Saturday, November 10, 2018

[CASE DIGEST] BUREAU OF FORESTRY v. CA (G.R. No. L-37995)


August 31, 1987

Ponente: Paras, CJ. 

FACTS:

·         In 1961, Mercedes Diago filed an application for registration of 4 parcels of land containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares in Buenavista, Iloilo. She alleged that she had bought said parcels of land from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. 

·         The Director of Lands opposed said application based on three grounds: (a) that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title over the lands applied for; (b) that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application; and that (c) 19.4080 hectares of the subject parcels of land were mangrove swamps and were therefore part of the public domain (i.e., unregisterable). 

·         In 1965, while the application for registration was pending, Filomeno Gallo purchased the 4 parcels of land from Mercedes Diago. Gallo substituted Diago in the case. In the same year, the Philippine Fisheries Commission also substituted the Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

·         Trial court ruled in favor of Gallo. Except for a portion of the subject parcels of land where the municipal hall of Buenavista town was built, the trial court ordered the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of Gallo. 

·         This ruling was affirmed by the CA, which held that the rule of prescription lied against the government since the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by Gallo and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge them from their holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase. Hence, the instant petition.

RULING:  

CA ruling reversed. Only 11.1863 hectares of coconut land can be registered in the name of Gallo. The rest of the 19.4080 hectares are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable.

Were the subject parcels of land registerable? – NOT ENTIRELY.

·         Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares were coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain. These can be registered in Gallo's name.

·         The rest, totaling 19.4080 hectares, were mangrove and nipa swamps within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 (way before Diago applied for registration in 1965) as lands needed for forest purposes. Therefore, these were lands of public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.

Can the rule on prescription be applied against the State in the instant case? – NO.
 
·         Gallo cannot claim to have obtained his title by prescription inasmuch as the application filed by him necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for were part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

Was there a need for the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land in dispute was not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes? – NO.

·         As enunciated in the case of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), the general rule is that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case. The exception to this is when the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral resources. 

·         The general rule does not apply in the instant case. As early as 1956, before Diago had applied for registration, 19.4080 hectares of the subject parcel of land had already been declared and certified as forest lands by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry. As such, contrary to Gallo's contention, there was no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute was not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question that the land was indeed forest land.

Were the trial court and the CA correct in reclassifying part of the subject parcels of land from public lands into alienable or disposable lands on the basis of prescription? – NO.

·         The CA committed grave error and/or abuse of discretion when it affirmed the trial court's ruling reclassifying the inalienable part of the subject parcels of land as disposable. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President.