June 30, 2005
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
·
Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995 square meters located in the vicinity of
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
·
The Lahug Airport had been turned over by the
Unites States Army to the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947.
·
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation
(NAC, formerly Surplus Property Commission then Bureau of Aeronautics, later
the Civil Aeronautics Administration), informed the owners of the various lots
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including Gopuco, that the government was
acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their properties on the
assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no
longer be used by the airport. Others, including Gopuco, refused to do so.
·
In 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the
CFI of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties.
In 1961, the CFI declared the expropriation of the subject lots, including Lot
No. 72, justified and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain.
·
No appeal
was taken from the decision on Lot
No. 72, so the judgment of condemnation became final and executory. In May
1962, the absolute title to Lot No. 72 was transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines.
·
In 1989, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed
by then President Corazon C. Aquino when the Mactan International Airport
commenced operations in the same year. Lot No. 72 was thus virtually abandoned.
·
In 1990, Gopuco sought the return of his lot.
In a letter addressed to the Bureau of Air Transportation, he offered to return
the money previously received by him as payment for the expropriation. This
letter was ignored.
·
Also in 1990, Congress enacted RA No. 6958,
creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). The law
provided for the transfer of Lahug Airport's assets to the MCIAA. The ownership
of Lot No. 72 was thus transferred to MCIAA.
·
In 1992, Gopuco filed an action against the
Air Transportation Office and the Province of Cebu for the recovery of
ownership of Lot No. 72. He argued that:
o by virtue
of the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the
property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to
the property had therefore reverted to him;
o when the
original judgment of expropriation had been handed down, and before they could
file an appeal thereto, the CAA offered them a compromise settlement whereby
they were assured that the expropriated lots would be resold to them for the
same price as when it was expropriated in the event that the Lahug Airport
would be abandoned. Gopuco did not present any proof to substantiate this
contention; and
o he had
come across several announcements in the papers that the Lahug Airport was soon
to be developed into a commercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of the
Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his property.
·
RTC: Dismissed complaint and directed
Gopuco to pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs. The
planned expansion of the airport in 1949 justified the exercise of eminent
domain. The fact of abandonment or closure of the Lahug Airport did not by
itself, result in the reversion of the subject property back to Gopuco nor did
it vest in him the right to demand reconveyance of said property.
·
CA: Reversed RTC ruling. The
expropriation of the property was conditioned on its continued devotion to its
public purpose. It stands to reason that should that public use be abandoned,
as what had happened with Lahug Airport when it was abandoned, then the
expropriated property should revert back to its former owner.
·
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING:
Whether
Gopuco has a right to reclaim ownership over his expropriated property upon the
cessation of operations of the Lahug Airport. – NO.
·
When real property has been acquired for
public use unconditionally, either by eminent domain or by purchase, the
abandonment or non-use of the real property, does not ipso facto give to the
previous owner of said property any right to recover the same.
·
As applied in the present case, the fact of
abandonment or closure of the Lahug Airport did not by itself, result in the
reversion of the subject property back to Gopuco. Nor did it vest in him the
right to demand reconveyance of said property.
When
private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular
public use is abandoned, does the land so expropriated return to its former
owner? – IT DEPENDS.
·
It depends upon the character of the title acquired
by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent
domain.
·
If, for example, land is expropriated for a
particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when
the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property
so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and
the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a
public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory
provision to the contrary. . . If upon
the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee
simple title – as in the instant case – then of course, the land becomes the
absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of
defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
·
When land
has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights
in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to
a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner.
Did the
judgment of expropriation concerning Lot No. 72 vest absolute and unconditional
title in the government? – YES.
·
Gopuco: (1) There is no showing that the
government benefited from entering into compromise agreements with the other
lot owners; (2) the compromise agreements were discriminatory because they
discriminate against those who have neither the werewithal nor the savvy to
contest the expropriation, or agree to modify the judgment; and (3) there
exists between the government and the owners of expropriated realty an implied
contract that the properties involved will be used only for the public purpose
for which they were acquired in the first place.
·
SC: The
terms of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings are clear and
unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 72 in fee simple to the Republic of
the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot
would return to Gopuco or that Gopuco had a right to repurchase the same if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property
was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. And although other lot
owners were able to successfully reacquire their lands by virtue of a
compromise agreement, since Gopuco was not a party to any such agreement, he
could not validly invoke the same.
·
Compromise agreements valid: A compromise
agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties. It is a
contract perfected by mere consent, whereby the parties, making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has
the force of law and is conclusive between the parties, and courts will not
relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their
contracts turned out to be unwise. But Gopuco
has not shown that any of the compromise agreements was in any way tainted with
illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Anyone who is not a party to a contract
or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since
Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke
the same.
·
In cases of expropriation, there is no implied
contract that the properties will be used only for the public purpose for which
they were acquired. The only direct constitutional qualification is that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and
so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought
to be enforced.
·
In the present case case, the judgment on the
propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the compensation received have long
become final. The terms of that judgment granted title in fee simple to the
Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, Gopuco failed to adduce any evidence at
all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor. Therefore, no rights to Lot
No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by Gopuco.
Nature of
exproriation
·
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.
·
Also often referred to as expropriation and,
with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation, an
inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional
gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant
more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a
right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public
use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty.
·
In fact, all separate interests of individuals
in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest
and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume
the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
·
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is
manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor
in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the
property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.
On why
Gopuco should not be ordered to pay damages
·
There was no proof that this case was clearly
unfounded or filed for purposes of harassment, or that Gopuco acted in gross
and evident bad faith. The reimposition of litigation expenses and costs has no
basis. It is not sound public policy to set a premium upon the right to
litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in the present case.