing the names of passers before a huge crowd.
For an institution insistent on decorum and rules of procedure, instigating a frenzy sounds positively mental.
This year, however, with the Philippines still reeling from the devastation wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court has decided to ditch the usual festivities at its building in Manila and instead opt for an online-only affair. It was quick to point out that while the shift to online release of results would mean foregoing the public fiesta in Padre Faura, all other traditions will remain in place, including the release of the top 10 Bar passers with the highest scores.
Again, the Philippines is just about the only country in the world that does this. Why the Supreme Court continues to do this bothers the mind. Clearly, it sees no urgency in setting itself apart from the Professional Regulatory Commission, which likewise routinely releases top 10 highest-scoring passers in all the licensure exams it conducts -- from the CPA Board Exam to the pen and paper Sub-Professional Civil Service Exam and everything else in between.
To say that releasing a top 10 list of passers is problematic amounts to a gross understatement. Beyond the usual question of whether doing such serves a vital public purpose (hint: it doesn't), there are also a host of attendant issues that necessarily come with it.
Here are some of the reasons why the Supreme Court of the Philippines should once and for all completely do away with the release of the top 10 list of Bar passers:
The Philippines is probably just about the only country on the planet where the results of the Bar Exams are treated very much like a kitschy spectacle. This is sad because in an idea world, the announcement of the results of the Bar Exams should be routine and matter of factly, not raucous and dramatic.
It doesn't help that the Supreme Court of the Philippines has continuously pandered to this fiesta-like tradition. This time of the year for so long, the Supreme Court would set up a platform at its courtyard in Padre Faura, Manila, complete with loud speakers and giant LCD monitors flashing the names of passers before a huge crowd.
For an institution insistent on decorum and rules of procedure, instigating a frenzy sounds positively mental.
This year, however, with the Philippines still reeling from the devastation wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court has decided to ditch the usual festivities at its building in Manila and instead opt for an online-only affair. It was quick to point out that while the shift to online release of results would mean foregoing the public fiesta in Padre Faura, all other traditions will remain in place, including the release of the top 10 Bar passers with the highest scores.
Again, the Philippines is just about the only country in the world that does this. Why the Supreme Court continues to do this bothers the mind. Clearly, it sees no urgency in setting itself apart from the Professional Regulatory Commission, which likewise routinely releases top 10 highest-scoring passers in all the licensure exams it conducts -- from the CPA Board Exam to the pen and paper Sub-Professional Civil Service Exam and everything else in between.
To say that releasing a top 10 list of passers is problematic amounts to a gross understatement. Beyond the usual question of whether doing such serves a vital public purpose (hint: it doesn't), there are also a host of attendant issues that necessarily come with it.
Here are some of the reasons why the Supreme Court of the Philippines should once and for all completely do away with the release of the top 10 list of Bar passers:
Sunday, May 3, 2020
[CASE DIGEST] TADEJA v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 145336)
February 20, 2013
Ponente: Sereno, J.
Ponente: Sereno, J.
FACTS:
·
Ruben Bernardo was killed on the eve of May 3,
1994 during the town fiesta of Barangay Talabaan in Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. Five men, all surnamed Tadeja, were charged with homicide (Criminal
Case No. Z-814). Meanwhile, one of the Tadejas filed a criminal case for
frustrated homicide against the two sons of the victim (Criminal Case No.
Z-815). These cases were later consolidated.
·
According to the witnesses of the prosecution
in Criminal Case No. Z-814, the five Tadejas, armed with bolos and sanggots,
hacked the victim to death. The accused denied the charge against them and
interposed alibis as defenses.
·
After the joint hearing, the trial court ruled
against the accused and found them guilty of homicide. The trial court also
acquitted the sons of the victim in the charge filed against them.
·
Four of the five Tadejas filed an appeal
before the CA, claiming that the trial court failed to consider the testimonies
of the witnesses presented. It was their posture that the testimonies of said
witnesses (both appearing for the Bernardos, as prosecution witnesses in Z-814
and defense witnesses in Z-814) contradicted each other on material and
substantial matters. The Tadejas claimed that one of the witnesses' testimony
showed that Ruben Bernardo was completely alone when found wounded, which was
contrary to the statement of the other witnesses. They claimed that this
inconsistency could have entitled them to an acquittal.
·
CA: Appeal denied on the ground that the
testimonies of the defense witnesses in Criminal Case No. Z-815 do not
adversely affect the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case
No. Z-814.
·
SC: Affirmed CA. Denied petitioners’ subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration, Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment, and
Second Motion for Reconsideration.
·
Following the SC’s ruling in 2006, one of the
convicted men, Plaridel, executed a confession that it was him who killed
Ruben. This prompted the other convicted to file a Motion to Vacate Judgment
Due to Supervening Event. The other convicted men argued that Plaridel’s
confession was a newly discovered evidence that warranted the reopening of the
case.
RULING:
Friday, May 1, 2020
CAREER OPTIONS FOR FILIPINO LAWYERS IN THE PHILIPPINES
The law profession has been consistently ranked as one of the highest-paying professions in the Philippines. In addition, some of the most notable business and political figures in the country are lawyers, too. No wonder then that a lot of people aspire to become part of this noble profession.
In the Philippines, only Filipino lawyers are allowed to practice law. Note, too, that Filipino lawyers cannot practice law overseas unless they have taken that country's Bar Exam. So unlike engineers, nurses, and even doctors, it is worth pointing out that Filipino lawyers stay put in the country for the most part and decide to build their careers here.
There are a variety of career tracks that Filipino lawyers can take and specialize in. The breadth and scope of law as a professional field gives lawyers plenty of opportunities for employment in a wide array of industries: from corporate to litigation to mining and media to just about any other field there is.
The choice of where to build one's legal career in depends in large part on the lawyer's own prefences, specialization, and personal convictions. Here are some of the career options Fiipino lawyers have:
In the Philippines, only Filipino lawyers are allowed to practice law. Note, too, that Filipino lawyers cannot practice law overseas unless they have taken that country's Bar Exam. So unlike engineers, nurses, and even doctors, it is worth pointing out that Filipino lawyers stay put in the country for the most part and decide to build their careers here.
There are a variety of career tracks that Filipino lawyers can take and specialize in. The breadth and scope of law as a professional field gives lawyers plenty of opportunities for employment in a wide array of industries: from corporate to litigation to mining and media to just about any other field there is.
The choice of where to build one's legal career in depends in large part on the lawyer's own prefences, specialization, and personal convictions. Here are some of the career options Fiipino lawyers have:
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