Thursday, July 4, 2019

[CASE DIGEST] POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-700)


MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO (G.R. No. 221697) + MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS and AMADO D. VALDEZ (G.R. No. 221698-700)

March 8, 2016

Concurring Opinion: Leonen, J.

I. Parameters of judicial review; political question doctrine inapplicable

·         The concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution recognizes the SC's jurisdiction to settle actual cases or controversies. It also underscores the SC's jurisdiction to determine whether a government agency or instrumentality committed grave abuse of discretion in the fulfillment of its actions. Judicial review grants the SC authority to invalidate acts-of the legislative, the executive, constitutional bodies, and administrative agencies-when these acts are contrary to the Constitution.

·         Thus, writs of certiorari are issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as where it uses wrong considerations and grossly misreads the evidence at arriving at its conclusion; (b) where a tribunal's assessment is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used;" "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable;" and ( d) where the tribunal uses wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue.

·         Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution is designed to ensure that the SC will not abdicate its duty as guardian of the Constitution's substantive precepts in favor of alleged procedural devices with lesser value.Given an actual case or controversy and in the face of grave abuse, the SC is not rendered impotent by an overgenerous application of the political question doctrine. In general, the present mode of analysis will often require examination of the potential breach of the Constitution in a justiciable controversy.

II. Final and executory COMELEC resolution still subject to judicial review

·         Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure, insofar as it states that the Commission on Elections' decisions become final and executor five (5) days after receipt, is valid. It does not violate Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution, which provides that any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be brought to the SC on certiorari within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy.

·         Granted, that the Commission on Elections may deem a resolution final and executory under its rules of procedure does not automatically render such resolution beyond the scope of judicial review under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 23, Section 8 of the Commission on Elections' Rules of Procedure merely guides the Commission as to the status of a decision for its own operations; it does not prevent this court from acting on the same decision via certiorari proceedings. In any event, while it is true that certiorari does not immediately stay a decision of a constitutional commission, a temporary restraining order can still be issued, as in this case.

III. No material misrepresentation

·         The COMELEC's jurisdiction, statutorily granted in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to candidates for the Offices of President and Vice President, is only with respect to determining whether a material matter asserted in a candidate's certificate of candidacy is false. For purposes of Section 78, a matter may be true or false only when it is verifiable. Hence, the section only refers to a matter of fact. It cannot refer to a legal doctrine or legal interpretation. Furthermore, the false representation on a material fact must be shown to have been done with intent. It must be accompanied with intent to deceive. It cannot refer to an honest mistake or error made by the candidate.

III-A. Denial of COC improper

·         A certificate of candidacy is filed to announce a person's candidacy and to declare his or her eligibility for elective office. Generally, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy. The COMELEC has the competence to deny acceptance of a certificate of candidacy when a candidate's lack of qualifications appears patent on the face of the certificate of candidacy and is indubitable. This is in line with its power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."

·         For instance, if the date of birth in the certificate of candidacy clearly and patently shows that the candidate has not met the required age requirement for the office for which he or she is running, the COMELEC may motu proprio deny acceptance. Specifically, in such cases, the candidate has effectively made an admission by swearing to the certificate of candidacy. Therefore, in the interest of an orderly election, the COMELEC may simply implement the law.

·         This is not the situation in this case. Poe-Llamanzares's Certificate of Candidacy did not patently show any disqualification or ineligibility. Thus, the denial of due course or cancellation of the certificate cannot be done motu proprio, but only when a petition is filed. The petition must be verified and based on the exclusive ground that a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false.

III-B. COMELEC's discretion under Sec. 78 is limited

·         The COMELEC's very existence and effectiveness inherently depend on its neutrality. Scrutiny of the qualifications of candidates for electoral positions of national importance was intentionally and expressly delegated to special electoral tribunals. Clearly, the credibility-and perhaps even the legitimacy-of those who are elected to these important public offices will be undermined with the slightest suspicion of bias on the part of the Commission on Elections. This is why the pressure to determine the qualifications of candidates to these positions has been purposely removed from the Commission on Elections.

·         After all, given Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, any "case or matter" decided by a constitutional commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." The Commission on Elections will find itself in a very difficult situation should it disqualify a candidate on reasons other than clearly demonstrable or factual grounds only for this court to eventually overturn its ruling. The Commission on Elections, wittingly or unwittingly, would provide justifiable basis for suspicions of partiality.

·         Before elections, the COMELC, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, may take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications for public office regardless of the elective position involved, but only on the limited and exclusive ground that a certificate of candidacy contains a material representation that is false.

·         Intent to deceive should remain an element of Section 78 petitions. Otherwise, the only issue to be resolved in Section 78 petitions would be whether the candidate possesses the qualifications required under the law. If the Commission acts on these petitions, it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELEC may validly take cognizance of petitions involving qualifications only if the petitions were filed after election and only with respect to elective regional, provincial, city, municipal, and barangay officials.

III-C. Entries in COCs do not require absolute certainty

·         To successfully challenge a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, a petitioner must establish that: 

o   First, that the assailed certificate of candidacy contains a representation that is false; 

o   Second, that the false representation is material, i.e., it involves the candidate's qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship and residency; and 

o   Third, that the false material representation was made with a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible" or "with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office."

·         In the instant case, Poe-Llamanzares correctly argued that Section 78 should be read in relation to Section 74's enumeration of what certificates of candidacy must state. Under Section 74, a person filing a certificate of candidacy declares that the facts stated in the certificate "are true to the best of his [or her] knowledge." The law does not require "absolute certainty" but allows for mistakes in the certificate of candidacy if made in good faith. This is consistent with the "summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy."

IV. The COMELEC acted arbitrarily when it ruled in favor of an erroneous petition for disqualification

·         The COMELEC should have dismissed Tatad' s Petition for Disqualification. Although denominated as a Petition for Disqualification, Tatad' s Petition before the Commission on Elections did not raise any ground for disqualification under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Instead, Tatad argued that Poe-Llamanzares lacked the required qualifications for presidency; hence, she should not be allowed to run for president.

·         The COMELEC showed bias and acted arbitrarily when it motu proprio converted the Petition into one which Tatad did not intend, contrary to the interest of the other party. While the COMELEC has the necessary and implied powers concomitant with its constitutional task to administer election laws, it cannot do so by favoring one party over the other.

·         Significantly, Tatad was not the only petitioner in those cases. There were three other petitions against one candidate, which already contained most if not all the arguments on the issues raised by Tatad. There was, thus, no discernable reason for the COMELEC not to dismiss a clearly erroneous petition. The COMELEC intentionally put itself at risk of being seen not only as being partial, but also as a full advocate of Tatad, guiding him to do the correct procedure.

·         On this matter, the COMELEC clearly acted arbitrarily.

V. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino

·         There was no material misrepresentation with respect to Poe-Llamanzares's conclusion that she was a natural-born Filipina. Her statement was not false. Thus, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to rule on the nature of citizenship of Poe-Llamanzares. Even assuming without granting that it had that competence, the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy on this ground. There was no material misrepresentation as to a matter of fact. There was no intent to deceive. Poe-Llamanzares, even as a foundling, presented enough facts to make a reasonable inference that either or both of her parents were Filipino citizens when she was born.

V-A. Burden of proof did not shift to Poe-Llamanzares

·         In an action for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the person who filed the petition alleging material misrepresentation has the burden of proving such claim. If, during the course of hearing, petitioner shows a prima facie case of material misrepresentation, the burden of evidence shifts. The opposing party will then need to controvert the claims made.

·         In the instant case, private respondents who initiated the action before the COMELEC failed to establish a prima facie case of material misrepresentation to warrant a shift of burden of evidence to Poe-Llamanzares. Based on this ground, the petitions for cancellation of certificate of candidacy should have already been dismissed at the level of the COMELEC.

·         Even assuming that the burden of proof and evidence shifted to Poe-Llamanzares, the COMELEC erred in only considering her statement that she is a foundling. It committed a grave error when it excluded all the other pieces of evidence she presented and isolated her admission (and the other parties' stipulation) that she was a foundling in order to conclude that the burden of evidence already shifted to her.

·         Poe-Llamanzares's admission that she is a foundling merely established that her biological parents were unknown. It did not establish that she falsely misrepresented that she was born of Filipino parents. It did not establish that both her biological parents were foreign citizens.

·         The COMELEC was blind to the following evidence alleged by Poe-Llamanzares and accepted by the other parties:

o   She was found in a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
o   When she was found, she was only an infant sufficient to be considered newborn;
o   She was found sometime in September 1968;
o   She was immediately registered as a foundling;
o   Jaro, Iloilo did not have an international airport; and
o   The physical characteristics of petitioner are consistent with a large majority of Filipinos.

·         All these facts can be used to infer that at least one of her biological parents is Filipino. These should be sufficient to establish that she is natural-born in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. The COMELEC arbitrarily disregarded these pieces of evidence. It chose to rely only on the admitted fact that she was a foundling to claim that the burden of evidence has already shifted.

V-B. Dissenting opinions are not controlling

·         The COMELEC was mistaken when it concluded that the burden of evidence shifted upon admission of the status of a foundling.

·         The COMELEC cited and relied heavily on Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio's Dissenting Opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC: "It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State." 

·         On the basis of this Dissent, the COMELEC concluded that Poe-Llamanzares cannot invoke any presumption of natural-born citizenship.

·         Elementary in citing and using jurisprudence is that the main opinion of this court, not the dissent, is controlling. Reliance by the COMELEC on the dissent without sufficiently relating it to the pronouncements in the main opinion does not only border on contumacious misapplication of court doctrine; it is utterly grave abuse of discretion.

V-C. SC previously held for FPJ as a natural-born Filipino

·         In Tecson v. COMELEC, the SC held that even though FPJ's natural-born citizenship could not be established conclusively, the petitioner in that case nonetheless failed to substantiate his claim of material misrepresentation. The same holds true in the instant case.

V-D. Foundlings are natural-born Filipinos

·         As a newborn abandoned by her parents in Jaro, Iloilo in 1968, Poe-Llamanzares was at birth Filipina. Thus, being Filipina at birth, she did not have to do anything to perfect her Filipino citizenship. She is natural-born.

·         The whole case of private respondents, as well as the basis of the COMELEC's Resolutions, is a presumption that all newborns abandoned by their parents even in rural areas in the Philippines are presumed not to be Filipinos. Private respondents' approach requires that those who were abandoned -- even because of poverty or shame -- must exert extraordinary effort to search for the very same parents who abandoned them and might not have wanted to be identified in order to have a chance to be of public service.

V-E. Verba legis and contemporaneous construction in constitutional construction

·         Constitutional construction mandates that we begin with the relevant text and give its words their ordinary meaning whenever possible, consistent with verba legis. As much as possible, the language of the text must be understood in its common usage and sense so as to maintain its presence in the People's consciousness. The language of the provision itself is the primary source from which the SCdetermines constitutional intent.

·         Contemporaneous construction may aid in illumination if verba legis fails. Contemporaneous construction is justified by the idea that the Constitution is not exclusively read by this court. The theory of a constitutional order founded on democracy is that all organs of government and its People can read the fundamental law. Only differences in reasonable interpretation of the meaning of its relevant text, occasioned by an actual controversy, will be mediated by courts of law to determine which interpretation applies and would be final.

·         Contemporaneous construction engages jurisprudence and relevant statutes in determining the purpose behind the relevant text.

·         In the hierarchy of constitutional interpretation, discerning purpose through inference of the original intent of those that participated in crafting the draft Constitution for the People's ratification, or discerning the original understanding of the past society that actually ratified the basic document, is the weakest approach.

·         Not only do these interpretative methodologies allow the greatest subjectivity for this court, it may also be subject to the greatest errors. For instance, those that were silent during constitutional conventions may have voted for a proposition due to their own reasons different from those who took the floor to express their views. It is even possible that the beliefs that inspired the framers were based on erroneous facts.

·         Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is different from the original understanding of the People who ratified it.

·         These considerations are taken into account in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution relevant to the instant case.

V-F. By any constitutional approach, Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino

·         The first approach is to assume as a matter of constitutional interpretation that all foundlings found in the Philippines, being presumptively born to either a Filipino biological father or a Filipina biological mother, are natural-born, unless there is substantial proof to the contrary. There must be substantial evidence to show that there is a reasonable probability that both, not just one, of the biological parents are not Filipino citizens.

·         This is the inevitable conclusion reached when the entirety of the provisions of the Constitution is considered alongside the contemporary construction based on statutes and international norms that form part of the law of the land. It is also the most viable conclusion given the purpose of the requirement that candidates for President must be natural-born.

·         The second approach is to read the definition of natural-born in Section 2 in relation to Article IV, Section 1 (2). Section 1 (2) requires that the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen.
·         There is no requirement that the father or mother should be natural-born Filipino citizens. It is possible that one or both of the parents are ethnically foreign. Thus, physical features will not be determinative of natural-born citizenship.

·         There is no requirement of citizenship beyond the first degree of ascendant relationship. In other words, there is no necessity to prove indigenous ethnicity. Contrary to the strident arguments of the Commission on Elections, there is no requirement of Filipino bloodline.

·         Significantly, there is also no requirement that the father or mother should be definitively identified. There can be proof of a reasonable belief that evidence presented in a relevant proceeding substantially shows that either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen.

V-G. Natural-born citizenship not a requirement for Presidency under the Constitution

·         The minimum constitutional qualifications for President are clearly enumerated in Article VII, Section 2: 

·         Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
·         There is no constitutional anchor for the added requirement that within the entire ten-year period prior to the election when a candidate is a resident, he or she also has to have reacquired his or her natural-born citizen status.

·         Therefore, to require Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born citizenship status in order to legally consider the commencement of her residency is, therefore, to add and amend the minimum requirements of the Constitution.

·         A contemporaneous construction of Article VII, Section 2 with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act on 2003, supports this reading. RA No. 9225 only requires that the personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be made "at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy" for those seeking elective public position. It does not require a ten-year period similar to the residency qualification.

V-H. Citizenship

·         Citizenship essentially is the "right to have rights." It is one's "personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. . . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance."

·         Citizenship also entails obligations to the community. Because of the rights and protection provided by the state, its citizens are presumed to be loyal to it, and even more so if it is the state that has protected them since birth.

V.I. Evolution of the constitutional provisions on citizenship 

·         During the Spanish regime, the native inhabitants of the Islands were denominated as "Spanish subjects" or "subject of Spain" to indicate their political status. The Spanish Constitution of 1876 declared persons born in Spanish territory as Spaniards, but this was never extended to the Philippine Islands due to the mandate of Article 89 in that the Philippines would be governed by special laws. The Civil Code of Spain became effective in this jurisdiction on December 18, 1889, making the first categorical listing on who were Spanish citizens.

·         The Philippine Revolution in 1898 marked the end of the Spanish era and the entry of the Americans. Spain was forced to cede the Philippine colony to the United States. Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris between the two countries on December 10, 1989, the native inhabitants were not automatically converted to American citizens. Since they also ceased to be "Spanish subjects," they were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States."

·         The concept of "Philippine citizens" crystallized with the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, where the term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared.

·         The United States Congress amended this section on March 23, 1912 to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This was restated in the Jones Law of 1916, otherwise known as the Philippine Autonomy Act.

·         Thus, the Jones Law of 1916 provided that native-born inhabitants of the Philippines were deemed Philippine citizens as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(l) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of other country."

·         While common law used by the United States follows jus soli as the mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution adopted jus sanguinis or blood relations as basis for Philippine citizenship.

·         The 1973 Constitution also provided a definition for "natural-born citizens" since the 1935 Constitution, similar to the United States Constitution, required the President to be a "natural-born citizen" without defining the term. Prior to the 1935 Constitution, public offices were filled through appointment by the colonizers. Thus, Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution added a definition for natural-born citizen, as follows:

·         SEC. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

·         The current Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, with further amendment in subsection (3) for purposes of correcting the irregular situation created by the 1935 Constitution.

V-J. "Natural-born citizen," definition of

·         The 1935 Constitution borrowed the term "natural-born citizen" from the US Constitution without defining the concept. It was only the 1973 Constitution that provided that "[a] natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

V-K. Two categories of citizens

·         There are only two categories of citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

·         A natural-born citizen, on the one hand, is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.

·         The COMELEC contends that in availing herself of the benefits under Republic Act No. 9225 to become a Filipino from being an American, Poe-Llamanzaress reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization, not natural-born citizenship, since she had to perform several acts to perfect this citizenship. Since she had acquired her Filiipino citizenship by naturalization, she is therefore not a natural-born Filipino, and therefore is barred from running for the Presidency.

·         But COMELEC's contention is wrong. Poe-Llamanzares did not undergo the naturalization process. She reacquired her Filipino citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.

·         To consider her as not natural-born on account of her being a foundling is also not tenable. If anything, this will result in grave consequences. For one, while it is true that she could exert time and extraordinary expense to find the parents who might have abandoned her, this will not apply to all foundlings. Thus, this approach will concede that we will have a class of citizens who are stateless due to no fault of theirs.

V-L. No substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known parents

·         The equal protection clause guarantees that "persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality."'

·         Apart from the anonymity of their biological parents, there is no substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth. The foundlings' fortuitous inability to identify their biological parents who abandoned them cannot be the basis of a law or an interpretation that has the effect of treating them as less entitled to the rights and protection given by the state. To base a classification on this circumstance would be to sanction statelessness and the marginalization of a particular class who, by force of chance, was already made to start life under tragic circumstances.

V-M. Foundlings, by law and through our Constitution, cannot be discriminated against

·         Foundlings are legally endowed with rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. Statelessness unduly burdens them, discriminates against them, and is detrimental to their development.

·         The legislature has provided statutes essentially based on a premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth.

·         It is also our state policy to protect children's best interest. The "best interest of the child" is defined as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."

·         Consistent with this law is the Philippines' ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This treaty has the effect of law and requires the domestic protection of children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth, against statelessness, and against discrimination based on their birth status.

·         The Philippines also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This treaty, which has the effect of law, also requires that children have access to immediate registration and nationality, and defends them against discrimination.

·         Government -- including the judiciary -- is obligated to abide by these treaties in accordance with the Constitution and with our international obligations captured in the maxim pacta sunt servanda.

V-N. Foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino; executive branch estopped in questioning Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born status

·         Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, was enacted as a means to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned." Abandoned children may include foundlings.

·         Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, includes foundlings among those who may be adopted.

·         Further, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates as requirement for the issuance of passports to foundlings to be adopted by foreign parents under Republic Act No. 8043.

·         The statutes providing for adoption only allow the recognition of filiation for children who are Filipinos. They allow adoption of foundlings. Therefore, foundlings are, by law, presumed to be Filipino.

·         The executive branch has also assumed Poe-Llamanzares's natural-born status as Filipina.

·         Her citizenship status was never questioned throughout her entire life until she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for President in 2015. Until the proceedings that gave rise to these consolidated cases, her natural-born status was affirmed and reaffirmed through different government acts.

·         She was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration on July 18, 2006. The President of the Philippines appointed her as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board-a government position that requires natural-born citizenship359-on October 6, 2010. The Commission on Elections also allowed her to run for Senator in the 2013 Elections despite public knowledge of her foundling status. Her natural-born status was recognized by the People when she was elected, and by the Senate Electoral Tribunal when it affirmed her qualifications to run for Senator on November 17, 2015.

·         She was likewise provided a foundling certificate after she was found. She was also the subject of an adoption process.

V-O. Poe-Llamanzares presented enough evidence to prove that either or both her parents were Filipinos

·         Filipino biological lineage cannot be proven easily by direct evidence such as birth certificates or witness testimonies of birth. Her status as an abandoned child makes it improbable, if not too expensive, to prove her citizenship through DNA evidence.

·         Our rules, however, allow different manners of proving whether any one of her biological parents were Filipinos. Aside from direct evidence, facts may be proved by using circumstantial evidence.

·         As a quasi-judicial body, the Commission on Elections requires substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

·         Poe-Llamanzares was found in Jaro, Iloilo at a parish church on September 3, 1968.366 Iloilo, as in most if not all provinces of the Philippines, had a population composed mostly of Filipinos. Petitioner is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She is only 5 feet and 2 inches tall.

·         There was also no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo at the time when she was born.

·         These circumstances provide substantial evidence to infer the citizenship of her biological parents. Her physical characteristics are consistent with that of many Filipinos. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is consistent with the expected behavior of a Filipino in 1968 who lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment. The nonexistence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo can reasonably provide context that it is illogical for a foreign father and a foreign mother to visit a rural area, give birth and leave their offspring there.

·         Statistically, Poe-Llamanzares has a higher probability of having Filipino parents. As per data from the Philippine Statistics Authority, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% of newborns were foreign. This translates to roughly 99.8% chance that Poe-Llamanzares was born a Filipina at birth.

VI. Poe-Llamanzares committed no material misrepresentation with respect to her residency. The facts that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented clearly show that she satisfied the requirement that she had residency 10 years immediately preceding the election.

VI-A. Residency

·         For the purpose of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. 

·         The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of residence there must be added the animus manendi.

VI-B. Requirement for residency, history of

·         This jurisdiction's imposition of residency as a qualification for elective public office traces its roots from the United States' own traditions relating to elections. It was included in order that the People may "have a full opportunity to know [the candidate's] character and merits, and that he may have mingled in the duties, and felt the interests, and understood the principles and nourished the attachments, belonging to every citizen in a republican government." Under the framework of the United States Constitution, residence was "to be understood as not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States during the whole period; but such an inhabitancy, as includes a permanent domicile in the United States."

·         In the Philippines, residency as a requirement for elective public office was incorporated into the Jones Law of 1916. Under this law, the requirement was relevant solely to members of the Legislature as it was only the positions of Senator and Member of the House of Representatives that were susceptible to popular election. Executive power was vested in the Governor-General who was appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and the consent of the Senate of the United States.

·         The Independence Act of 1934, otherwise known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, paved the way for the Philippines' transition to independence. Under this Act, the 1935 Constitution was adopted. The residency requirement, which under the Jones Law already applied to legislators, was extended to the President and the Vice President. 

·         When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, the same residency requirement of 10 years was retained for the position of President. The 1973 Constitution also retained the residency requirement for those seeking to become members of the Batasang Pambansa. 

·         The present 1987 Constitution retains the residency requirement for elective officials both in the executive (i.e., President and Vice President) and legislative (i.e., Senators and Members of the House of Representatives) branches.

·         Similarly, Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code412 provides that, in order to be eligible for local elective public office, a candidate must possess the following qualifications: (1) a citizen of the Philippines; (2) a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the district where he or she intends to be elected; (3) a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and (4) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

VI-C. Residency requirement, purpose of

·         This jurisdiction's requirement of residency for elective public office seeks to ensure that a candidate is acquainted with the conditions of the community where he or she seeks to be elected and to serve. It is meant "to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for." It seeks "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."It is also a safeguard against candidates "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain."

·         The length of residency required for an elective post is commensurate with what is deemed to be the period necessary to acquire familiarity with one's intended constituency and sensitivity to their welfare.

VI-D. Citizenship =/= residency

·         Both requirements for elective public office, citizenship and residency, are two distinct concepts. One is not a function of the other; the latter is not contingent on the former. Thus, the loss or acquisition of one does not necessarily result in the loss or acquisition of the other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring citizenship elsewhere is neither inevitable nor inexorable.

·         But though distinct, residency and citizenship may both consider locus. They both have geographical aspects: citizenship entails inclusion in a political community, which generally has established territory; residency pertains to one's place of abode.

VI-E. Fact of residence

·         The decisive factor in determining whether a candidate has satisfied the residence requirement remains to be the unique "fact of residence."

·         For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. As such, it can only be ascertained through overt acts.

·         However, blanket reliance on pre-determined indicators of what suffices to establish or retain domicile (e.g., registration as a voter in a certain district) is misguided. Each case arises from a unique context. A nuanced, context-based examination of each case is imperative.

VI-F. Acquisition or establishment of residence may transpire through an incremental process

·         "Initial" and "preparatory moves" count. Thus, residence is deemed acquired (or changed) as soon as these moves are established. Equally vital are the context in which he or she accomplished such actions and even seemingly innocuous nuances that could have actually tilted the course of that person's actions.

·         In approaching residence questions, therefore, what is crucial is a comprehensive or holistic, rather than a myopic or isolationist, appreciation of the facts. Not only must all the pertinent facts be considered, so too must be their relationships and synergies. To do otherwise would be to render lip service to the basic imperative of an exacting consideration of facts in residence controversies.

VI-G. Poe-Llamanzares satisfied the residence requirement

·         It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to hold that Poe-Llamanzares committed a material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President, considering that she satisfied the residence requirement provided in Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

·         At the onset, the Commission on Elections flat-out precluded the timely reestablishment of petitioner's residence in the Philippines because it held that "the earliest possible date that the respondent could have re- established her residence in the Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino Citizenship on July 2006." 

·         But it is precisely this dogmatic reliance on formal preconceived indicators that the SC has repeatedly decried is grave abuse of discretion. Worse, the COMELEC relied on the wrong formal indicators of residence.

·         The COMELEC ignored the basic distinction between citizenship and residence. Likewise, it erroneously considered a visa -- a mere permission to enter -- as a badge of residence, and equated an immigrant with one who is domiciled in the Philippines.

VI-H. Non-possession of a permanent resident or immigrant visa does not negate residency for election purposes

·         A visa is but a travel document given by the issuing country to travelers for purposes of border control. Holders of a visa are "conditionally authorised to enter or leave a territory for which it was issued, subject to permission of an immigration official at the time of actual entry."

·         In this jurisdiction, visas are issued by a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy or Consulate as a permit to go to the Philippines and seek permission to enter the country at its port of entry. The decision to admit or disallow entry into the country belongs to immigration authorities at the port of entry. Hence, the mere issuance of a visa does not denote actual admission into, let alone prolonged stay, i.e., domicile, in the country.

·         The pivotal consideration is entry into, not permanent stay, in the Philippines.

·         The COMELEC insists that Poe-Llamanzares should have obtained a visa that supposedly evidences permanent resident status. However, it failed to acknowledge that petitioner did not even need a visa to accomplish the purpose that a visa serves, that is, to enter the Philippines. Beginning May 24, 2005, petitioner's entries to the Philippines were through the visa-free Balikbayan Program provided for by Republic Act No. 6768, as amended by Republic Act No. 9174.

·         The Balikbayan Program is not only a scheme that dispenses with the need for visas; it is a system that affirmatively works to enable balikbayans to reintegrate themselves into the Philippines. Alternatively stated, it works to enable balikbayans to reestablish domicile in the Philippines.

VI-J. Pieces of evidence of Poe-Llamanzares reestablishing her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

o   United States Passport No. 017037793 issued to petitioner on December 18, 2001, indicating that she travelled back to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, consisting of 13 pages

o   E-mail exchanges on various dates from March 18, 2005 to September 29, 2006 between petitioner and her husband and representatives of Victory Van Corporation, and National Veterinary Quarantine Service of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Philippines, consisting of 23 pages

o   Official Transcript of Records of Brian Daniel Poe Llamanzares, issued by the Beacon School, consisting of one (1) page

o   Certification issued by the Registrar of La Salle Green Hills dated April 15, 2015, consisting of one (1) page

o   Elementary Pupil's Permanent Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College, consisting of two (2) pages

o   Secondary Student's Permanent Record for Hanna Mackenzie Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College, consisting of two (2) pages

o   Certificate of Attendance dated April 8, 2015, issued by the Directress of the Learning Connection, Ms. Julie Pascual Penaloza, consisting of one (1) page

o   Certification dated April 14, 2015 issued by the Directress of the Green Meadows Leaming Center, Ms. Anna VillalunaReyes, consisting of one (1) page

o   Elementary Pupil's Permanent Record for JesusaAnika Carolina Llamanzares, issued by Assumption College, consisting of one (1) page

o   Identification Card, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to petitioner on July 22, 2005, consisting of one (1) page

o   Condominium Certificate of Title No. 11985-R covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Registry of Deeds of San Juan City on February 20, 2006, consisting of four (4) pages

o   Condominium Certificate of Title No. 11986-R covering the parking slot for Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Registry of Deeds of San Juan City on February 20, 2006, consisting of two (2) pages

o   Declaration of Real Property No. 96-39721 covering Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City on April 25, 2006, consisting of one ( 1) page

o   Declaration of Real Property No. 96-39722 covering the parking slot of Unit 7F of One Wilson Place, issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City on April 25, 2006, consisting of one page

o   Receipt No. 8217172, issued by the Salvation Army on February 23, 2006, consisting of one (1) page

o   Receipt No. 8220421, issued by the Salvation Army on February 23, 2006, consisting of one (1) page

o   E-mail from the U.S.A. Postal Service, sent on March 28, 2006 to petitioner's husband, confirming the latter's submission of a request for change of address to the U.S.A. Postal Service, consisting of one (1) page

o   Final Statement issued by the First American Title Insurance Company, which indicates as Settlement Date: "04-27/2006", consisting of two (2) pages

o   Transfer Certificate of Title No. 290260 covering a 509-square meter lot at No. 106, Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon City, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 1, 2006, consisting of four (4) pages

o   Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship issued by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, accomplished by petitioner on July 12, 2011

o   Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3) pages

o   Affidavit of Teodoro Llamanzares dated November 8, 2015, consisting of three (3) pages

·         The COMELEC chose to ignore all these pieces of evidence showing reestablishment of residence prior to July 7, 2006 by the mere invocation of her then status as one who has not yet reacquired Philippine citizenship. The COMELEC relied on a manifestly faulty premise to justify its position that all of her evidence relating to the period before July 7, 2006 deserved no consideration. Clearly, this was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in two (2) respects: first, in using citizenship as a shortcut; and second, in evading its positive duty to scrutinize the facts and evidence.

VI-J. Poe-Llamanzares satisfied the 10-year residency requirement

·         Poe-Llamanzares has shown by substantial evidence that the incremental process of establishing her residence in the Philippines commenced on May 24, 2005 and was completed in the latter part of April 2006. 

·         Her evidence satisfies the three (3) requisites for establishing domicile of choice in the Philippines: First, bodily presence in the Philippines is demonstrated by her actual arrival in the country on May 24, 2005. Second, animus manendi or intent to remain in the Philippines, is demonstrated by:

o   Petitioner's travel records, which indicate that even as she could momentarily leave for a trip abroad, she nevertheless constantly returned to the Philippines;

o   Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, which attests to how, upon their arrival in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner and her children first lived with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City, thereby requiring a change in the living arrangements at her own residence;

o   The school records of petitioner's children, which prove that they have been continuously attending Philippine schools beginning in June 2005;

o   Petitioner's Tax Identification Number Identification Card, which indicates that "shortly after her return in May 2005, she considered herself a taxable resident and submitted herself to the Philippines' tax jurisdiction";487 and

o   Two condominium certificates of title (one for Unit 7F, One Wilson Place, and another for a corresponding parking slot which were both purchased in early 2005), and along with corresponding Declarations of Real Property Tax Declarations which establish intent to permanently reside in the Philippines.

·         Lastly, animus non revertendi or intent to abandon domicile in the United States is demonstrated by:
o   Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, which "attests to, among others, the reasons which prompted [petitioner] to leave the [United States] and return permanently to the Philippines";

o   Affidavit of petitioner's husband, which affirms petitioner's explanations of how they made arrangements for their relocation to the Philippines as early as March 2005;

o   Petitioner and her husband's documented inquiries and exchanges with property movers as regards the transfer of their effects and belongings from the United States to the Philippines, which affirms their intent to permanently leave the United States as early as March 2005;

o   The actual relocation and transfer of effects and belongings, "which were packed and collected for storage and transport to the Philippines on February and April 2006";

o   Petitioner's husband's act of informing the United States Postal Service that he and his family are abandoning their address in the United States as of March 2006;

o   Petitioner and her husband's sale of their family home in the United States on April 27, 2006;

o   Petitioner's husband's resignation from his work in the United States effective April 2006; and

o   Petitioner's husband's actual return to the Philippines on May 4, 2006.

