Wednesday, February 17, 2021

[CASE DIGEST] ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS v. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE and RAFAEL SALAS (G.R. No. L-28790)

April 29, 1968

Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.

FACTS

In 1968, Antonio H. Noblejas, then the Commissioner of Land Registration, received a letter from Secretary of Justice Claudio requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.

In his answer to Secretary Teehankee, Noblejas said that his position was created by R.A. No. 1151, which further provided that as Commissioner, he enjoyed the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. As such, he argued that he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon.

Later on, Executive Secretary Rafael Salas suspended Noblejas after finding that a prima facie case against him existed for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest.

Noblejas filed a petition before the SC against Secretary Teehankee and Executive Secretary Salas for grave abuse of discretion and conduct in excess of jurisdiction.

RULING

Is the Commissioner of Land Registration, who enjoys the same benefits as a Judge of the Court of First Instance, subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court? -- NO.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

As Commissioner of Land Registration, Noblejas had administrative or executive functions, not judicial. Even the Resolutions on consultas that he signs cannot be said to be judicial rulings. In fact, the SC held that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of Noblejas's administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Further, the SC pointed out the following to debunk the argument of Noblejas:

Section 67 of the Judiciary Act provides that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The SC pointed out that since Noblejas is not a district judge, then the SC cannot exercise disciplinary authority over him.

Other Executive officials enjoy the same privileges as officers of the court. The Solicitor General, for example, has the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals. Despite this, the SolGen remains under the disciplinary authority of the President.

Finally, having an official of the executive department subject to the disciplinary authority of the SC would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging the SC with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

The grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void.

The petition of Noblejas is denied.