MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC and ESTRELLA
C. ELAMPARO (G.R. No. 221697) + MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS and AMADO D. VALDEZ (G.R. No. 221698-700)
March
8, 2016
Concurring
Opinion: Leonen, J.
I.
Parameters of judicial review; political question doctrine inapplicable
·
The concept of judicial power
under the 1987 Constitution recognizes the SC's jurisdiction to settle actual
cases or controversies. It also underscores the SC's jurisdiction to determine
whether a government agency or instrumentality committed grave abuse of
discretion in the fulfillment of its actions. Judicial review grants the SC
authority to invalidate acts-of the legislative, the executive, constitutional
bodies, and administrative agencies-when these acts are contrary to the
Constitution.
·
Thus, writs of certiorari are
issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, as where it uses wrong considerations and grossly misreads
the evidence at arriving at its conclusion; (b) where a tribunal's assessment
is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can
be used;" "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable;" and ( d) where the tribunal uses wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue.
·
Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution is designed to ensure that the SC will not abdicate its duty as
guardian of the Constitution's substantive precepts in favor of alleged
procedural devices with lesser value.Given an actual case or controversy and in
the face of grave abuse, the SC is not rendered impotent by an overgenerous
application of the political question doctrine. In general, the present mode of
analysis will often require examination of the potential breach of the
Constitution in a justiciable controversy.
II.
Final and executory COMELEC resolution still subject to judicial review
·
Rule 23, Section 8 of the
Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, insofar as it states that the
Commission on Elections' decisions become final and executor five (5) days
after receipt, is valid. It does not violate Article IX, Section 7 of the
Constitution, which provides that any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Elections may be brought to the SC on certiorari within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy.
·
Granted, that the Commission on
Elections may deem a resolution final and executory under its rules of
procedure does not automatically render such resolution beyond the scope of
judicial review under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 23, Section 8
of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure merely guides the Commission
as to the status of a decision for its own operations; it does not prevent this
court from acting on the same decision via certiorari proceedings. In any
event, while it is true that certiorari does not immediately stay a decision of
a constitutional commission, a temporary restraining order can still be issued,
as in this case.
III.
No material misrepresentation
·
The COMELEC's jurisdiction,
statutorily granted in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to
candidates for the Offices of President and Vice President, is only with
respect to determining whether a material matter asserted in a candidate's
certificate of candidacy is false. For purposes of Section 78, a matter may be
true or false only when it is verifiable. Hence, the section only refers to a
matter of fact. It cannot refer to a legal doctrine or legal interpretation.
Furthermore, the false representation on a material fact must be shown to have
been done with intent. It must be accompanied with intent to deceive. It cannot
refer to an honest mistake or error made by the candidate.
III-A.
Denial of COC improper
·
A certificate of candidacy is
filed to announce a person's candidacy and to declare his or her eligibility
for elective office. Generally, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy. The COMELEC has the
competence to deny acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a candidate's
lack of qualifications appears patent on the face of the certificate of
candidacy and is indubitable. This is in line with its power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election."
·
For instance, if the date of birth
in the certificate of candidacy clearly and patently shows that the candidate
has not met the required age requirement for the office for which he or she is
running, the COMELEC may motu proprio deny acceptance. Specifically, in such
cases, the candidate has effectively made an admission by swearing to the
certificate of candidacy. Therefore, in the interest of an orderly election,
the COMELEC may simply implement the law.
·
This is not the situation in this
case. Poe-Llamanzares's Certificate of Candidacy did not patently show any
disqualification or ineligibility. Thus, the denial of due course or
cancellation of the certificate cannot be done motu proprio, but only when a
petition is filed. The petition must be verified and based on the exclusive
ground that a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false.
III-B.
COMELEC's discretion under Sec. 78 is limited
·
The COMELEC's very existence and
effectiveness inherently depend on its neutrality. Scrutiny of the
qualifications of candidates for electoral positions of national importance was
intentionally and expressly delegated to special electoral tribunals. Clearly,
the credibility-and perhaps even the legitimacy-of those who are elected to
these important public offices will be undermined with the slightest suspicion
of bias on the part of the Commission on Elections. This is why the pressure to
determine the qualifications of candidates to these positions has been
purposely removed from the Commission on Elections.
·
After all, given Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution, any "case or matter" decided by a
constitutional commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." The Commission on Elections will find itself in a very difficult
situation should it disqualify a candidate on reasons other than clearly
demonstrable or factual grounds only for this court to eventually overturn its
ruling. The Commission on Elections, wittingly or unwittingly, would provide
justifiable basis for suspicions of partiality.
·
Before elections, the COMELC,
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, may take cognizance of petitions
involving qualifications for public office regardless of the elective position
involved, but only on the limited and exclusive ground that a certificate of
candidacy contains a material representation that is false.
