RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors
April 12, 2011
Ponente: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Timeline of events:
Ø
October 2, 2006: PGMA approved into law R.A. No.
9355, or An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
Ø
November 10, 2006: Herein petitioners, w ho were
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355. The said petition was dismissed on technical grounds.
Despite the initial dismissal of their petition, herein
petitioners filed another petition for certiorari. They alleged that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an
illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del
Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation
(IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a
population of only 106,951. This was in violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
and of Section 461 of the LGC, viz:
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. x x x (i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. x x x (b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Ø
December 3, 2006: The Comelec conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under
the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative votes.
Ø
January 26, 2007: The interim set of provincial
officials of the Province of Dinagat Islands appointed by PGMA took their oath
of office.
Ø
May 14, 2007: Registered voters of the Province
of Dinagat Islands elected their new set of provincial officials.
Ø
February 10, 2010: The SC issued a 2nd
resolution pertaining to the 2nd petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioners. The SC declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to
comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat
and the election of its officials as null and void. The SC's decision
likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch
as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
Ø
May 12, 2010: Prior to the June 2010 national
elections, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8790, which indicated that once
the SC’s 2nd resolution becomes final and executory before the June 2010
elections, then the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del
Norte will remain as two separate provinces. However, if the SC’s 2nd
resolution becomes final and executory after the national elections, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, which means the results of the
2010 election in Dinagat Islands shall be nullified.
Ø
June 18, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors, duly
elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the
nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010
Resolution of the Comelec is not reversed, filed before the SC a motion for
reconsideration of the SC's February 20, 2010 resolution. They averred
that: (1) the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3)
that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
Ø
July 20, 2010: The SC denied the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion
was before and not after the resolution of this case.
Ø
September 7, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing
previous SC rulings allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition
of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their
legal interest in this case was not yet existent. It was only after they were
elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte
that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
Ø
October 5, 2010: The SC issued an order for
Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and
executory on May 18, 2010.
Ø
October 29, 2010: Herein movants-intervenors
filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment..
RULING:
The provision
in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID. Herein petitioners’ petition to have R.A. No. 9355 declared
unconstitutional is therefore DISMISSED.
Whether herein
movants-intervenors have standing to intervene. – YES.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because
constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is
likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to
this interest in the constitutional question raised.
This case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had
nothing at stake in the outcome of this case.
Presently, though, it cannot be denied that movants-intervenors
will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently
shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all
be nullified and be put to naught.
Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should
not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest
in this case became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The
consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their disadvantage,
nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the dispute.
Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries
out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-intervenors be
heard on the merits of their cause.
The motion for intervention and the motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin
to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory
right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part
of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to
deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and
ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly
affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
The SC had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall
entries of judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
final. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the
movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely
affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties
thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of
the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units.
What are the criteria
in the creation of LGUs? Which is more important?
The central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria
prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed
to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom,
has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing
emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
The primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC as can be gleamed from the transcript of House deliberations on the crafting of the LGC.
From the LGC, it can be seen that with respect to the
creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
Whether the exemption
from the land area requirement in the creation of component cities and
municipalities consisting of more than one islands as expressed in the LGC is
similarly applicable in the creation of provinces made up of two or more
islands. – YES.
Whether the provision
in the IRR of the LGC exempting provinces with more than one islands from the
land area requirement is valid even though such exemption is absent in the LGC.
– YES.
When the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit
to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears no reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the
physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of
a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight
in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent.
This interpretation finds merit when the basic policy
considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy are considered.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum
land area requirements for prospective local government units should be
liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.
The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010
Decision (see Timeline in FACTS) could prove to be counter-productive, if not
outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of
islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and
442, respectively, of the LGC.
Yet, the province would be made to comply with
the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists
of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a
distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of
self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to
the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a
contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench
on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy
and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application
of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may
resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative
history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and
pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be
deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
HOW THE IRR OF THE LGC WAS FORMULATED
The LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee
consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments,
pursuant to Section 533[32] of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight
Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the
Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment
of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and countryside
development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to
be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and
cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This
accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government
units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442
and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities,
but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of
provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight
Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the
House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective
Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the
Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with
respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was
intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of
the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the
LGC-IRR.
FILLING IN THE GAP
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both
executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to
implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to
be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct
amendments to the LGC.
But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the
exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation
of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In
effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and
blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it
into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was
filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers
of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into
the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the
creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly
provided only in the LGC-IRR.
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by
way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is NOT conclusive in showing
that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement
of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and
capable of becoming a province.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of
the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker
is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within
the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
See digests of dissenting opinions HERE.