[FULL CASE] SANTANA v. MARIÑAS (G.R. No. L-35537)

December 27, 1979

Ponente: Santos, J.

This is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision dated September 5, 1972 of the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals-composed of Justice E. Soriano, M. Barcelona and L.B. Reyes in CA-G.R. 37292-R, entitled "Sotero Mariñas vs. Francisco Santana and Jose H. Panganiban", Soriano, J., ponente, which reversed the decision 1 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Sotero Mariñas-plaintiff below and private respondent herein — for recovery of the property in litigation under Section 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as Public Land Law and (2) ordered Francisco Santana and Jose H. Panganiban — defendants below and now herein petitioners — to reconvey the aforesaid property to respondent Mariñas upon payment by him of the repurchase price in the amount of P4,128.60, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Required to comment in the resolution of September 28, 1972, private respondent did so on October 20, 1972. 4 Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the comment of private respondent, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit in its resolution of October 31, 1972. 5 In due time, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 6 of the aforesaid resolution denying their petition for review. In the resolution of November 23, 1972, 7 private respondent was required to comment on the motion for reconsideration. The required comment was filed by private respondent on December 15, 1972. 8

On February 9, 1973, the Court resolved: (a) to reconsider its October 31, 1972 resolution of denial and (b) to give due course to the petition. 9 Accordingly, the parties filed their respective briefs. 10

The procedural, as well as the factual, antecedents that spawned the present case are not in dispute. On April 21, 1960, private respondent Sotero Mariñas - as plaintiff - filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint to recover a real property alleging, insofar as material to this petition, (1) that he acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 217, Rizal Registry, a parcel of land containing an area of four hectares, twelve ares and eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16, 1956, he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco Santana - one of the defendants below - for a sum of ?4,128,60; that the other petitioner Jose H. Panganiban - also a co-defendant below - was included in the complaint because he is a subsequent lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold to him by Santana on March 25, 1956 for the same amount of P4,128.60; that the land has an annual produce worth P400.00; and praying (2) that judgment be rendered: (a) allowing him to repurchase the property for the sum of P4,128.60 and (b) awarding to him P400.00 annually from date of filing of the complaint until the property is delivered to him, with costs. 11

On May 26, 1960, herein petitioners, defendants below, filed their respective answers admitting some material factual allegations in the complaint; but denied the right of private respondent to repurchase the property, and interposed the following affirmative defenses: (1) that at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally ignorant of and had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to repurchase by private respondent, who assured petitioner Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in question absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not subject to any right of repurchase as he (respondent Mariñas) had been in possession of the property for over twenty-five (25) years; (2) that they (petitioners) have always been of the honest belief that they acquired absolute ownership of the property, free from any Hen or encumbrances whatsoever and, hence, are purchasers in good faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for value, they acquired absolute ownership over the property and private respondent cannot enforce against them any right of repurchase of whatever nature; (4) that as absolute owners and possessors in good faith, they (petitioners) incurred necessary and useful expenses thereon in the total amount of not less than Pl0,000.00; and (5) that the property in question now a residential area with real estate subdivisions and roads in front and at the back thereof and its present increased value is no less than P2.50 a square meter. Petitioners interposed a counterclaim for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the total sum of P5,000.00. In their prayer petitioners asked for the rendition of judgment absolving them completely from the complaint, with costs, and sentencing private respondent to pay them moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00; or in the remote possibility that repurchase by private respondent were allowed, to require the latter to pay the reasonable market value of not less than P2.50 per square meter. 

SC Associate Justice takes a somber stance on lockhorn with Malacanang

"As long as [the SC] works for the ideal, it is worth your support." – Justice Leonen

MANILA, August 28, 2014 -- Speaking before a crowd of mostly law students, Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen calmly underscored the importance of the rule of law in settling judicial issues.

"Words have settled meaning within a particular frame," he said, adding that "the most difficult cases are the ones whose outcomes have an impact to

society."

