[CASE DIGEST] PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii v. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (G.R. NO. 139325)

Tinga, J.

FACTS

In 1991, a complaint was filed before the US District Court, District of Hawaii, against the estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The suit was filed by 10 prominent human rights victims on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. The US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims.

Trial ensued. Subsequently, a jury rendered an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the complainants. Thereafter, a final judgment was rendered, awarding the complainants a total of US$1,964,005,859.90. The judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. •    In 1997, Mijares, et al. filed a complaint before the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the foreign judgment. The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The estate alleged that Mijares, et al. had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages worth billions.  •    Judge Ranada of Makati RTC dismissed the complaint for the enforcement of the foreign judgment. Relying on Section 7(a) of Rule 141, Judge Ranada estimated the proper amount of filing fees to be around P472M, which obviously had not been paid. Hence, the instant petition.

RULING


Petition granted. Complaint for the enforcement of the foreign judgment before the Makati RTC reinstated.




Whether Mijares, et al. paid the right docket fees in their complaint for the enforcement of the foreign judgment before the Makati RTC. – YES.

Judge Ranada erred when he relied on Section 7(a) of Rule 141 in computing the proper docket fee that should have been paid by Mijares, et al. For one, this provision applies only to money claims against an estate not based on judgment. Mijares, et al.'s complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it was clearly based on a judgment, which was the Final Judgment of the US District Court.

Second, a reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. This has no application to the complaint filed by Mijares, et al.z

Third, the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.

The amount paid as docket fees by Mijares, et al. on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property as indicated in Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, which is the correct rule Judge Ranada should have utilized in determining the proper docket fees to be paid. Mijares, et al. thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for Judge Ranada to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

Whether the filing of the complaint before the Makati RTC by Mijares, et al. was the proper recourse for the enforcement of the subject foreign judgment. – YES.  

It is necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment. This is to give the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.•    The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose.

The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment are outlined in Section 48 of Rule 39.* Based on this provision, for an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. In both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issue. Known as the POLICY OF PRECLUSION, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes. If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.

Whether the enforcement of a foreign judgment involving an award of a sum of money is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. – NO.

Mijares, et al. tried to justify their payment of P410 docket fee by arguing that the enforcement of a foreign judgment involving an award of a sum of money is not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages, and is therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation.

But the Court held that it is counter-intuitive to claim that the enforcement of a foreign judgment involving an award of a sum of money is incapable of pecuniary estimation. For all intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. In theory, such an action is primarily for the enforcement of the foreign judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since, as applied in this case, there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.

The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is as follows: If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

Whether RTCs have jurisdiction over complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments. – YES. 

Mijares, et al. were contending that if a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment be considered as one that is capable of pecuniary estimation, then it may lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. They assert that this would be problematic since under BP 129, MTCs are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

The Court held that the fear of Mijares, et al. re: jurisdiction was unfounded because Section 33 of BP 129 (on the jurisdiction of MTCs and RTCs in civil cases) refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or a sum of money. It is important to note that the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.

Pursuant to Section 19(6) of BP 129, whether or not the enforcement of a foreign judgment is capable of pecuniary estimation, the case would still fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Whether Philippine courts are bound to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. – YES.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause** of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law, body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

DOCTRINE

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in the Philippines merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. // There is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the par


ty, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.