·
Intent to deceive should remain an
element of Section 78 petitions. Otherwise, the only issue to be resolved in
Section 78 petitions would be whether the candidate possesses the qualifications
required under the law. If the Commission acts on these petitions, it acts in
excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELEC may validly take cognizance of
petitions involving qualifications only if the petitions were filed after
election and only with respect to elective regional, provincial, city,
municipal, and barangay officials.
III-C.
Entries in COCs do not require absolute certainty
·
To successfully challenge a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78, a petitioner must establish that:
o
First, that the assailed
certificate of candidacy contains a representation that is false;
o
Second, that the false
representation is material, i.e., it involves the candidate's qualifications
for elective office, such as citizenship and residency; and
o
Third, that the false material
representation was made with a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible" or
"with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
public office."
·
In the instant case,
Poe-Llamanzares correctly argued that Section 78 should be read in relation to
Section 74's enumeration of what certificates of candidacy must state. Under
Section 74, a person filing a certificate of candidacy declares that the facts
stated in the certificate "are true to the best of his [or her]
knowledge." The law does not require "absolute certainty" but
allows for mistakes in the certificate of candidacy if made in good faith. This
is consistent with the "summary character of proceedings relating to
certificates of candidacy."
·
The COMELEC should have dismissed
Tatad' s Petition for Disqualification. Although denominated as a Petition for
Disqualification, Tatad' s Petition before the Commission on Elections did not
raise any ground for disqualification under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Instead, Tatad argued that Poe-Llamanzares lacked the required
qualifications for presidency; hence, she should not be allowed to run for
president.
·
The COMELEC showed bias and acted
arbitrarily when it motu proprio converted the Petition into one which Tatad
did not intend, contrary to the interest of the other party. While the COMELEC
has the necessary and implied powers concomitant with its constitutional task
to administer election laws, it cannot do so by favoring one party over the
other.
·
Significantly, Tatad was not the
only petitioner in those cases. There were three other petitions against one
candidate, which already contained most if not all the arguments on the issues
raised by Tatad. There was, thus, no discernable reason for the COMELEC not to
dismiss a clearly erroneous petition. The COMELEC intentionally put itself at
risk of being seen not only as being partial, but also as a full advocate of
Tatad, guiding him to do the correct procedure.
·
On this matter, the COMELEC
clearly acted arbitrarily.
V.
Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
·
There was no material misrepresentation
with respect to Poe-Llamanzares's conclusion that she was a natural-born
Filipina. Her statement was not false. Thus, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to rule on the nature of
citizenship of Poe-Llamanzares. Even assuming without granting that it had that
competence, the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled her
Certificate of Candidacy on this ground. There was no material
misrepresentation as to a matter of fact. There was no intent to deceive.
Poe-Llamanzares, even as a foundling, presented enough facts to make a
reasonable inference that either or both of her parents were Filipino citizens
when she was born.
V-A.
Burden of proof did not shift to Poe-Llamanzares
·
In an action for cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
person who filed the petition alleging material misrepresentation has the
burden of proving such claim. If, during the course of hearing, petitioner
shows a prima facie case of material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence
shifts. The opposing party will then need to controvert the claims made.
·
In the instant case, private
respondents who initiated the action before the COMELEC failed to establish a
prima facie case of material misrepresentation to warrant a shift of burden of
evidence to Poe-Llamanzares. Based on this ground, the petitions for
cancellation of certificate of candidacy should have already been dismissed at
the level of the COMELEC.
·
Even assuming that the burden of
proof and evidence shifted to Poe-Llamanzares, the COMELEC erred in only
considering her statement that she is a foundling. It committed a grave error
when it excluded all the other pieces of evidence she presented and isolated her
admission (and the other parties' stipulation) that she was a foundling in
order to conclude that the burden of evidence already shifted to her.
·
Poe-Llamanzares's admission that
she is a foundling merely established that her biological parents were unknown.
It did not establish that she falsely misrepresented that she was born of
Filipino parents. It did not establish that both her biological parents were
foreign citizens.
·
The COMELEC was blind to the
following evidence alleged by Poe-Llamanzares and accepted by the other
parties:
o
She was found in a church in Jaro,
Iloilo;
o
When she was found, she was only
an infant sufficient to be considered newborn;
o
She was found sometime in
September 1968;
o
She was immediately registered as
a foundling;
o
Jaro, Iloilo did not have an
international airport; and
o
The physical characteristics of
petitioner are consistent with a large majority of Filipinos.
·
All these facts can be used to
infer that at least one of her biological parents is Filipino. These should be
sufficient to establish that she is natural-born in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Constitution. The COMELEC arbitrarily disregarded
these pieces of evidence. It chose to rely only on the admitted fact that she
was a foundling to claim that the burden of evidence has already shifted.
V-B.
Dissenting opinions are not controlling
·
The COMELEC was mistaken when it
concluded that the burden of evidence shifted upon admission of the status of a
foundling.
·
The COMELEC cited and relied
heavily on Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio's Dissenting Opinion in
Tecson v. COMELEC: "It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of
the State."
·
On the basis of this Dissent, the
COMELEC concluded that Poe-Llamanzares cannot invoke any presumption of
natural-born citizenship.