He said judicial review is "shaped by every case," and that as long as the SC "works for the ideal, it is worth your support."

Justice Leonen's pronouncements, addressed in an academic discussion on constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and public accountability at the University of the Philippines College of Law on August 28th, come on the heels of President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino's well-publicized verbal assaults against what he thinks is a "meddlesome" court.

The President has openly broached the idea of amending the 1987 Constitution, not only for a possible term extension, but also to clip the Judiciary's power for judicial review following a succession of setbacks his administration has received from the court, notably the SC's unanimous decision rendering parts of the controversial Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), more popularly known as the President's pork, as unconstitutional.

[CASE DIGEST] JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE v. NLRC (G.R. No. L-65482 )

December 1, 1987 

Ponente: Paras, J. 

 

FACTS:

·         In behalf of the faculty and personnel of Jose Rizal College (JRC), the National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) filed a complaint before the Ministry of Labor against JRC for its non-payment of  holiday pay to its employees from 1975 to 1977. 

·         The Labor Arbiter ruled that: (a) faculty and personnel who are paid a uniform salary per month are no longer entitled to separate payment for regular holidays; (b) personnel who are paid their wages daily are entitled to be paid the 10 unworked regular holidays according to the pertinent provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid compensation on a per hour basis are not entitled to unworked regular holiday pay considering that these regular holidays have been excluded in the programming of the student contact hours.

·         On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's ruling on the first two types of employees but modified the ruling pertaining to the third type. The NLRC held that teaching personnel paid by the hour are also entitled to holiday pay. Hence, the instant petition.

ARGUMENTS:

·         JRC: Private school teachers paid by the hour are required to hold classes for a particular number of hours. In the programming of these student contract hours, legal holidays are excluded and labelled in the schedule as "no class day. " On the other hand, if a regular week day is declared a holiday, the school calendar is extended to compensate for that day. As such, the advent of any of the legal holidays within the semester will not affect the faculty's salary because this day is not included in their schedule while the calendar is extended to compensate for special holidays. 

·         SolGen: Under Article 94 of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442 as amended), holiday pay applies to all employees except those in retail and service establishments. To deprive therefore employees paid at an hourly rate of unworked holiday pay is contrary to the policy considerations underlying such presidential enactment, and its precursor, the Blue Sunday Law (Republic Act No. 946) apart from the constitutional mandate to grant greater rights to labor (Constitution, Article II, Section 9).

·         NLRC: The purpose of a holiday pay is obvious; that is to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn. That is his holiday pay. It is no excuse therefore that the school calendar is extended whenever holidays occur, because such happens only in cases of special holidays.

RULING: 

[FULL CASE] RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY v. CA (G.R. No. 83992)

January 27, 1993

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.

Two (2) issues are presented for Our resolution in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz: (1) whether or not the two-year redemption period fixed by the Rural Banks' Act1 in a foreclosure sale of property acquired through a homestead patent superseded or repealed the five-year repurchase period prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Act2 and (2) if it did not, whether, in the event of the expropriation by the Government of the subject property during the redemption or repurchase period, a homesteader, who thereafter exercised his right to redeem or repurchase, is entitled to the compensation for such expropriation less the redemption or repurchase amount. The trial court ruled in the negative for the first issue and in the affirmative for the second. The respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Hence, We have the instant petition seeking for a contrary ruling.

The undisputed facts generative of this controversy are as follows:

On 18 April 1978, private respondents Gabriel Abellano and Francisca Sequitan obtained a loan in the amount of P45,000.00 from the petitioner, a rural bank organized and existing under the Rural Banks' Act. The terms thereof called for payment of the loan in two (2) equal installments on 21 October 1978 and 21 April 1979.

As security for the loan, the private respondents mortgaged with the petitioner a parcel of land, belonging to them, with an area of one (1) hectare, more or less, located at Matina, Davao City and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7392. The land was acquired through a homestead patent.

On 1 July 1978, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City a complaint for the expropriation of several parcels of land located in Davao City to carry out its Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program; said action was directed against the private respondents, with respect to the mortgaged property, and fifteen (15) other persons. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 11157 and was raffled off to Branch II of said court. As mortgagee, the petitioner filed therein a motion to intervene, which the court granted.

Upon arrival of the loan's maturity dates, private respondents failed to pay their obligation to the petitioner. The latter therefore caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended. During the foreclosure sale held on 9 November 1979, the petitioner submitted the highest bid; consequently, the Deputy Sheriff executed in its favor a certificate of sale for the total amount of P54,883.00 which included the unpaid interest and other charges.

The certificate of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Davao City on 7 December 1979. Private respondents, however, failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the period of two (2) years from the date of registration, or up to 7 December 1981, as provided for in Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act. Despite such failure, the petitioner extended the period to October 1982. The private respondents still failed to redeem the property. Petitioner then asked for the consolidation of its title over the same. In due course, the private respondents' certificate of title was canceled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-92487 in the name of the petitioner was issued on 3 November 1982.

On 24 February 1983, Branch II of the CFI of Davao City issued an order in Special Civil Case No. 11157 requiring the NHA to pay the amount of P85.00 per square meter for the properties sought to be expropriated, which included the aforementioned foreclosed property. This amount was subsequently reduced to P49.00 per square meter. Thus, the price to be paid for the foreclosed property was P490,000.00.

On 9 November 1983, private respondents notified the petitioner of their desire to repurchase the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). Rebuffed by the latter, private respondents filed on 9 February 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a complaint for reconveyance of their foreclosed property under said Section 119. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 16693 and was raffled off to Branch XIII of the said court.

In its Affirmative Defenses set up in the Answer to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the private respondents' action will no longer prosper because their right to repurchase had become moot and academic as the property could no longer be physically, materially and actually recovered or repurchased. This is so because no less than the sovereign state needed the same — pursuant to its socialized housing program under P.D. No. 875, as amended — to be divided into smaller lots for distribution to a greater number of recipients, and that "the right to repurchase cannot be exercised without the actual, material and physical recovery of the property itself, otherwise such an action, as the instant action of the plaintiffs, is purely speculative, which our Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, had frowned upon and disallowed."3

After the issues were joined, the trial court conducted a pre-trial conference on 3 May 1984. On the same date, it issued an order requiring the private respondents to deposit the sum of P54,883.00 as repurchase price which they complied with.

On 2 July 1984, private respondents filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint and File Supplemental Pleading alleging therein, inter alia, that since "there is a seeming impossibility for the plaintiffs now to reacquire the property by reason of the order of expropriation, justice also demands that the said amount of P490,000.00 must be given to the plaintiffs, in lieu of the property expropriated." Despite the petitioner's opposition, the trial court issued on 2 August 1984 an order granting the motion and admitting the amended complaint.

The trial court decided the case on 1 February 1985 on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered, declaring plaintiffs entitled to the price paid by the National Housing Authority for the property in question and ordering the defendant:

1.    To pay or remit the (sic) plaintiffs the sum of P435,117.00, the remaining balance of said price of the property paid by NHA after deducting the obligation of plaintiffs in the sum of P54,883.00;

2.    To pay plaintiff's interest on the P435,117.00 at the rate defendant grants to its depositor commencing on the date when defendant received the sum of P490,000.00 from NHA in payment of the property in question until the whole obligation is fully paid;

3.    To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fee plus costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner seasonably appealed this decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court on both questions of fact and law. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07689.

On 30 March 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals, as the successor of the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated, through a division of five (5) (Sixteenth Division), its decision in CA-G.R. No. 07689 affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 16693.5

In affirming the trial court's decision, the respondent Court held that Section 5 of the Rural Banks' Act, as amended, did not reduce the period of redemption of homestead lands from the five (5) years prescribed in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, to two (2) years from the date of registration of the foreclosure sale as fixed in the former; in support of such conclusion, it summoned Oliva vs. Lamadrid6 wherein this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, held: