[CASE DIGEST] Salas v. Jarencio (G.R. No. L-29788)

August 30, 1972

FACTS:

Republic Act 4118 was signed into law for the purpose of allowing the Land Tenure Authority to sell a 7,450 sqm property in Manila to the tenants thereof.

Mayor Villegas of Manila brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds from further implementing RA No. 4118 and praying for the declaration of RA No. 4118 as unconstitutional.

The Manila Mayor contended that the subject property belonged to the City by virtue of a TCT issued in the name of the City of Manila by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1919.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject land is the patrimonial property of the City of Manila. -- NO.
Whether RA No. 1148 is constitutional. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Baksh v. CA (G.R. No. 97336)

February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan, courted and proposed marriage to Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year old single Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Marilou accepted the marriage proposal.

Subsequently, Gashem forced her to live with him. Marilou, who was a virgin before she began living with Gashe, became pregnant. She was later provided some medicine for abortion by Gashem.

Marilou was subjected to threats and maltreatment by Gashem, who later on repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.

Marilou sought damages against Gashem for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The trial Court ruled in her favor and awarded her moral damages in the sum of P20,0000, attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000, and litigation expenses in the sum of P2,000.

In his appeal, Gashem argued that Article 21 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case because of the following: (1) he claims to have not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; (2) he has not professed love or proposed marriage to Marilou; (3) he never maltreated her; (4) the trial court liberally invoked Filipino customs, traditions and culture, to his prejudice; (5) his actions were tolerable under his Muslim upbringing; and (6) the mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable.

ISSUE:

Whether Marilou may recover damages from Gashem on the basis of Article 21. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Elcano v. Hill (G.R. No. L-24803)

May 26, 1977

FACTS:

Reginald Hill was accused of killing Agapito Elcano. Hill was subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act was not considered criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”

Pedro Elcano, father of the victim Agapito, filed a case for recovery of damages instead against Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill, before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

The Hills filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that the action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata. The CFI granted said motion. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for recovery of damages by the Elcanos is barred by the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case filed against him. -- NO.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-31195)

June 5, 1973

FACTS:

On March 4, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about about PBMEO's plans, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. called for a meeting with the leaders of the union. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by PBMEO, which noted that the demonstration was not a strike against the company. PBMEO stated that the planned demonstration was an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances against police indignities.

The company asked PBMEO to cancel the demonstration, noting that the same would constitute an interruption of the normal course of their business which may result in loss of revenue. The company also threatened the workers that they would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the demonstration.

A second meeting took place where the company stressed that those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate in the demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed.

Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the demonstration took place. The officers of PBMEO were eventually dismissed by the company for violation of the "No Strike and No Lockout" clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of PBMEO officers from their employment constituted a violation of their constitutional right to freedom of expression, assembly, and petition. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Mercury Drug and Rolando Del Rosario v. Spouses Huang and Stephen Huang (G.R. No. 172122)

June 22, 2007

FACTS:

A sedan owned by Stephen Huang and a six-wheeler Mitsubishi truck owned by Mercury Drug Corp. and driven by its employee Rolando del Rosario figured in an accident along C5 in Taguig, Metro Manila. As a result, the sedan was wrecked while Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed from chest down requiring continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Spouses Huang, Stephen's parents, were with him in the vehicle at the time of the accident and consequently sustained injuries.

It must be noted that at the time of the accident, Del Rosario had a Traffic Violation Receipt because his driver’s license had been confiscated as he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.

Before the RTC, Spouses Huang faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.

RTC found Del Rosario and Mercury Drug jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA upheld the RTC's ruling. Hence, the instant appeal.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mercury Drug should be held liable for the negligence of its employee Del Rosario. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] People v. Balisacan (G.R. No. L-26376)

August 31, 1966

FACTS:

Aurelio Balisacan stabbed Leonicio Bulaoat, which resulted in the latter's death. Aurelio was subsequently charged with homicide before the trial court of Ilocos Norte.

During the arraignment, Aurelio pleaded guilty. He was then allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. During his testimony, Aurelio said he stabbed Leonicio in self-defense because the latter was strangling him.

On the basis of the above testimony, the trial court acquitted Aurelio.

An appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals, but the CA forwarded the same to the Supreme Court, noting that said appeal involved questions purely of law.

ISSUE:

Whether an appeal challenging the acquittal of Aurelio constitutes double jeopardy. -- NO.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] People v. Estoista (G.R. No. L-5793)

August 27, 1953

FACTS:

Alberto Estoista and his father, Bruno Estoista, lived in the same house. A little distance from their house was a 27-hectare property belonging to their family. The property was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds, and second growth trees.

From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, Alberto took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was allegedly not known by Alberto.

There was a disparity in how the incident came about. According to Alberto, he was told by his father Bruno to shoot a wild rooster crowing near their house. But according to Bruno, he gave his gun to his sharp-shooting son Alberto upon the latter's request in order to shoot the wild chickens on the plantation.