·
Elementary in citing and using
jurisprudence is that the main opinion of this court, not the dissent, is
controlling. Reliance by the COMELEC on the dissent without sufficiently
relating it to the pronouncements in the main opinion does not only border on
contumacious misapplication of court doctrine; it is utterly grave abuse of
discretion.
V-C.
SC previously held for FPJ as a natural-born Filipino
·
In Tecson v. COMELEC, the SC held
that even though FPJ's natural-born citizenship could not be established
conclusively, the petitioner in that case nonetheless failed to substantiate
his claim of material misrepresentation. The same holds true in the instant
case.
V-D.
Foundlings are natural-born Filipinos
·
As a newborn abandoned by her
parents in Jaro, Iloilo in 1968, Poe-Llamanzares was at birth Filipina. Thus,
being Filipina at birth, she did not have to do anything to perfect her
Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born.
·
The whole case of private
respondents, as well as the basis of the COMELEC's Resolutions, is a
presumption that all newborns abandoned by their parents even in rural areas in
the Philippines are presumed not to be Filipinos. Private respondents' approach
requires that those who were abandoned -- even because of poverty or shame --
must exert extraordinary effort to search for the very same parents who
abandoned them and might not have wanted to be identified in order to have a
chance to be of public service.
V-E.
Verba legis and contemporaneous construction in constitutional construction
·
Constitutional construction
mandates that we begin with the relevant text and give its words their ordinary
meaning whenever possible, consistent with verba legis. As much as possible,
the language of the text must be understood in its common usage and sense so as
to maintain its presence in the People's consciousness. The language of the
provision itself is the primary source from which the SCdetermines
constitutional intent.
·
Contemporaneous construction may
aid in illumination if verba legis fails. Contemporaneous construction is
justified by the idea that the Constitution is not exclusively read by this
court. The theory of a constitutional order founded on democracy is that all
organs of government and its People can read the fundamental law. Only
differences in reasonable interpretation of the meaning of its relevant text,
occasioned by an actual controversy, will be mediated by courts of law to
determine which interpretation applies and would be final.
·
Contemporaneous construction
engages jurisprudence and relevant statutes in determining the purpose behind
the relevant text.
·
In the hierarchy of constitutional
interpretation, discerning purpose through inference of the original intent of
those that participated in crafting the draft Constitution for the People's
ratification, or discerning the original understanding of the past society that
actually ratified the basic document, is the weakest approach.
·
Not only do these interpretative
methodologies allow the greatest subjectivity for this court, it may also be
subject to the greatest errors. For instance, those that were silent during
constitutional conventions may have voted for a proposition due to their own
reasons different from those who took the floor to express their views. It is
even possible that the beliefs that inspired the framers were based on
erroneous facts.
·
Moreover, the original intent of
the framers of the Constitution is different from the original understanding of
the People who ratified it.
·
These considerations are taken
into account in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution relevant to the
instant case.
V-F.
By any constitutional approach, Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
·
The first approach is to assume as
a matter of constitutional interpretation that all foundlings found in the
Philippines, being presumptively born to either a Filipino biological father or
a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born, unless there is substantial
proof to the contrary. There must be substantial evidence to show that there is
a reasonable probability that both, not just one, of the biological parents are
not Filipino citizens.
·
This is the inevitable conclusion
reached when the entirety of the provisions of the Constitution is considered
alongside the contemporary construction based on statutes and international
norms that form part of the law of the land. It is also the most viable
conclusion given the purpose of the requirement that candidates for President
must be natural-born.
·
The second approach is to read the
definition of natural-born in Section 2 in relation to Article IV, Section 1
(2). Section 1 (2) requires that the father or the mother is a Filipino
citizen.
·
There is no requirement that the
father or mother should be natural-born Filipino citizens. It is possible that
one or both of the parents are ethnically foreign. Thus, physical features will
not be determinative of natural-born citizenship.
·
There is no requirement of
citizenship beyond the first degree of ascendant relationship. In other words,
there is no necessity to prove indigenous ethnicity. Contrary to the strident
arguments of the Commission on Elections, there is no requirement of Filipino
bloodline.
·
Significantly, there is also no
requirement that the father or mother should be definitively identified. There
can be proof of a reasonable belief that evidence presented in a relevant
proceeding substantially shows that either the father or the mother is a
Filipino citizen.
V-G.
Natural-born citizenship not a requirement for Presidency under the
Constitution
·
The minimum constitutional
qualifications for President are clearly enumerated in Article VII, Section 2:
·
Section 2. No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
·
There is no constitutional anchor
for the added requirement that within the entire ten-year period prior to the
election when a candidate is a resident, he or she also has to have reacquired
his or her natural-born citizen status.
·
Therefore, to require
Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born citizenship status in order to legally consider
the commencement of her residency is, therefore, to add and amend the minimum
requirements of the Constitution.
