November 28, 2007
Ponente: Tinga, J
FACTS:
·
On or about April 24, 1998, in Leganes,
Iloilo, Alexander Parreño, together with his 14-year-old daughter Michelle and
neighbor Phoebe, went to the house of Joemarie Cerillo. They were warmly
welcomed by Joemarie and his wife.
·
An hour later, a blackout occurred. At this
time, Alexander sought permission from the couple to leave, which the latter
acknowledged.
·
On their way home, Michelle was walking ahead
of Alexander with the latter closely following his daughter. Suddenly, after
walking for about 100 meters from Joemarie's house, Michelle heard an
explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw Joemarie pointing a gun
at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her. Phoebe the
neighbor ran away.
·
Michelle ran to her father. Michelle was
cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her that it
was Joemarie who shot him. Twenty minutes later, Alexander’s other daughter,
Novie Mae, arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was
Joemarie who shot him.
·
SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and
other police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander to
an ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he
answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which Joemarie was
known.
·
Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the
hospital was also told by Alexander that it was Joemarie who shot him.
Alexander died the following day.
·
Joemarie interposed alibi as his main defense.
He said he did not go out of his house after Alexander and his daughter had
left. This was corroborated by his wife and stepdaughter. Likewise, two police
officers stated that when they went to the hospital to interrogate Alexander,
the latter could not give a definite answer as to who shot him.
·
On August q5, 2000, the RTC found Joemarie
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court regarded the victim’s dying
declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to Joemarie as the assailant.
The trial court also appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the
crime to murder because the victim was unarmed and walking on his way home when
he was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by Joemarie, whose alibi and
denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.
·
The CA sustained Joemarie's conviction. Hence,
the instant automatic review. Joemarie's main argument is that the trial court erred in giving full credence
to the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the
dying declaration of Alexander considering that the circumstances (moonless
night, power blackout) under which the crime was committed rendered the
identification of the gunman impossible.
RULING:
Whether
Michelle's testimony and Alexander's dying declaration should be given credence.
– YES.
·
Michelle’s account of how her father was shot
by Joemarie was corroborated by the post-mortem examination which reveals that
the entrance wound is located at the back of the victim. Significantly,
Michelle’s positive identification of Joemarie as the perpetrator of the crime
is fully supported the victim’s dying declaration.
·
A dying declaration is a statement made by the
victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the cause and
circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that
death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short
time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of
recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person after a mortal
wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the
facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
·
As an exception to the rule against hearsay
evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus
admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the
cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault
was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant’s death renders it impossible
his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other
equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a
failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a
situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by an oath administered in court.
·
Of the doctrines that authorize the admission
of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying declarations is
the most mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in
its limitations. In the United States, the notion of the special likelihood of
truthfulness of deathbed statements was widespread long before the recognition
of a general rule against hearsay in the early 1700s. Not surprisingly, nearly
as soon as we find a hearsay rule, we also find an exception for dying
declarations.
Requisites for a dying declaration to be admissible
·
First, the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to
the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the
assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the
nature of the declarant’s injury or the cause of death; those imparting
deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for
the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of
cause for the act are admissible.
·
Second, at the time the declaration was made,
the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule
is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the
belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of
fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that
the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The
test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on
death as certainly impending.
·
Third, the declarant is competent as a
witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent
witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible.
Accordingly, declarations made by a child too young to be a competent witness
or by a person who was insane or incapable of understanding his own statements
by reason of partial unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence. Thus, in
the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been
competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained
that he would have been competent.
·
Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the
victim. Anent this requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in
fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify in
open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante mortem statement in the present
criminal case for murder.
·
As applied to this case: First, Alexander’s
declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the
fatal quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence
of his death as his condition was so serious that his demise occurred the
following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have
been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is
offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
Other issues:
On
Alexander's inability to provide an answer as to who shot him when asked by
police officers:
PO1 Javelora alleged that he happened to pass by the crime scene
and saw a young girl crying. The girl led him to her father who was sitting on
the roadside. He asked the victim who shot him but he did not get any reply.
PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the hospital and questioned Alexander as to
who shot him but the latter told them, "I am not sure because it was
dark." These statements cannot be construed as a categorical statement of
the victim denying knowledge as to the identity of his assailant. It can be
recalled that at the time Alexander was being questioned, he was already being
readied for surgery. At that point, he was understandably no longer fit to
respond to questions. Between these two seemingly conflicting testimonies, it
is the positive identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration which
must be sustained.
On the
impossibility of identifying the assailant with clarity since there was a power
blackout at the time of the commission of the crime and was then a moonless
night:
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not
cast doubt on Alexander’s and Michelle’s positive identification of appellant.
While the place of occurrence was dark, this did not prevent the Alexander or
Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot was
delivered at close range. A person’s nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily
diminished just because there is no illumination from the moon, because it is a
fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that we can still see
objects clearly even without sufficient lighting. In the case at bar, it would
not be so hard for Michelle to identify a person’s fact especially if the
latter – as in the present case – was barely two (2) arms length away from them
which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the body of the
victim.
On
Joemarie's alibi:
Michelle's positive identification of Joemarie must necessarily
prevail over his alibi. It was not physically impossible for Joemarie to have
been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The
distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is only
120-150 meters, more or less.
On the
negative result of the paraffin test conducted on Joemarie:
A negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that
one has not fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and
yet bear no traces of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his
hands or wears gloves. The trial court correctly rejected the result of the
paraffin test in light of the positive identification of appellant.
On the
presence of treachery:
The killing was qualified by treachery because Alexander, who was
unarmed, was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by Joemarie without any
risk to the latter from any defense which the former might make. There was no
opportunity given to Alexander to repel the assault or offer any defense of his
person. There was not the slightest provocation on his part. Joemarie suddenly,
and without warning, shot Alexander from his back.