Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
·
Horace William Barker, a British consultant of
the World Bank, and his Filipino wife Teresita Mendoza, lived in a country home
in Tuba, Benguet together with two female househelps.
·
On August 27, 1991, their former houseboy,
Rene Salvamante, together with another man, broke into the Barkers' home. Using
lead pipes, the two men attacked members of the household, leaving the two
female househelps wounded, Teresita badly injured, and Horace dead. The two men
also ransacked the property, taking away valuables with an aggregate cost of
P204,250. Items stolen included Teresita's Canon camera, radio casette
recorder, and pieces of jewelry.
·
A certain Richard Malig was arrested as
Salvamante's supposed co-conspirator, but his name was subsequently dropped
from the Information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him.
·
Subsequently, the Information was amended to
implead Hector Maqueda alias "Putol" because the evaluation of the
evidence submitted established his complicity in the crime. He was identified
by the witnesses on account of his amputated left hand and a right hand with a
missing thumb and index finger, hence his alias.
·
Maqueda was arrested in 1992. In his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker
house on August 27, 1991.
·
While he was under detention, Maqueda filed an
application for bail where he categorically stated that he was willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he was the
least guilty among the accused. Prosecutor Daniel Zarate then had a talk with
Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of
Salvamante on the date of the crime in entering the house of the Barkers. After
he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would
oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial
since Salvamante remained at large.
·
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa, executive
vice president of the Baguio College Foundation, arrived at the office of
Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda.
Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that
Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut
vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when
they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal
purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected
to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the
Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with
a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda,
to attack her with the lead pipe provided·him by Salvamante, After he felled
Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his
wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante
went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio
cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
·
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they
then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road where they
Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney
stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio
City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street
in Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station
where they boarded a bus for Manila.
·
During the trial, Maquedo denied any
involvement in the crime. Instead, he interposed an alibi, saying he was in
Muntinlupa working at a polvoron factory at the time the crime against the
Barkers was committed. This was, however, disproved by circumstantial evidence
showing he was not working at a polvoron factory at the time.
·
Although the trial court had doubts on the
identification of Maqueda by Teresita and the two female househelps, and thus
disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it nonetheless decreed a
conviction based on Maqueda's confession and the proof of corpus delict, as
well as on circumstantial evidence.*
·
The trial court found Maqueda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical
injuries and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim, Teresita, in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of
William Horace Barker.
·
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING:
Whether
Maqueda's Sinumpaang Salaysay where he recounted his involvement in the crime
constituted an extrajudicial confession. – NO.
·
Maqueda's Sinumpaang Salaysay is not an
extrajudicial confession but an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction
between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of
fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his
guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.
·
According to Wharton: "A confession is an
acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of
the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something
less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt."
·
Under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Whether
Maqueda's extrajudicial admission in his Sinumpaang Salaysay admissible as
evidence. – NO.
·
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by
SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his
rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a
reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights
under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel.
Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to
paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads: "Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
·
The trial court erred in admitting Maqueda's
Sinumpaang Salaysay as evidence despite knowing that it was taken without the
assistance of counsel. The right to be heard would be a farce if it did not
include the right to counsel. The present Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel.
·
The trial court was also out of line when it
held that since an information had already been filed in court against Maqueda
and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined
to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but
are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense."
·
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court
to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited
to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom
a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its
filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the
theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement
agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned
because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the
enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.
·
The trial court likewise erred when it held
that Section 12(1), Article III** of the Constitution was not applicable since
the police investigation was "no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation."
·
And finally, the trial court erred in declaring
that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. It was wrong for the trial court to rule that since voluntariness
was presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to
do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.
·
In sum, the subject Sinumpaang Salaysay should
not have been admitted as evidence.
Whether
Maqueda's verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa are
admissible as evidence. – YES.
·
Maqueda's extrajudicial admissions to Zarate
and Salvosa are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in
the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be
utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a
private person.
·
The provisions of the Bill of Rights are
primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that
government has the duty to protect; or
restriction on the power of government found "not in the particular
specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps
alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not
unlimited. They are the fundamental
safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse
of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals.
·
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean
Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former Under
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence
against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim
the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that
rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
·
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial
admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that
"he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in
this case."
·
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness,
Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty.
Whether
Maqueda's conviction should be sustained. – YES.
·
Even if the Court disregard his extrajudicial
admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, Maqueda's guilt was, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence.
·
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)There
is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
·
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
·
The following circumstances were duly proved
in this case:
- He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was committed there;
- Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;
- He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
- He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991;
- He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
- He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty."