RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate
of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S.
BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE
ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands CONGRESSMAN
FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR.,
HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS,
and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors
April 12, 2011
DISSENTING OPINION
Carpio, J.
Key contentions:
Ø
The Dinagat Islands province simply does not
meet the criteria for the creation of a province. To implement the Constitution
and for reasons of political practicality and economic viability, Section 461
of the Local Government Code bars the creation of provinces unless two of three
minimum requirements are met, viz: average annual income of P20M, a contiguous
territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, and a population of not less
than 250,000 inhabitants.
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income
requirement and either the minimum land area or minimum population requirement.
In short, two of the three minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the
minimum income requirement one of the two. The Dinagat Islands province, whose income
at the time of its creation in 2006 was P82,696,433.22, satisfies only the minimum
income requirement. The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the
minimum land area requirement or the minimum population requirement.
Indisputably, Dinagat Islands cannot qualify as a province under Section 461 of
the Local Government Code, the law that governs the creation of provinces.
In re: Legislative Construction
The majority argues that since the exception of island
provinces from the minimum land area requirement was inserted in the
implementing rules by the congressional Oversight Committee, the Court should
extend great weight to this “legislative construction” of the Code. This is
gross error for two reasons.
First, congressional oversight committee has no power to
approve or disapprove the implementing rules of laws because the implementation
of laws is purely an executive function. Second, Congress has no power to
construe the law. Only the courts are vested with the power to construe the
law.
Congress may provide in the law itself a definition of terms
but it cannot define or construe the law through its Oversight Committee after
it has enacted the law because such power belongs to the courts.
On why Congress did not carve an exception to the land
area requirement in the creation of provinces under the LGC:
The province, as the largest political and corporate
subdivision of local governance in this country, serves as the geographic base
from which municipalities, cities and even another province will be carved,
fostering local development. The majority ruling, allowing the creation of an
island province irrespective of population and land area so long as it has P20
million annual income, wipes away the territorial and population tiering among
provinces, cities and municipalities the Local Government Code has carefully
structured, reducing provinces to the level of a rich municipality, unable to
host otherwise qualified new smaller local government units for sheer lack of
space.
Ø
It is mandatory that a province must have a
population of at least 250,000.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district. Thus, when Congress creates a
province it necessarily creates at the same time a legislative district. The
province must comply with the minimum population of 250,000 because the Constitution
mandates that 250,000 shall be the minimum population for the creation of
legislative districts.
Because the Province of Dinagat Islands only had 120,813
inhabitants in the year it became a province, in effect it became a premium district.
One vote in Dinagat Islands has the weight of more than two votes in Metro
Manila for the purpose of representation in the House of Representatives.
What special and compelling circumstances have the majority
found that entitle the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands to such a privileged
position? This is not what our “one person, one vote” representative democracy
is all about.
Ø
RA 9355
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands perpetuates political dynasties. It
fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by
assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds.
Under the majority’s ruling, not only land area but also
population is rendered immaterial in creating island provinces. This is an open
invitation to ruling political clans strategically situated in this country’s
thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of more underpopulated provinces
within their political bailiwicks, enabling them to capture more pork barrel
funds, thus tightening their grip on the levers of power. This inevitably fuels
the feudal practices plaguing Philippine local politics by fortifying patron
(congressman) — ward (constituents) relations upon which dynastic politics
thrive.
Ø
Population and land area – not income – are the
pivotal factors in funding local government units.
Under the Local Government Code, these components determine
75% of the share from the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each local government unit receives,
the lifeblood of their operations, based on the following formula:
Population – Fifty percent (50%)
Land Area – Twenty-five percent (25%)
Equal sharing – Twenty-five percent (25%)
Thus, population, with a weight of 50%, ranks first in
importance in determining the financial entitlement of local government units,
followed by land area with a weight of 25%.
By treating Dinagat Islands’ land area of 802.12 square
kilometers as compliant with the 2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section
461, the majority effectively included in their land area computation the
enclosed marine area or waters of Dinagat Islands. This disposition not only
reverses, without cause, decades’ old jurisprudence, it also wreaks havoc on
the national government’s allocation of the internal revenue allotment to
existing island provinces which would be justified in invoking today’s ruling
to clamor for increased revenue shares due to increased land area. In short,
other island provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan,
can now claim their enclosed marine areas as part of their land area in
computing their share of the IRA.
In its zeal to legalize the creation of an obviously
disqualified local government unit, the majority unwittingly creates classes of
elite and disadvantaged provinces, using the most arbitrary factor of
geographic accident as basis for classification. Even under the most benign
equal protection analysis, this does not pass constitutional muster.
Ø
The
Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for courts to
reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as
encoded in their provisions. Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of
their sworn duties when they second guess the intent of the Constitution’s
framers and the people’s elected representatives, pretending to act as if they
themselves have been accorded electoral mandate to amend statutes as they see
fit.
DISSENTING OPINION
Brion, J.
Key contentions:
The majority ruling disregarded procedural rules that the
Court itself had created. Herein respondents’ motion was effectively a third
motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading.
The Court’s Decision of February 10, 2010 became final and
executory, and Entry of Judgment was made by the Clerk of Court on May 18,
2010. At that point, the Decision of the Court should have been beyond recall.
Violations of the majority ruling:
Ø
Violation
of the Rule on Reconsideration
By a 9-6 vote, the Court declared the entry of judgment lifted.
In so doing, it completely disregarded its own rule that any 2nd motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained through a vote of 2/3 of the actual
membership, or of 10 members, of the Court. It likewise disregarded the rule
that a second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the
ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Court’s declaration.
It conveniently forgot, too, when it subsequently claimed
that the motion it was considering was not by respondent Governor Ecleo but by
the would-be intervenors, that what an original party could no longer do with
respect to a final decision, would-be intervenors – practically representing
the same interests and who had not even been recognized by this Court – cannot
also do; otherwise, what is directly prohibited is allowed through indirect
means. Unbelievably, among the majority’s supporting arguments to support their
violation, was that (1) a motion to lift entry of final judgment is not a
motion for reconsideration of the decision sought to be declared non-final; and
that (2) no exact provision of the Internal Rules covers the lifting of an
entered final judgment.
Ø
Violation
of the Rule on Finality of Judgments
Worse than the above transgression, the Court turned a blind
eye to the finality of the judgment it had reached in the case.
Ø
Violation
on the Rule of Intervention
The Court disregarded as well the rule on interventions. The
motion for intervention was initially denied since the Court’s decision was
already final, and intervention could no longer be allowed. To go around this
rule, the would-be intervenors, without first successfully securing leave to
intervene, instead filed its own motion to lift entry of judgment – the same
2nd motion from the original respondents that the Court previously simply noted
without action. The Court granted the motion to lift judgment by a 9-6 vote,
under the fiction that it was an intervening party, not the barred original
respondents, who had asked for it.
To complete this blow-by-blow account, the respondents’
legal tactician used the ploy of first reopening the case (initially through
the original respondents, and subsequently solely through the would-be
intervenors), and thereafter moved to allow intervention since the original
respondents had by then exhausted their arguments for the constitutionality of
RA 9355.
On two previous attempts, the original respondents had failed. To get
around the insurmountable block posed by the rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration,
they fell back on their modified Resolution with the position that another
party – the would-be intervenors – wanted to lift the entry of judgment. Once
the entry of judgment was lifted and intervention was allowed, it was an easy
step to reopen the arguments, add to what the original respondents presented,
and submit the case for a ruling on the merits. The same magic numbers of
course prevailed all throughout: 9 to 6.
In this manner, the original and final ruling of the Court,
in what is commonly known as the “Dinagat case” was reversed. Unlike the case
of Lazarus who rose from the dead through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected
because the Court disregarded its own rules and established jurisprudential
principles. Of course, it can similarly be called a miracle as no reversal
could have taken place if just one of the series of transgressions pointed out
did not take place. How such resurrection can happen in the Supreme Court is a
continuing source of wonder!
* * *
DISSENTING OPINION
Peralta, J.
Key contentions:
Ø
In case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing
the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Contrary to the contention of the movants-intervenors,
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which exempts a proposed province from the land area requirement if it is
composed of one or more islands, cannot be deemed incorporated in R.A. No.
9355, because rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions
of the basic law.
Ø
Where the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
but only for application.
Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the
requisites for the creation of a province, specifically states the requirement of
a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers.
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement
of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000
square kilometers are distinct and
separate requirements for land area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and
Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
The exemption (i.e., territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province) pertains only to the
requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement
of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province
comprising two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere is it expressly
stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of two or more
islands or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or
cities, such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 square kilometers.
Ø
The
general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative
fact is inapplicable. The contention of the intervenors that since the Province
of Dinagat Islands has been organized and is functioning as a province anyway does
not hold water. A violation or non-observance of a law shall not be excused by disuse
or custom or practice to the contrary. Furthermore, when the courts declare a
law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Ø
The
majority’s ruling that the exemption to the land area requirement for component
cities and municipalities should also apply to provinces does not deserve even
scant merit. The Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, so 19
years have lapsed since its enactment. If the Legislature committed the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 as alleged by Justice Nachura, it
would have amended Section 461, which is a function of Congress.
Substantial oversights in the basic law, particularly as alleged with
respect to Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, cannot be corrected in the
implementing rules thereof, as it is settled rule that the implementing rules
of the basic law cannot go beyond the scope of the basic law.
Ø
In the
creation of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State, the requirements
provided by the Local Government Code must also be complied with, which R.A.
No. 9355 failed to do.
Based on the criteria for the creation of a province
provided for in Section 461 of the Local Government, the Court found that R.A.
No. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands failed to comply with the
population or territorial requirement; hence, R.A. No. 9355 was declared
unconstitutional.
Ø
The motion
for reconsideration filed by movants-intervenors on the denial of the motion
for intervention should have been denied since to grant the same would be
tantamount to reopening a case which is already final. Worse, movants-intervenors
are not even original parties to the present case and therefore are not in a
position to file a motion to recall a judgment which is already final and
executory.
No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. When a final judgment is
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
must become final at some definite point in time.
See the full case digest of the majority decision HERE.
See the full case digest of the majority decision HERE.