Ponente: Romero, J.
FACTS:
In March 1994, Dindo Rios, who was then the incumbent mayor
of the Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon, caused the disposition of
confiscated, assorted and sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces
without proper authority.
As such, he was charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
SEC. 3 Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x x x x x x x(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Before his arraignment, Rios filed a Motion to Quash
Information and Recall Warrant of Arrest on the ground that the information was
invalid as there was no probable cause to hold him liable.
In September 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP) filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, to which Rios filed an
Opposition, reiterating the same ground stated in his motion to quash.
Sandiganbayan: Overruled Rios. // SC: Affirmed Sandiganbayan.
In January 1997, Rios entered a plea of not guilty. At this
point, he was not any longer questioning the validity of the information
against him.
In March 1997, the Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of
Rios from office for 90 days counted from the receipt of such resolution.
Rios filed an MR but was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
RULING:
Whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the facts
charged in the Information constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019. – NO.
RIOS: The mere fact that he acted beyond the scope of
his authority by selling the confiscated lumber without the prior approval of
the DENR and without a resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan, does not
constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. What renders the
disposition of lumber contrary to law is any resulting undue injury which,
however, is absent in this case because the proceeds of the disposition went to
the coffers of the Municipal Government.
SC: The act complained of in this case is the
disposition by Rios of confiscated, assorted and sawn lumber consisting of 1,319
pieces without proper authority therefor, thus causing undue injury to the
Government.
The act of disposing of confiscated lumber without prior
authority from DENR and the Sangguniang Bayan constituted a violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. 3019. Therefore, there is probable cause to hold Rios liable for
such act, for which the information was validly filed.
Furthermore, the assertion that no undue injury was caused
because the proceeds of the disposition of confiscated lumber went to the
Municipal Government gratuitously assumes that the price at which the lumber
was disposed of was the reasonable market value thereof and that all the
proceeds were paid to the local government. The assertion is further based on
the wrong assumption that the lumber belonged to the municipality of which the
accused was mayor. It was the National Government, as distinguished from local
governments, that owned it, (Sec. 2(a), RA 3019) there being no evidence that
the National Government had disposed of the lumber in any manner.
Public office is a
public trust.
The SC noted that this case should serve as a reminder to
public officials of their crucial role in society and the trust lodged upon
them by the people.
Pursuant to this, any act or omission that is not in
consonance with the prescribed norms of conduct inflicts injury to the
Government, for the reason that it is a disturbance of law and order. This is
more so when, as in this case, the alleged offender (Rios) is the highest
officer in the Municipal Government, because he sets a reprehensible example to
his constituents.
Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to
guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government
service.
The good of the service and the degree of morality which
every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and
confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the
law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity
and efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account.
Whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the suspension of
Rios. – NO.
Whether the
Sandiganbayan erred when it ordered the suspension of Rios for 90 days. – YES.
IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 60 DAYS ONLY.
The suspension pendente lite meted out by the Sandiganbayan
is, without doubt, a proper and commensurate sanction against Rios.
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides that: “Any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.”
The aforequoted provision makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer who has been validly charged with a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property.
The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from
using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. This is based on the presumption
that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution
or commit further acts of malfeasance or both.
BUT...
...the Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90-day suspension
upon Rios for the single case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the
Local Government Code, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days.
SEC. 63 (b). Preventive suspension may be imposed at any
time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence;
Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local
elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further,
That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety
(90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known
at the time of the first suspension.