January 22, 2014
Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
·
Ralph Tua and Rossana Honrado-Tua were married
in 1998. Sometime in 2005, Rossana filed a verified petition before the Imus
RTC for the issuance of a protection order for herself and her three minor
children Ralph. This was pursuant to RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004. She alleged that in separate instances, Ralph
(a) pointed a gun to her head to convince her not to proceed with the legal
separation case she filed; (b) fed their children with the fried chicken that
their youngest daughter had chewed and spat out in order to stop one of the
children from crying; (c) threatened their children with a belt; (d) threatened
her of withholding his financial support and pushed her to lie flat on the bed;
and (e) forcibly took the children and
refused to give them back to her.
·
On May 23, 2005, Judge Mangrobang of Imus RTC
issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
·
Subsequently, Ralph filed a Petition with
Urgent Motion to Lift TPO. He denied Rossana's allegations. As a defense, he
stated that it was him who was being abused by Rossana. He added that Rossana
was cohabiting with another man, which rendered her mentally, psychologically,
spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody.
·
Without waiting for the resolution of his
Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO, Ralph filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. He argued that the TPO was issued with grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Mangrobang and that Section 15 of RA 9262 relating to the
issuance of a TPO was violative of his constitutional right to be afforded due
process.
·
CA dismissed Ralph's petition. The CA found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Imus RTC in the issuance of the TPO as
the same was in complete accord with the provision of RA 9262. As for the
constitutionality of the Anti-VAWC Law, the CA did not issue any ruling on it
because the constitutionality of the law was not the lis mota of Ralph's
petition.
·
Hence, the instant petition before the SC.
RULING:
Whether
the issuance of TPOs under Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law is violative of the
constitutional right to due process of the party being complained against. –
NO.
·
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. –
Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the
court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination
that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all
of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30)
days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent
Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The
court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent
by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
·
A protection order is an order issued to
prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family
or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life.
·
The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is
no denial of procedural due process.
·
Before a TPO is issued, several steps need to
be taken. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the
essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there
is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the
victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
·
There need not be any fear that the judge may
have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not
only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
·
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore,
be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could
be prevented.
·
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is
issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs.
The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.
·
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court
will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
·
The opposition to the petition which the
respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
·
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the
respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Whether
Judge Mangrobang acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
TPO. – NO.
·
The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the
date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there
is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not
be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it
is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached
thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children
for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
·
In this case, the alleged acts of Ralph, while
not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO. Contrary to Ralph's
assertion that there must be a judicial determination of the basis of the
issuance of a TPO, the law is designed to ensure that the victim or offended
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure
their financial support.
·
There is grave abuse of discretion when there
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The CA did
not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the
issuance of the TPO.