October 30, 1981
Ponente: Fernando, C.J.
FACTS
On September 14, 1981, the Free Telephone Workers Union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices against PLDT. The Union was claiming that: (a) there was a unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; (b) that such implementation resulted in the illegal terminations and suspensions of the Union's officers and members; and (c) there were violations of the CBA, particularly the policy on sick leaves.
During the conciliation meetings, the Union expressed its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned. It also pleaded that in the meanwhile, the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended, to which PLDT refused. As such, the labor dispute was brought up to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
In the meantime, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amended Art. 264 of the Labor Code regarding strikes "affecting the national interest." The amended article now reads: "In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same."
Despite the fact that the labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union and PLDT was still pending before the NLRC, and despite the fact that there was no actual strike to speak of, the Free Telephone Workers Union still filed a petition before the SC challenging the constitutionality of the amended Art. 264 of the LC.
The Union was arguing that the delegation to the Minister of Labor and Employment (now the SOLE) of the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, was an undue delegation of legislative powers and was violative of the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining.
RULING
Petition denied. On its face, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amending Art. 264 of the LC is NOT on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
Whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 amending Art. 264 of the LC was an undue delegation of legislative power. – ON ITS FACE, NO. BUT THERE COULD BE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION.
Three reasons why the SC dismissed the Union's petition: (a) The allegation that there was undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny because at the time the petition was filed, there was no strike in progress (i.e., the Minister of Labor and Employment had not yet exercised his power to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute); (b) the doctrine of qualified political agency lends legitimacy to actions by ministers (now cabinet secretaries); and (c) a study of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 would show that the law satisfies the completeness test and does not in any way confer legislative powers to the Minister of Labor.
UNION'S PETITION IS PREMATURE
While the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 has not been demonstrated, there is no ruling on the issue of unconstitutional application, especially so as to any alleged infringement in the exercise of the power of compulsory arbitration of the specific modes provided in the Constitution to assure compliance with the constitutional mandate to "afford protection to labor" being at this stage premature.
The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for the Union within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress (which is not the case in the present petition, there being no strike yet).
There is no ruling on the question of whether or not the amended Art. 264 of the LC has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by PLDT, the matter is NOT YET ripe for judicial determination.
In any event, there is an unconstitutional application of a law when a law "fair on its face and impartial in appearance is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand." An example of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law (e.g., the protection of labor) is ignored or disregarded.• As a reminder, the SC held that when it comes to the application of the amended Art. 264, arbiters are required to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
Secretaries of departments exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.
As applied in the present case, any act by the Minister of Labor proceeding from the power conferred upon him by the amended Art. 264 of the LC shall be subject to the President's approval or disapproval.
Villena v. Secretary of Interior: "All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
Philippine American Management Co. v. Philippine American Management Employees Association: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, 'each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.'"
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 130 SATISFIES THE COMPLETENESS TEST
Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation of such power may be discerned. In fact, the subject law satisfies the completeness test; Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest."
People v. Exconde: "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."
Edu v. Ericta: "What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or riot there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted."
Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission: "The principle of non-delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modem governments giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."
A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
DOCTRINE
The Constitution is not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel.
