February 3, 2004 | G.R. No. 159085
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane.
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 ("Declaring a State of Rebellion") and General Order No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of Rebellion Has Ceased to Exist").
Subsequently, several petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the President Arroyo's declaration of state of rebellion. These were:
• G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, thereexists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.
• G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers" claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. They contend that the declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that “confuses, confounds and misleads” because “[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.” Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.
• G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo) - petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion. Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a “superfluity,” and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
• G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.) - Senator Pimentel assails the subject presidential issuances as “an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution.” In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion “opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case is moot and academic, given that the President has already declared the cessation of the state of rebellion.
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether or not Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution grants the President the power to declare a state of rebellion.
4. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity.
5. Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion has an effect on the rights of the citizens.
1. Yes, the Court held that the case is moot and academic, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." However, the Court treated the immediate case as one that is "capable of repetition yet evading review." Hence, the discussion of the merits and demerits of the issues presented.
2. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
3. Yes, the Court held that it is within her prerogative as Chief Executive for the President to declare a state of rebellion. For the fact is, the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 18, Art. VII reads in part: "The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." This provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’”
It is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. The Solicitor General points out the statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
4. Yes, the declaration of a state of rebellion is a mere superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
5. No. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are unfounded. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion. In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.