·
A contemporaneous construction of
Article VII, Section 2 with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act on 2003, supports this reading. RA
No. 9225 only requires that the personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship be made "at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy" for those seeking elective public position. It does not require
a ten-year period similar to the residency qualification.
V-H.
Citizenship
·
Citizenship essentially is the
"right to have rights." It is one's "personal and more or less
permanent membership in a political community. . . . The core of citizenship is
the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public
office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievance."
·
Citizenship also entails obligations
to the community. Because of the rights and protection provided by the state,
its citizens are presumed to be loyal to it, and even more so if it is the
state that has protected them since birth.
V.I.
Evolution of the constitutional provisions on citizenship
·
During the Spanish regime, the
native inhabitants of the Islands were denominated as "Spanish
subjects" or "subject of Spain" to indicate their political
status. The Spanish Constitution of 1876 declared persons born in Spanish
territory as Spaniards, but this was never extended to the Philippine Islands
due to the mandate of Article 89 in that the Philippines would be governed by
special laws. The Civil Code of Spain became effective in this jurisdiction on
December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish
citizens.
·
The Philippine Revolution in 1898
marked the end of the Spanish era and the entry of the Americans. Spain was
forced to cede the Philippine colony to the United States. Pursuant to the
Treaty of Paris between the two countries on December 10, 1989, the native
inhabitants were not automatically converted to American citizens. Since they
also ceased to be "Spanish subjects," they were "issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of
the United States."
·
The concept of "Philippine
citizens" crystallized with the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
where the term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared.
·
The United States Congress amended
this section on March 23, 1912 to include a proviso for the enactment by the
legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This was restated in the Jones
Law of 1916, otherwise known as the Philippine Autonomy Act.
·
Thus, the Jones Law of 1916
provided that native-born inhabitants of the Philippines were deemed Philippine
citizens as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(l) a subject of Spain on
April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since
that date, not a citizen of other country."
·
While common law used by the
United States follows jus soli as the mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution adopted jus sanguinis or blood relations as basis for Philippine
citizenship.
·
The 1973 Constitution also
provided a definition for "natural-born citizens" since the 1935
Constitution, similar to the United States Constitution, required the President
to be a "natural-born citizen" without defining the term. Prior to
the 1935 Constitution, public offices were filled through appointment by the
colonizers. Thus, Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution added a
definition for natural-born citizen, as follows:
·
SEC.
4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
·
The current Constitution adopted
most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, with further
amendment in subsection (3) for purposes of correcting the irregular situation
created by the 1935 Constitution.
V-J.
"Natural-born citizen," definition of
·
The 1935 Constitution borrowed the
term "natural-born citizen" from the US Constitution without defining
the concept. It was only the 1973 Constitution that provided that "[a]
natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
V-K.
Two categories of citizens
·
There are only two categories of
citizens: natural-born and naturalized.
·
A natural-born citizen, on the one
hand, is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, a naturalized citizen
is one who is not natural-born.
·
The COMELEC contends that in
availing herself of the benefits under Republic Act No. 9225 to become a
Filipino from being an American, Poe-Llamanzaress reacquired Philippine
citizenship by naturalization, not natural-born citizenship, since she had to
perform several acts to perfect this citizenship. Since she had acquired her
Filiipino citizenship by naturalization, she is therefore not a natural-born
Filipino, and therefore is barred from running for the Presidency.
·
But COMELEC's contention is wrong.
Poe-Llamanzares did not undergo the naturalization process. She reacquired her
Filipino citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.
·
To consider her as not
natural-born on account of her being a foundling is also not tenable. If
anything, this will result in grave consequences. For one, while it is true
that she could exert time and extraordinary expense to find the parents who
might have abandoned her, this will not apply to all foundlings. Thus, this approach
will concede that we will have a class of citizens who are stateless due to no
fault of theirs.
V-L.
No substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known parents
·
The equal protection clause
guarantees that "persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality."'
·
Apart from the anonymity of their
biological parents, there is no substantial distinction between foundlings and
children with known Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state
from birth. The foundlings' fortuitous inability to identify their biological
parents who abandoned them cannot be the basis of a law or an interpretation
that has the effect of treating them as less entitled to the rights and
protection given by the state. To base a classification on this circumstance
would be to sanction statelessness and the marginalization of a particular
class who, by force of chance, was already made to start life under tragic
circumstances.
V-M.
Foundlings, by law and through our Constitution, cannot be discriminated
against
·
Foundlings are legally endowed
with rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. Statelessness
unduly burdens them, discriminates against them, and is detrimental to their
development.
·
The legislature has provided
statutes essentially based on a premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens
at birth.
·
It is also our state policy to
protect children's best interest. The "best interest of the child" is
defined as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are
most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the
child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional
development."
·
Consistent with this law is the
Philippines' ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. This treaty has the effect of law and requires the domestic protection
of children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth,
against statelessness, and against discrimination based on their birth status.
·
The Philippines also ratified the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This treaty, which
has the effect of law, also requires that children have access to immediate
registration and nationality, and defends them against discrimination.
·
Government -- including the
judiciary -- is obligated to abide by these treaties in accordance with the
Constitution and with our international obligations captured in the maxim pacta
sunt servanda.
V-N.
Foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino; executive branch estopped in
questioning Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born status
·
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, was enacted as a means to
"provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."
Abandoned children may include foundlings.
·
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043,
otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, includes foundlings
among those who may be adopted.
·
Further, foundling certificates
may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates as requirement for
the issuance of passports to foundlings to be adopted by foreign parents under
Republic Act No. 8043.
·
The statutes providing for
adoption only allow the recognition of filiation for children who are
Filipinos. They allow adoption of foundlings. Therefore, foundlings are, by
law, presumed to be Filipino.
·
The executive branch has also
assumed Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born status as Filipina.
·
Her citizenship status was never
questioned throughout her entire life until she filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for President in 2015. Until the proceedings that gave rise to these
consolidated cases, her natural-born status was affirmed and reaffirmed through
different government acts.
·
She was granted an order of
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the
Bureau of Immigration on July 18, 2006. The President of the Philippines
appointed her as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board-a government position that requires natural-born
citizenship359-on October 6, 2010. The Commission on Elections also allowed her
to run for Senator in the 2013 Elections despite public knowledge of her
foundling status. Her natural-born status was recognized by the People when she
was elected, and by the Senate Electoral Tribunal when it affirmed her
qualifications to run for Senator on November 17, 2015.
·
She was likewise provided a
foundling certificate after she was found. She was also the subject of an
adoption process.
V-O.
Poe-Llamanzares presented enough evidence to prove that either or both her
parents were Filipinos
·
Filipino biological lineage cannot
be proven easily by direct evidence such as birth certificates or witness
testimonies of birth. Her status as an abandoned child makes it improbable, if
not too expensive, to prove her citizenship through DNA evidence.
·
Our rules, however, allow
different manners of proving whether any one of her biological parents were
Filipinos. Aside from direct evidence, facts may be proved by using
circumstantial evidence.
·
As a quasi-judicial body, the
Commission on Elections requires substantial evidence, or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
·
Poe-Llamanzares was found in Jaro,
Iloilo at a parish church on September 3, 1968.366 Iloilo, as in most if not
all provinces of the Philippines, had a population composed mostly of
Filipinos. Petitioner is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a
low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She is
only 5 feet and 2 inches tall.
·
There was also no international
airport in Jaro, Iloilo at the time when she was born.
·
These circumstances provide
substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her biological parents. Her
physical characteristics are consistent with that of many Filipinos. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is consistent with the expected behavior of a
Filipino in 1968 who lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment.
The nonexistence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can reasonably
provide context that it is illogical for a foreign father and a foreign mother
to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring there.
·
Statistically, Poe-Llamanzares has
a higher probability of having Filipino parents. As per data from the
Philippine Statistics Authority, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the
Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% of newborns were foreign. This
translates to roughly 99.8% chance that Poe-Llamanzares was born a Filipina at
birth.
VI.
Poe-Llamanzares committed no material misrepresentation with respect to her
residency. The facts that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence
presented clearly show that she satisfied the requirement that she had
residency 10 years immediately preceding the election.
VI-A.
Residency
·
For the purpose of election law,
the question of residence is mainly one of intention.
·
The term "residence" as
used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must
conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact
of residence there must be added the animus manendi.
VI-B.
Requirement for residency, history of
·
This jurisdiction's imposition of
residency as a qualification for elective public office traces its roots from
the United States' own traditions relating to elections. It was included in
order that the People may "have a full opportunity to know [the
candidate's] character and merits, and that he may have mingled in the duties,
and felt the interests, and understood the principles and nourished the
attachments, belonging to every citizen in a republican government." Under
the framework of the United States Constitution, residence was "to be
understood as not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States during the
whole period; but such an inhabitancy, as includes a permanent domicile in the
United States."
·
In the Philippines, residency as a
requirement for elective public office was incorporated into the Jones Law of
1916. Under this law, the requirement was relevant solely to members of the
Legislature as it was only the positions of Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives that were susceptible to popular election. Executive power was
vested in the Governor-General who was appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and the consent of the Senate of the United States.
·
The Independence Act of 1934,
otherwise known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, paved the way for the Philippines'
transition to independence. Under this Act, the 1935 Constitution was adopted.
The residency requirement, which under the Jones Law already applied to legislators,
was extended to the President and the Vice President.
·
When the 1973 Constitution was
adopted, the same residency requirement of 10 years was retained for the
position of President. The 1973 Constitution also retained the residency
requirement for those seeking to become members of the Batasang Pambansa.
·
The present 1987 Constitution
retains the residency requirement for elective officials both in the executive
(i.e., President and Vice President) and legislative (i.e., Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives) branches.
·
Similarly, Section 39(a) of the
Local Government Code412 provides that, in order to be eligible for local
elective public office, a candidate must possess the following qualifications:
(1) a citizen of the Philippines; (2) a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or in the case of a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the district where
he or she intends to be elected; (3) a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and (4) able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
VI-C.
Residency requirement, purpose of
·
This jurisdiction's requirement of
residency for elective public office seeks to ensure that a candidate is
acquainted with the conditions of the community where he or she seeks to be
elected and to serve. It is meant "to give candidates the opportunity to
be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth
and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and
fitness for the job they aspire for." It seeks "to exclude a stranger
or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."It is also a safeguard against candidates "from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain."
·
The length of residency required
for an elective post is commensurate with what is deemed to be the period
necessary to acquire familiarity with one's intended constituency and
sensitivity to their welfare.
VI-D.
Citizenship =/= residency
·
Both requirements for elective
public office, citizenship and residency, are two distinct concepts. One is not
a function of the other; the latter is not contingent on the former. Thus, the
loss or acquisition of one does not necessarily result in the loss or acquisition
of the other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring citizenship elsewhere
is neither inevitable nor inexorable.
·
But though distinct, residency and
citizenship may both consider locus. They both have geographical aspects:
citizenship entails inclusion in a political community, which generally has
established territory; residency pertains to one's place of abode.
VI-E.
Fact of residence
·
The decisive factor in determining
whether a candidate has satisfied the residence requirement remains to be the
unique "fact of residence."
·
For purposes of election law, the
question of residence is mainly one of intention. As such, it can only be
ascertained through overt acts.
·
However, blanket reliance on
pre-determined indicators of what suffices to establish or retain domicile
(e.g., registration as a voter in a certain district) is misguided. Each case
arises from a unique context. A nuanced, context-based examination of each case
is imperative.
VI-F.
Acquisition or establishment of residence may transpire through an incremental
process
·
"Initial" and
"preparatory moves" count. Thus, residence is deemed acquired (or
changed) as soon as these moves are established. Equally vital are the context
in which he or she accomplished such actions and even seemingly innocuous
nuances that could have actually tilted the course of that person's actions.
·
In approaching residence
questions, therefore, what is crucial is a comprehensive or holistic, rather
than a myopic or isolationist, appreciation of the facts. Not only must all the
pertinent facts be considered, so too must be their relationships and
synergies. To do otherwise would be to render lip service to the basic
imperative of an exacting consideration of facts in residence controversies.
VI-G.
Poe-Llamanzares satisfied the residence requirement
·
It was grave abuse of discretion
for the COMELEC to hold that Poe-Llamanzares committed a material
misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President, considering
that she satisfied the residence requirement provided in Article VII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution.
·
At the onset, the Commission on
Elections flat-out precluded the timely reestablishment of petitioner's
residence in the Philippines because it held that "the earliest possible
date that the respondent could have re- established her residence in the
Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino Citizenship on July 2006."
·
But it is precisely this dogmatic
reliance on formal preconceived indicators that the SC has repeatedly decried
is grave abuse of discretion. Worse, the COMELEC relied on the wrong formal
indicators of residence.
·
The COMELEC ignored the basic
distinction between citizenship and residence. Likewise, it erroneously
considered a visa -- a mere permission to enter -- as a badge of residence, and
equated an immigrant with one who is domiciled in the Philippines.
VI-H.
Non-possession of a permanent resident or immigrant visa does not negate
residency for election purposes
·
A visa is but a travel document
given by the issuing country to travelers for purposes of border control.
Holders of a visa are "conditionally authorised to enter or leave a
territory for which it was issued, subject to permission of an immigration
official at the time of actual entry."
·
In this jurisdiction, visas are
issued by a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy or Consulate as a permit
to go to the Philippines and seek permission to enter the country at its port
of entry. The decision to admit or disallow entry into the country belongs to
immigration authorities at the port of entry. Hence, the mere issuance of a
visa does not denote actual admission into, let alone prolonged stay, i.e.,
domicile, in the country.
·
The pivotal consideration is entry
into, not permanent stay, in the Philippines.
·
The COMELEC insists that
Poe-Llamanzares should have obtained a visa that supposedly evidences permanent
resident status. However, it failed to acknowledge that petitioner did not even
need a visa to accomplish the purpose that a visa serves, that is, to enter the
Philippines. Beginning May 24, 2005, petitioner's entries to the Philippines
were through the visa-free Balikbayan Program provided for by Republic Act No.
6768, as amended by Republic Act No. 9174.
·
The Balikbayan Program is not only
a scheme that dispenses with the need for visas; it is a system that
affirmatively works to enable balikbayans to reintegrate themselves into the
Philippines. Alternatively stated, it works to enable balikbayans to
reestablish domicile in the Philippines.
VI-J.
Pieces of evidence of Poe-Llamanzares reestablishing her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
o
United States Passport No.
017037793 issued to petitioner on December 18, 2001, indicating that she
travelled back to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, consisting of 13 pages
o
E-mail exchanges on various dates
from March 18, 2005 to September 29, 2006 between petitioner and her husband
and representatives of Victory Van Corporation, and National Veterinary
Quarantine Service of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Philippines,
consisting of 23 pages
o
Official Transcript of Records of
Brian Daniel Poe Llamanzares, issued by the Beacon School, consisting of one
(1) page
o
Certification issued by the
Registrar of La Salle Green Hills dated April 15, 2015, consisting of one (1)
page
o
Elementary Pupil's Permanent
Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College,
consisting of two (2) pages
o
Secondary Student's Permanent
Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College,
consisting of two (2) pages
o
Certificate of Attendance dated
April 8, 2015, issued by the Directress of the Learning Connection, Ms. Julie
Pascual Penaloza, consisting of one (1) page
o
Certification dated April 14, 2015
issued by the Directress of the Green Meadows Leaming Center, Ms. Anna
VillalunaReyes, consisting of one (1) page
o
Elementary Pupil's Permanent
Record for JesusaAnika Carolina Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College,
consisting of one (1) page
o
Identification Card, issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to petitioner on July 22, 2005, consisting of one
(1) page
o
Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 11985-R covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of San Juan City on February 20, 2006, consisting of four (4) pages
o
Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 11986-R covering the parking slot for Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of San Juan City on February 20, 2006, consisting of
two (2) pages
o
Declaration of Real Property No.
96-39721 covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of San Juan City on April 25, 2006, consisting of one ( 1) page
o
Declaration of Real Property No.
96-39722 covering the parking slot of Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by
the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City on April 25, 2006, consisting
of one page
o
Receipt No. 8217172, issued by the
Salvation Army on February 23, 2006, consisting of one (1) page
o
Receipt No. 8220421, issued by the
Salvation Army on February 23, 2006, consisting of one (1) page
o
E-mail from the U.S.A. Postal
Service, sent on March 28, 2006 to petitioner's husband, confirming the
latter's submission of a request for change of address to the U.S.A. Postal
Service, consisting of one (1) page
o
Final Statement issued by the
First American Title Insurance Company, which indicates as Settlement Date:
"04-27/2006", consisting of two (2) pages
o
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
290260 covering a 509-square meter lot at No. 106, Rodeo Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon City, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City on June 1, 2006, consisting of four (4) pages
o
Questionnaire Information for
Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship issued by the U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, accomplished by petitioner on July 12, 2011
o
Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe
dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3) pages
o
Affidavit of Teodoro Llamanzares
dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3) pages
·
The COMELEC chose to ignore all
these pieces of evidence showing reestablishment of residence prior to July 7,
2006 by the mere invocation of her then status as one who has not yet
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The COMELEC relied on a manifestly faulty
premise to justify its position that all of her evidence relating to the period
before July 7, 2006 deserved no consideration. Clearly, this was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC in two (2) respects: first, in using
citizenship as a shortcut; and second, in evading its positive duty to
scrutinize the facts and evidence.
VI-J.
Poe-Llamanzares satisfied the 10-year residency requirement
·
Poe-Llamanzares has shown by
substantial evidence that the incremental process of establishing her residence
in the Philippines commenced on May 24, 2005 and was completed in the latter
part of April 2006.
·
Her evidence satisfies the three
(3) requisites for establishing domicile of choice in the Philippines: First,
bodily presence in the Philippines is demonstrated by her actual arrival in the
country on May 24, 2005. Second, animus manendi or intent to remain in the
Philippines, is demonstrated by:
o
Petitioner's travel records, which
indicate that even as she could momentarily leave for a trip abroad, she
nevertheless constantly returned to the Philippines;
o
Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe,
which attests to how, upon their arrival in the Philippines on May 24, 2005,
petitioner and her children first lived with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills
West, San Juan City, thereby requiring a change in the living arrangements at
her own residence;
o
The school records of petitioner's
children, which prove that they have been continuously attending Philippine
schools beginning in June 2005;
o
Petitioner's Tax Identification
Number Identification Card, which indicates that "shortly after her return
in May 2005, she considered herself a taxable resident and submitted herself to
the Philippines' tax jurisdiction";487 and
o
Two condominium certificates of
title (one for Unit 7F, One Wilson Place, and another for a corresponding
parking slot which were both purchased in early 2005), and along with
corresponding Declarations of Real Property Tax Declarations which establish
intent to permanently reside in the Philippines.
·
Lastly, animus non revertendi or
intent to abandon domicile in the United States is demonstrated by:
o
Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe,
which "attests to, among others, the reasons which prompted [petitioner]
to leave the [United States] and return permanently to the Philippines";
o
Affidavit of petitioner's husband,
which affirms petitioner's explanations of how they made arrangements for their
relocation to the Philippines as early as March 2005;
o
Petitioner and her husband's
documented inquiries and exchanges with property movers as regards the transfer
of their effects and belongings from the United States to the Philippines,
which affirms their intent to permanently leave the United States as early as
March 2005;
o
The actual relocation and transfer
of effects and belongings, "which were packed and collected for storage
and transport to the Philippines on February and April 2006";
o
Petitioner's husband's act of
informing the United States Postal Service that he and his family are
abandoning their address in the United States as of March 2006;
o
Petitioner and her husband's sale
of their family home in the United States on April 27, 2006;
o
Petitioner's husband's resignation
from his work in the United States effective April 2006; and
o
Petitioner's husband's actual
return to the Philippines on May 4, 2006.
