Ponente: Hilado, J.
FACTS
On March 4, 1945, Juan Francisco was arrested and subsequently detained in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro on charges of robbery. On the same day, he sought and was granted permission to go to his house to obtain payment for his bail. Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel was detailed to guard him.
Upon reaching the house, Juan went to a room upstairs where his wife Emilia Taladtad and their one-and-a-half year old son Romeo were at. Sgt. Pimentel stayed at the foot of the stairs.
Later on, Sgt. Pimentel heard a woman scream, prompting him to go upstairs where he saw Emilia rushing out of the room with a stab on her right breast. He then saw the accused Juan still alive but bleeding with a stab on his abdomen and Romeo the infant dead with a stab on his back.
Juan, who survived from the incident, was subsequently charged with parricide. In a sworn affidavit (Exhibit C), he admitted to the crime imputed upon him, saying:
o it was him who stabbed his wife Emilia and their infant son Romeo using a pair of scissors;In his arraignment, Juan entered a plea of guilty.
o that he stabbed himself, too, driven by the desire to wipe out his family on account of the supposed threat made by his uncle that the latter would order someone to kill him because he was a source of shame and dishonor to their family; and
o that he was already tired and disgusted with his life.
During the trial, however, Juan repudiated his confession, saying that he only admitted to the crime because he was tortured. According to him, it wasn't him, but it was in fact his wife Emilia, who stabbed their son Romeo dead.
According to Juan, the factual circumstances were as follows: He was lying on the bed facing Emilia while the latter was looking at the opposite direction. Their child Romeo was lying between them, face downward. Emilia, who was then holding a pair of scissors on her right arm, swung the same arm when Juan tried to touch her. Juan stood up and saw their son Romeo bleeding. Obfuscated by the sight of blood, Juan seized the scissors from Emilia and thereafter stabbed her before stabbing himself.
On account of this "new" set of facts, the prosecution, during the rebuttal, presented Emilia, where she denied Juan's allegation. This was objected to by the defense, citing Emilia's incompetency as a witness. Note that Emilia did NOT testify in the direct evidence because of the marital disqualification rule; she only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son.
On the strength of Juan's extrajudicial confession in his sworn affidavit, his plea of guilty during the arraignment, and his wife Emilia's denial of his allegation, the lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Juan filed this petition before the SC to challenge the admissibility of Emilia's testimony, arguing that imputing the crime to her did not constitute a waiver of the objections to her incompetency, and as such, her testimony should have been excluded by the lower court in the determination of his guilt.
RULING
Petition denied. Trial court ruling affirmed.
Whether Emilia's testimony upon rebuttal is admissible, notwithstanding the marital disqualification rule. – YES.
General rule: Spouses cannot testify for or against each other for the following reasons: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
Exceptions: The marital disqualification rule does not apply where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The instant case does NOT fall under any of the exceptions. Regardless, the SC held that Emilia's rebuttal testimony is still valid because Juan's imputation of the crime to his wife constituted a waiver of the objections to his wife's incompetency.
WAIVER OF INCOMPETENCY
The rule of marital incompetency may be waived. Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner.
It is well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered as witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly. (Wharton)
As to waiver of objection to incompetency:A party may waive his objection to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify. A party calling an incompetent witness as his own waives the incompetency. Also, if, after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived. (Wharton)
In sum: The accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner, the reason being that the State is entitled to question the spouse so presented as to all matters germane and pertinent to the direct testimony.
As applied in this case, when Juan imputed the crime to this wife, the State had the right to rebut the new matter contained in that testimony. And that rebuttal evidence, which was rendered necessary by Juan's own testimony, could be furnished only by his wife, Emilia, who, as he fully knew, was alone with him and their son at the precise place and time of the event. This right to rebut is secured to the State, no less than to the accused.
When Juan testified that it was his wife Emilia who caused the death of their son, he could not justly expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the only witness available, namely, his wife Emilia; nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of his testimony, or to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of her own child.
A decent respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an average mother will tell us that such a moral and social stigma would be no less injurious to her than a criminal punishment. And if the wife should, in such a case and at such a juncture, be allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should at least be the same as that of her husband. This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common sense.
Whether Juan's confessions in his sworn affidavit were extracted by means of violence and intimidation. – NO.
Juan's affidavit was sworn to and subscribed by him before the justice of the peace of Mansalay, who testified that he asked the prisoner before the latter signed said affidavit whether he understood the contents thereof, and that said latter answered in the affirmative. Juan also signed the exhibit voluntarily after stating that the said affidavit was his. There is a total absence of evidence, besides the testimony of Juan himself, to show that his statements contained in said exhibit were extracted from him by the use of violence and intimidation.
Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, is proper. – YES.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63, paragraph 3, of the same code, provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, and the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
In this case, in view of the court's determination that when Juan committed the crime he must have been suffering from some illness (of the body, the mind, the nerves, or the moral faculty) as a mitigating circumstance, and there being no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty is reclusion perpetua, which was the penalty correctly applied by the trial court.
DISSENTING
Feria, J.
Subject of dissent: Not the conviction of Juan, but the new theory enunciated in the majority opinion that Juan's testimony to the effect that his wife was the one who unintentionally inflicted the wound which caused the death of their child, capacitated his wife to testify as a witness on rebuttal against her husband, and "constituted a waiver of all objections to her testimony."
Main point: In the interest of justice, Emilia's testimony should be rejected. Instead, the Court should make a determination whether Juan's confession alone in his sworn affidavit is sufficient to support his conviction.
The marital disqualification rule only relates to cases in which the testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the latter is a party. And the reason is obvious: Although the testimony of the husband against his wife who is not a party to the case is admissible; yet, as said testimony can not be used as evidence against the wife in a civil case or criminal prosecution against her, it would not effectively strain the marital and domestic relations; lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; disturb the peace, harmony, and tranquility of the family, and destroy the identity of interest.
Such testimony, far from producing said results, might have a different effect. Where one of the spouses testifies in his defense that the other spouse, who is not a party to the case, is the one who committed the crime charged, his testimony, if believed by the court, would result in the acquittal and release of the defendant spouse and enable the accused, if confined in prison, to join again his spouse, without placing the latter in danger of being prosecuted and convicted by his testimony.
As applied to the instant case, Juan's testimony does not require any rebuttal by his wife, because, according to the clear provisions of law, the latter can not testify against her husband. And it does not call for a denial by the wife in herself or own defense, because it can not be used or admitted without her consent as evidence in a criminal case instituted against her for her son's death.
ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION BY THE FISCAL
It is clear that Emilia testified against her husband only because the fiscal erroneously assumed that Juan later imputed to her the crime charged. This error is apparent in light of the following transcript where there was no categorical imputation of the crime to Emilia:
P. Please tell the Court what happened when you sat beside your wife?
Sr. Fiscal: Objection, no basis.
Court: He may answer.
R. When I sat beside my wife and our son was lying face downward on the bed I was joking my wife because at the time I was drunk.
P. What was the relative position of your son with respect to you and your wife? —
R. I am going to demonstrate our relative positions, (the accused was facing his wife and the wife was facing in the opposite direction and the son was between them lying face downward and little bit behind on the bed). I used to touch her, so she swung her hand backward towards me, then I stood up and evaded the blow. Later on I heard the boy cried.
P. What hand did your wife swing, left or right hand?--
R. Her right hand.
P. Is this the very scissors when she swung her arm? —
R. Yes, sir.P. After she swung her arm what happened? —
R. The child cried.
P. Then what happened? —
R. When I stood up our child was already wounded so I became obfuscated.
P. Then what happened? —
R. I got hold of the scissors that she was holding and stabbed her and then stabbed myself."
BLACK LETTER LAW
It is to be borne in mind that the capacity or incapacity of one of the spouses to testify against the other is governed by the statute in force and the Court should construe the statute such as it is, and not as it should. It is for the law-making power to evolve new theories and enact law in accordance therewith.
As applied in the instant case, inasmuch as our statute on the matter provides that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent except in a criminal case for crime committed by one against the other, and in this case Juan objected strenuously to the testimony of his wife Emilia against him, her testimony is inadmissible and can not be taken into consideration in the decision of the case.
The SC can not evolve a new theory, however reasonable and plausible it may be, and apply for the first time as if it were the law in the present case against Juan. It may be a good theory or a sufficient reason for amending the law in order to include it as one of the exceptions of the rule incapacitating one spouse to testify against the other; but the SC can not legally apply it as a law now against Juan, a defendant in a criminal case.
NOT A MERE REBUTTAL
Emilia's testimony to the effect that her husband was the one who inflicted and she saw him inflict the wound on their infant child Romeo that caused the death of the latter is not a rebutting but a new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue whether or not Juan is guilty of the offense charged.
It is elemental that the scope of a rebuttal is circumscribed to contradicting or destroying the evidence of the adverse party tending to prove new matter in favor of the latter, and can not extend to disproving directly the main issue in question, that is, the guilt of Juan in the present case.
Evidently, Juan's testimony that his wife was the one who unintentionally inflicted the wound which caused the death of their child, can not gravely expose her to the danger of criminal proceeding against her," and "to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected to be the killer of her own offspring;" because said testimony is not admissible against his wife in that or in any other cases, and everybody is presumed to know the law that incapacitates the wife to testify against her accused husband and contradict what the latter may testify against her however false it may be.
NOT A WAIVER OF ALL OBJECTIONS TO EMILIA'S INCOMPETENCY
The majority's conclusion that Juan's testimony to the effect that the cause of the death of their child was the wound unintentionally inflicted by his wife Emilia, constituted a waiver of all objection to her testimony, is without any foundation in fact and in law; because Juan had strongly and persistently objected to his wife taking the witness stand, and no law, court or authority, from time immemorial up to the present, has ever recognized such testimony as a waiver.
The only cases in which the incapacity of one of the spouses to testify against the other is considered waived according to law, are those stated in section 1205, of Wharton on Criminal Evidence:
SEC. 1205. Waiver of incompetency. — Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally.Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner. It is well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly.
The cases of waiver of objections to incompetency are limited to those listed in the provision above. All works on criminal evidence enumerate only those cases, because there are no other cases provided for by the statutes or declared by the courts in their decisions. It would be too presumptuous to assume that this Court is the first to find correctly that the case is one of the exceptions upon said rule. For the majority can not point out a single decision in support of the exception which the majority intends to establish now for the first time.
What is called waiver is merely or nothing more than the consent of one spouse that the other testify in a case in which he or she is interested or a party, consent provided for as exception by law. As the consent may be either express or implied: express when the spouse who is a party presents the other spouse to testify, and implied when the adverse party or the prosecution presents the other spouse as a witness, and the spouse against whom the other is to testify does not object; so the waiver may also be expressed and implied. And, therefore, just as there can not be any other way of giving such consent than those above-stated, so there is no other case of waiver under the laws now in force.