VI-K. Poe-Llamanzares's husband not a party to this case

·         Insisting that petitioner failed to timely reestablish residence, the COMELEC underscores three (3) facts: first, her husband, Teodoro Llamanzares, "remained a resident of the US in May 2005, where he kept and retained his employment"; second, Poe-Llamanzares, using her United States passport, supposedly travelled frequently to the United States from May 2005 to July 2006; and third, a statement in the Certificate of Candidacy she filed for Senator indicating that she was a resident of the Philippines for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May 13, 2013, which must mean that: first, by May 9, 2016, she shall have been a resident of the Philippines for a cumulative period of nine (9) years and six (6) months; and second, she started to be a resident of the Philippines only in November 2006.

·         None of these facts sustain the COMELEC's conclusions.

·         Relying on the residence of her husband is simply misplaced. He is not a party to this case. No incident relating to his residence (or even citizenship) binds the conclusions that are to be arrived at in this case. Poe-Llamanzares was free to establish her own residence. The position that the residence of the wife follows that of the husband is antiquated and no longer binding. Article 110 of the Civil Code used to provide that "[t]he husband shall fix the residence of the family." But it has long been replaced by Article 152 of the Family Code, which places the wife on equal footing as the husband.

·         On Poe-Llamanzares's trips to the US, the COMELEC was wrong in tagging as "frequent" a total of two trips, neither of which even extended longer than a month. This is a red flag, a badge of how the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to go about its task of meticulously considering the evidence.

·         Moreover, what is pivotal is not that petitioner travelled to the United States. Rather, it is the purpose of these trips. If at all, these trips attest to the abandonment of her domicile in the United States and her having reestablished it in the Philippines. As petitioner explained, it was not out of a desire to maintain her abode in the United States, but it was precisely to wrap up her affairs there and to consummate the reestablishment of her domicile in the Philippines.

·         As to the entries in her 2013 COC for her senatorial bid, which show that she has yet to satisfy the 10-year residency requirement, Poe-Llamanzares referred to these as "honest mistakes." But as per COMELEC, a certificate of candidacy, being a notarized document, may only be impugned by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant because it has in its favor a presumption of regularity. 

·         Even assuming, however, that an "admission" is worth considering, the mere existence of any such admission does not imply its conclusiveness. "No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant."

·         In the instant case, Poe-Llamanzares has established her good faith, that is, that she merely made an honest mistake. In addition, she adduced a plethora of evidence, "more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper," that proves the fact of her residence, which was reestablished through an incremental process commencing on May 24, 2005.

·         Additionally, the standard form for the certificate of candidacy that petitioner filed for Senator required her to specify her "Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." This syntax lent itself to some degree of confusion as to what the "period before May 13, 2013" specifically entailed. It was, thus, quite possible for a person filling out a blank certificate of candidacy to have merely indicated his or her period of residence as of the filing of his or her Certificate of Candidacy. This would not have been problematic for as long as the total period of residence relevant to the position one was running for was complied with.

·         The fact of Poe-Llamanzares's honest mistake is accounted for. Working in her favor is a seamless, consistent narrative. This controverts any intent to deceive. It is an honest error for a layperson.

VI-L. Real properties in the US not determinative of residence

·         Another fact cited against Poe-Llamanzares is her continuing ownership of two (2) real properties in the United States. Specifically, these pertain to two residential houses in the US, one purchased in 1992, and the other in 2008.

·         The characterization of the two properties as "residential" does not mean that Poe-Llamanzares has actually been using them as her residence. Classifying real properties on the basis of utility (e.g., as residential, agricultural, commercial, etc.) is merely a descriptive exercise. It does not amount to an authoritative legal specification of the relationship between the real property owner and the property. Thus, one may own agricultural land but not till it; one may own a commercial property but merely lease it out to other commercial enterprises.

·         In other words, to say that Poe-Llamanzares owns "residential" property does not mean that she is actually residing in it.

·         Moreover, there is a distinction between residence and domicile. It is this distinction that permits a person to maintain a separate residence simultaneously with his or her domicile.

·         Ultimately, it does not matter that Poe-Llamanzares owns residential properties in the United States, or even that she actually uses them as temporary places of abode. What matters is that she has established and continues to maintain domicile in the Philippines.
  
CONCLUSION

·         Clearly, the Commission on Elections' actions constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to utter lack of jurisdiction. These actions being unjust as well as unchristian (?), we have no choice except to annul this unconstitutional act.