VI-K.
Poe-Llamanzares's husband not a party to this case
·
Insisting that petitioner failed
to timely reestablish residence, the COMELEC underscores three (3) facts:
first, her husband, Teodoro Llamanzares, "remained a resident of the US in
May 2005, where he kept and retained his employment"; second,
Poe-Llamanzares, using her United States passport, supposedly travelled
frequently to the United States from May 2005 to July 2006; and third, a
statement in the Certificate of Candidacy she filed for Senator indicating that
she was a resident of the Philippines for only six (6) years and six (6) months
as of May 13, 2013, which must mean that: first, by May 9, 2016, she shall have
been a resident of the Philippines for a cumulative period of nine (9) years
and six (6) months; and second, she started to be a resident of the Philippines
only in November 2006.
·
None of these facts sustain the
COMELEC's conclusions.
·
Relying on the residence of her
husband is simply misplaced. He is not a party to this case. No incident
relating to his residence (or even citizenship) binds the conclusions that are
to be arrived at in this case. Poe-Llamanzares was free to establish her own
residence. The position that the residence of the wife follows that of the
husband is antiquated and no longer binding. Article 110 of the Civil Code used
to provide that "[t]he husband shall fix the residence of the family."
But it has long been replaced by Article 152 of the Family Code, which places
the wife on equal footing as the husband.
·
On Poe-Llamanzares's trips to the
US, the COMELEC was wrong in tagging as "frequent" a total of two
trips, neither of which even extended longer than a month. This is a red flag,
a badge of how the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to go
about its task of meticulously considering the evidence.
·
Moreover, what is pivotal is not
that petitioner travelled to the United States. Rather, it is the purpose of
these trips. If at all, these trips attest to the abandonment of her domicile
in the United States and her having reestablished it in the Philippines. As
petitioner explained, it was not out of a desire to maintain her abode in the
United States, but it was precisely to wrap up her affairs there and to
consummate the reestablishment of her domicile in the Philippines.
·
As to the entries in her 2013 COC
for her senatorial bid, which show that she has yet to satisfy the 10-year residency
requirement, Poe-Llamanzares referred to these as "honest mistakes."
But as per COMELEC, a certificate of candidacy, being a notarized document, may
only be impugned by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant because it has in its favor a presumption of regularity.
·
Even assuming, however, that an
"admission" is worth considering, the mere existence of any such
admission does not imply its conclusiveness. "No doubt, admissions against
interest may be refuted by the declarant."
·
In the instant case,
Poe-Llamanzares has established her good faith, that is, that she merely made
an honest mistake. In addition, she adduced a plethora of evidence, "more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper," that proves the fact of
her residence, which was reestablished through an incremental process
commencing on May 24, 2005.
·
Additionally, the standard form
for the certificate of candidacy that petitioner filed for Senator required her
to specify her "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013." This syntax lent itself to some degree of confusion as to what the
"period before May 13, 2013" specifically entailed. It was, thus,
quite possible for a person filling out a blank certificate of candidacy to
have merely indicated his or her period of residence as of the filing of his or
her Certificate of Candidacy. This would not have been problematic for as long
as the total period of residence relevant to the position one was running for
was complied with.
·
The fact of Poe-Llamanzares's
honest mistake is accounted for. Working in her favor is a seamless, consistent
narrative. This controverts any intent to deceive. It is an honest error for a
layperson.
VI-L.
Real properties in the US not determinative of residence
·
Another fact cited against
Poe-Llamanzares is her continuing ownership of two (2) real properties in the
United States. Specifically, these pertain to two residential houses in the US,
one purchased in 1992, and the other in 2008.
·
The characterization of the two properties
as "residential" does not mean that Poe-Llamanzares has actually been
using them as her residence. Classifying real properties on the basis of
utility (e.g., as residential, agricultural, commercial, etc.) is merely a
descriptive exercise. It does not amount to an authoritative legal
specification of the relationship between the real property owner and the
property. Thus, one may own agricultural land but not till it; one may own a
commercial property but merely lease it out to other commercial enterprises.
·
In other words, to say that
Poe-Llamanzares owns "residential" property does not mean that she is
actually residing in it.
·
Moreover, there is a distinction
between residence and domicile. It is this distinction that permits a person to
maintain a separate residence simultaneously with his or her domicile.
·
Ultimately, it does not matter
that Poe-Llamanzares owns residential properties in the United States, or even
that she actually uses them as temporary places of abode. What matters is that
she has established and continues to maintain domicile in the Philippines.
CONCLUSION
·
Clearly, the Commission on
Elections' actions constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to utter
lack of jurisdiction. These actions being unjust as well as unchristian (?), we
have no choice except to annul this unconstitutional act.