Thursday, April 23, 2015

[CASE DIGEST] VICTOR BENIN, et al. v. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON (G.R. No. L-26127, G.R. No. L-26128, G.R. No. L-26129)

June 28, 1974

Ponente: Zaldivar, J.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933.

Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.

RULING:

It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. 

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.

Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili.

The court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.

The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.