Thursday, May 9, 2019

[CASE DIGEST] Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp. v. Tagyamon (G.R. No. 191475)


December 11, 2013 

Ponente: Peralta, J. 

FACTS:

·         Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. In March 2004, it issued a memorandum of dismissal to five of its employees (Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and Comandao) due to a slump in the market demand for carpets. Fifteen other employees (including Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis) claimed that they were also dismissed by PCMC in March 2004 when they were pressured to avail of the company's voluntary retirement program. 

·         In 2007, or three years after their dismissal from service, the said employees questioned the validity of PCMC's retrenchment program by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. Their arguments were: (a) the facts and circumstances of their situation match the facts and circumstances in the 2006 case of Philippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, where the SC ruled in favor of the employees; (b) PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and subsequent to their termination; and (c) their acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case.

·         PCMC interposed the defense that: (a) its decision to terminate the services of its former employees was a necessary management prerogative; (b) there was an authorized cause for dismissal; (c) the principle of laches should apply against the complainants because it took them 3 years before filing a complaint; (d) considering that the complainants accepted their separation pay and voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, the principle of estoppel should apply, too; and (e) Marcos, Ilao and Nemis were not dismissed from employment, but voluntarily retired from employment to take advantage of the company’s program.

·         Labor Arbiter: Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. The LA found no flaw in the complainants’ termination as they voluntarily opted to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized, terminated from employment and were paid separation benefits.  In view of the employees' belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such action is a mere afterthought designed primarily for them to collect more money, taking advantage of the 2006 Supreme Court decision.

·         NLRC: Affirmed the LA's ruling. The NLRC also emphasized the application of the principle of laches for complainants' inaction for an unreasonable period.

·         CA: Reversed the NLRC ruling. The CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. Citing the Court’s decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the similar factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary resignation, the CA found the same not a bar to the illegal dismissal case because they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC was losing money.

RULING: 

Petition denied. CA affirmed.

Whether the principle of laches applies in the instant case. – NO. 

·         An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants’ rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. In this case, the dismissed employees filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal, which was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.

·         Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

·         Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. 

·         As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

·         Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.

Whether the ruling in the Philcea case applies in the instant case. – YES.

·         In Philcea v. Hon. Sto Tomas, the company complained against issued a memorandum of dismissal to 77 of its employees because it was supposedly suffering from losses. However, after the dismissal of the said employees, the company hired 100 new employees and appropriated P60M tofor the purchase of new equipment. In this case, the SC held that the company's subsequent actions belied its claim that it was losing money. The company therefore acted in bad faith when it dismissed 77 of its employees. The SC ruled that the employees' dismissal was invalid and were therefore entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.

·         The facts and circumstances in the Philcea case are subtantially identical to the case at bar. As such, the principle of stare decicis applies. The dismissed employees here were similarly situated as the dismissed employees in the Philcea case. 

·         PCMC failed to prove that it was suffering from losses. It failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the confluence of the essential requisites for a valid retrenchment of its employees.In short, the SC adopts its findings in the Philcea case that there was no valid ground to terminate the employees.

Whether the signing of waivers, releases, and quitclaims bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. – NO. 

·         As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel.

·         To excuse the dismissed employees from complying with the terms of their waivers, they must locate their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable; or (3) the terms of the waiver are contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

·         The instant case falls under the first situation.

·         As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as the employees’ consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. 

·         There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which the employee held in the company when it concerns the pressure which the employer may exert upon the free will of the employee who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in the present case, who is confronted with the same dilemma of whether [to sign] a release and quitclaim and accept what the company offers them, or [to refuse] to sign and walk out without receiving anything, may do succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is going to take quite a while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is only after a protracted legal battle starting from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The Court understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever, coupled with the probability of not immediately getting any gainful employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on company practice and policy or by law.