Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of two cases.
FIRST CASE: G.R. No. 120905
In 1994, an administrative complaint was filed before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro against Renato Reyes, mayor of Bongabong,
forthe following alleged infractions of the law:
o that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each
market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market;
o that certain checks issued to him by the National
Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts
of the same officer; and
o that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from
beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and
fattened the cattle for seven months.
In 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found Reyes guilty of
the charges and ordered his removal from office.
Earlier, however, after learning that the Sanggunian had
terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, Reyes
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of
Oriental Mindoro, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without
giving him a chance to be heard.
A TRO was issued by the court, enjoining the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes.
Following the expiration of the TRO and without any
injunction being issued by the RTC, an attempt was made to serve the decision
upon Reyes’ counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the
decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon Reyes himself also
failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.
In March 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order
for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office
to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also
refused.
In the same month, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy
with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong to seek for
reelection in the upcoming May 1995 elections.
Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, filed a
complaint for disqualification before the COMELEC against Reyes as candidate
for mayor, citing the LGC, which states that:
§40. Disqualification. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . . (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
COMELEC did not issue any order regarding the
disqualification case.
In the May 8, 1995 elections, Reyes was reelected as mayor
of Bongabong.
On May 9th, or the day after the elections, COMELEC issued a
resolution disqualifying Reyes from running for public office in conformity
with Sec. 40 of the LGC, which disqualifies those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case.
The next day, May 10th, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC,
proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
In June 1995, Reyes filed an MR on his disqualification. He
argued that pursuant to the condonation doctrine (i.e., a public official could
not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor) in the case of
Aguinaldo v. Santos, his reelection was a bar to his disqualification.
COMELEC denied his motion, declared him to have been validly
disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as
municipal mayor of Bongabong.
Hence, the instant petition.
SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 120940
Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of
votes next to Reyes in the May 8, 1995 elections, intervened in the COMELEC
after the main decision disqualifying Renato Reyes was promulgated. Garcia
argued that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
He argued further that:
o the COMELEC en banc should have decided his petition at
least 15 days before the May 8, 1995 elections as provided in Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Elections Code, and that because it failed to do so, many votes were invalidated
which could have been for him had the voters been told earlier who were
qualified to be candidates;
o that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
final and executory and resulted in the automatic disqualification of Reyes,
and the COMELEC did not need much time to decide the case for disqualification
against Reyes since the latter did not appeal the decision in the
administrative case ordering his removal; and
o that the COMELEC should have considered the votes cast for
Reyes as stray votes.
COMELEC dismissed Garcia's contentions. In its
resolution on the matter, the COMELEC held that, pursuant to the SC's
ruling in Republic v. De la Rosa, a candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in an election cannot be declared winner.
Hence, the instant petition.
RULING:
Both petitions are dismissed for lack of showing that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions in
question.
Whether the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s decision ordering the removal of Reyes from office
has attained finality despite the Sanggunian’s failure to personally serve a
copy of the order to him. – YES.
Whether the Sanggunian’s
decision ordering the removal of Reyes from office is a valid ground for his
disqualification in the May 1995 elections. – YES.
Reyes’ consistent refusal to receive a copy of the
Sanggunian’s decision in the administrative case against him may be construed
as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the
party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the
same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, enable a party to file
an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes
final. In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading,
notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with
receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.
In the case at bar, Reyes was given sufficient notice of the
decision. Although a TRO was issued by the RTC, no preliminary injunction was
subsequently issued. The TRO issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he
should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the
President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, § 67. But he did not do so.
Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon
him.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for
reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or
decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the
attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his
counsel's refusal to receive it.
The net result of all these instances of refusal to be
served a copy of the Sanggunian’s decision was that when the elections were
held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already
become final and executory.
The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not
prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action
of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the
principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the
proceeding.
Doctrine of condonation inapplicable
Reyes argued that because he was reelected, the
administrative charges against him were rendered moot and academic.
In Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that a public official
could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
In the Aguinaldo cases, before the petition questioning the
validity of the administrative decision removing Aguinaldo could be decided,
the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.
If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can
no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is
the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.
Furthermore, at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided,
the LGC was not yet in effect. At the time, there was no provision similar to §
40(b) of the LGC, which disqualifies any person from running for any elective
position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative
case. The LGC could not be given a retroactive effect.
But the doctrine of condonation is inapplicable in the
instant case. Here, although Reyes brought an action to question the decision
in the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed,
with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the
Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant
to § 40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
On Reyes’ contention
that he was not afforded due process by the Sanggunian
It appears that Reyes was given sufficient opportunity to
file his answer. In fact, he filed several motions and manifestations before
the Sanggunian for extension of time and even a motion to dismiss. He was also
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, but he failed to do so.
He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement
and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrayed the pattern of delay he
had employed to render the case against him moot by his election.
Whether Garcia may be
validly proclaimed as the winning mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato
Reyes. – NO.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute the Court’s judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.
Garcia’s plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated
is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in
the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as
stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast
for him.
It cannot also be said that COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. The fact is, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for
disqualification against a candidate even after the election and order the
suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
As such, there is no merit in the argument that the COMELEC
should have seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative
remedies by appealing the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and,
therefore, should have disqualified him before the elections.
SEPARATE OPINION
Padilla, J.,
concurring and dissenting
Concurs with the ponencia EXCEPT insofar as it reiterates
case law that where a first placer in an election is disqualified and cannot be
proclaimed, the second placer cannot likewise be declared elected and
proclaimed. Justice Padilla argues that, consistent with his opinion in Marcos
vs. Montejo (G.R. No. 119976), when a first placer is disqualified, the
qualified candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed. As
applied in the instant case, Garcia should have been proclaimed the elected
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro because he was the candidate with
qualifications for the office who received the highest number of votes (after
Renato Reyes was declared disqualified).