In any event, the trial court acquitted Alberto for homicide through reckless imprudence but held him guilty for illegal possession of firearm. The trial court ruled that Alberto be imprisoned from 5 to 10 years and to pay fines.

Alberto filed the instant petition to challenge the constitutionality of the sentence meted out to him, arguing that the imprisonment of 5 to 10 years is cruel and unusual.

ISSUE:

Is imprisonment from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm cruel or unusual? -- NO.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board (G.R. No. L-75697)

June 18, 1987

Valentin Tio, petitioner
Videogram Regulatory Board, Minister of Finance, Metro Manila Commission, City Mayor, and City Treasurer of Manila, respondents

FACTS:

Presidential Decree No. 1987, entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board," was promulgated on October 5, 1985.

A month later, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code, providing that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

In September 1986, Valentin Tio, who was doing business under the name and style of OMI Enterprises, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of PD No. 1987, on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.
   

ISSUE:

Whether PD No. 1987 is unconstitutional. -- NO.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (G.R. No. L-29646)

November 10, 1978

Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, petitioner
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho and Judge Francisco Arco, respondents

FACTS:

On February 22, 1968, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 6537. The ordinace was signed by Mayor Antonio Villegas.

Section 1 of said Ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Exempted are persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

In May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. He cited the following grounds:

1. As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
   
   
2. As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
   
   
3. It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

The trial court ruled in Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho's favor, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 6537 is unconstitutional. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Mandanas v. Ochoa (G.R. Nos. 199802, 208488)

July 3, 2018

Hermilando Mandanas, et al., petitioners
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, et al., respondents

FACTS:

The fiscal autonomy guaranteed to local governments under Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution means the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the "national taxes" released by the National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.

Pursuant to this Constitutional dictum, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC). Sec. 284 of the LGC provides that LGUs shall have an allotment equivalent to 40% of the the national internal revenue taxes.

The share of the LGUs, known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has been regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Two petitions were filed to challenge the base figure for the computation of the IRA.

In G.R. No. 199802, Cong. Hermilando Mandanas, et al., alleged that the NIRTs certified by the BIR excluded the NIRTs collected by the Bureau of Customs, specifically excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs), and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs). Such exclusion resulted in LGUs being deprived of ₱60,750,000,000.00 for FY 2012. Further, the petitioners argued that since this mistake in computation was happening since 1992, then the National Government has effectively deprived LGUs of ₱438,103,906,675.73 in their IRA.

Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 208488, Cong. Enrique Garcia, Jr. sought the issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel respondents to compute the just share of the LGUs on the basis of all national taxes. He argued that the insertion by Congress of the words "internal revenue" in the phrase "national taxes" found in Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Alanis III v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 216425)

November 11, 2020 | G.R. No. 216425

Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III, petitioner
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, and Hon. Gregorio de la Pena III of RTC Branch 12 of Zamboanga City, respondents

FACTS:

Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III was born to Mario Cimafranca Alanis (father) and Jarmila Imelda Al-Raschid Ballaho (mother). His parents separated when he was 5 years old. As such, he and his siblings were raised alone by his mother.

Subsequently, he filed a petition before the RTC of Zamboanga City to change his name to Abdulhamid Ballaho, for two reasons: (a) he wanted to remove the name of his father; and (b) he has always been known as Abdulhamid Ballaho, as evidenced by his yearbook, campus newspaper, non-professional driver's license, and community tax certificate, among others.

RTC: Denied petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant a change of name. The RTC also held that to allow him to drop his last name was to disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate children shall principally use their fathers' surnames.

CA denied petitioner's Petition for Certiorari based on procedural lapses.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers' surnames as their surnames. -- YES.

HELD:

[CASE DIGEST] Sonza v. ABS-CBN (G.R. No. 138051)

June 10, 2004 | G.R. No. 138051

Jose "Jay" Y. Sonza, petitioner
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., respondent

FACTS:

In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation (MJMDC). MJMDC agreed to provide Jay Sonza’s services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay for Sonza's services a monthly talent fee of ₱310,000 for the first year and ₱317,000 for the second and third year of the Agreement.

On April 1, 1996, Sonza wrote a letter wrote a letter to ABS-CBN President Eugenio Lopez III, accusing ABS-CBN of violating the Agreement.

On April 30, 1996, Sonza filed a complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), alleging that  that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan.

ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties.

LABOR ARBITER: Dismissed Sonza's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that because Sonza is a "talent," he cannot be considered an employee.

NLRC: Dismissed Sonza's Motion for Reconsideration.

COURT OF APPEALS: Affirmed NLRC ruling. The CA ruled that the allegations of Sonza against ABS-CBN did not constitute a labor dispute because there was no employer-employee relationship to begin with. If anything, Sonza's allegations constitute an action for breach of contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil dispute to be resolved by a civil court, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether Jay Sonza was an employee of ABS-CBN? -- NO.

HELD: