May 30, 1961
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
FACTS
Tee Hook Chun arrived in Manila from HK bearing a fake Filipino passport with the name Eutemio Rayel. After a preliminary investigation, the Immigration Commissioner ordered the exclusion of Tee Hook Chun for being a foreigner.
Thereafter, prosecutors of the City of Manila filed a criminal action against Tee Hook Chun for breach of paragraph (e) of section 45 of CA 613 when he made a misrepresentation of his citizenship to avoid immigration laws. He was later found guilty by the CFI Manila where he was ordered to be imprisoned for a year, to pay a fine of P1,000, and be deported to HK after serving his sentence.
Tee Hook Chun filed an appeal before the CFI of Manila, which ordered his release pending the resolution of his appeal after he posted a bail of P10,000. But the Immigration Commissioner refused to release Tee Hook Chun on the ground that an exclusion order had already been issued against the latter.
Because of the Immigration Commissioner's refusal to release him, Tee Hook Chun filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus before the CA, which petition was eventually granted.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING
Petition granted. CA ruling reversed.
Whether the CA's order to have Tee Hook Chun released from custody be sufficient to override the latter's detention on account of the exclusion order rendered against him in the administrative proceedings. – NO.
At the outset, it should be noted that, although both administrative and criminal proceedings arose from the same facts, each proceeding sought to deal with a violation of a provision of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which is entirely different and distinct from that dealt with in the other proceeding.
The administrative proceeding for deportation shall be "independent of the criminal action." Hence, an order of release in the criminal action, upon the filing therein of the corresponding bail bond, would not affect the legality of the detention under a warrant of arrest or deportation issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. Similarly, the acquittal of the accused in said criminal action would not bar his deportation under the same provision, by the Commissioner of Immigration.
When the detaining officer holds the accused in pursuance of a warrant issued by another court, in connection with another case, whether the latter be criminal or civil, said detaining officer is not bound to release said accused by order of the court first mentioned, and defendant's continued deprivation of liberty, despite such order, upon the authority of the warrant issued by the latter court or by Congress, will not be illegal and would not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Whether the filing of a subsequent criminal action against Tee Hook Chun invalidated the adverse ruling rendered against him in the administrative proceedings. – NO.
The power of exclusion is not set aside, waived or lost upon institution of the criminal case. The sole effect is that one order will have to yield to the other, but only in point of priority or order of execution or performance. But neither will nullify onr set aside the other, nor imply a renunciation of the latter.
In the present case, the Immigration Commissioner may have to postpone the actual exclusion of Tee Hook Chun, until after the latter has served such penalty as may eventually be imposed upon him in the criminal case. And if the sentence in the criminal case should include an order for Tee Hook Chun's deportation, the Immigration Commissioner shall then deport him. In such event, Tee Hook Chun would be "deported", not excluded from the Philippines, not because the Immigration Commissioner's authority to order the exclusion has been extinguished, nullified or waived in consequence of the filing of said criminal action, but, because, it would be unnecessary to exercise it, in view of the Tee Hook Chun's deportation.
The logic for this rule is: If the party accused in a criminal case were entitled to release, despite the warrant of exclusion, the effect of said criminal action as deterrent would be considerably impaired. In fact, under certain conditions, one bent on being in the Philippines at all cost, even if only for a couple of years, would welcome his prosecution in court, for it would afford him a sure means to beat the proceedings for his exclusion, gain entry into the Philippines and be free to roam therein on bail, until the judgment rendered in the criminal case shall have become executory.
DOCTRINE
Although criminal and administrative proceedings
are entirely different and distinct from each other, the former is not
legally inconsistent with the latter and vice versa. As such, the
prosecution for the former does not entail a waiver of the action due
for the latter.
